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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the development of ^  independent 
dental profession in the first half of 20th century Britain. First, 
the relevant sociological literature is reviewed and the framework 
of the empirical study that forms the core of the thesis is spelled 
out. Then the campaign for the prohibition of unregistered practice 
of dentistry which culminated in the passing of the Dentists Act,
1921 is analysed. The organisation of oral care services at the 
end of the 19th century is sketched out and the efforts of dental 
practitioners to form viable and credible professional associations, 
to change their legal status and to expand and stabilise the market 
for their services are described.
The second half of the thesis is devoted to the 
I92I-I956 period which ended with the adoption of the Dentists Act,
1956 which gave dentists self-regulatory powers. This Act forms the 
framework within which dentistry is practised in Britain today.
The main issue under scrutiny in this period is how dental practitioners 
endeavoured to protect the occupational monopoly granted to them in 
1921. As with the study of the pre-1921 period, three areas of 
concern - professional organisation, legislative action and the control 
of the market for dentists* services - provide the framework of the 
analysis. Successive chapters are devoted to the long and difficult 
process of achieving unity of organisation among dentists; to the 
numerous attempts to amend the Dentists Act, 1921 to strengthen the 
profession*s control of its area of work; and to the profession*s 
struggle against attempts by the state and others to modify the 
system of providing oral care services, particularly by introducing 
new categories of dental personnel.
A concluding chapter examines the issues of why 
dentists chose to engage in the pursuit of professional status and 
why their collective occupational strategies were on the whole 
successful.
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INTRODUCTION
The words "profession", "professionalism", 
"professionalisation", even "deprofessionalisation" now belong 
to everyday vocabulary. Yet, it is difficult to find generally 
accepted definitions of these words, though people usually refer 
to professionals as experts and accept, implicitly at least, the 
claim of professional organisations that they are the best 
protection against charlatanism and incompetence.
Sociologists themselves have given the word 
"profession" many different meanings with the result, for example, 
that the numerous statements made in the last two or three decades 
about the importance of the role of professionalism in the development 
of industrial societies, about its impact on people's life, and 
about its future are both confusing and difficult to assess (1).
Part of this confusion stemmed from attempts by sociologists until 
the mid 1960*s to define professions as a category of occupations 
with specific and distinctive qualities, everyone in the end coming 
out with a different definition. It is now generally agreed that in 
their search for a definition of what is a "profession" sociologists 
must first analyse the socio-political processes that lead to a 
division of labour in which some occupations have gained control 
over their own activities gad that of other occupations in the 
same area of work.
In recent years, the claim made by many occupational 
groups that professionalism is the only proper work structure through 
which their services can be safely and competently provided has been
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increasingly disputed. To many, the professionalisation of such 
activities as healing, teaching or helping the poor, has increased 
the dependence of individuals on experts to an extent that 
professionalism csin be said to have a 'disabling effect' (2). 
Moreover, whether professionalism as a form of occupational control 
is beneficial to the consumers of professional services and to 
society as a whole, is disputable; but the fact that it is now 
a matter for discussion is not unconnected with recent developments 
in the sociology of professions which I will review later.
At this point, I wish to suggest that professionalism 
can be seen, for analytical purposes, both as a structural feature of 
the division of labour and as an ideology. Such an approach enables 
us to encompass, on the one hand,occupations which have gained control 
over an area of activity and its related institutions and, on the 
other, occupations which claim such control and have developed an 
ideology and a set of strategies to further their claim. I also 
suggest that professionalism can be best understood by considering 
areas of work - like health care, social services, administration 
and law - rather than single occupations- No field of activity is 
free from inter-occupational tensions and these have a significant 
influence on the division of labour in any area of production of 
goods and services.
The medical division of labour, for example, is 
not dictated by medicine alone, even if this occupation can be said 
to be in the dominant position of controlling other occupations 
and not being controlled by anyone. Paramedical groups, like nurses, 
medical technicians, radiographers, physiotherapists, chiropodists, 
opticians and 'extra-medical' occupations like osteopaths or
- 7 -
chiropractors, all strive for more autonomy, greater social 
recognition and more control over their own work; almost 
continuously, they challenge medicine's status and attempt to 
renegotiate the medical division of labour. To understand 
the present work structure in medicine and its development, 
one has to consider the history of inter - and intra - 
occupational relationships in the field of health care. In 
addition, factors like trade union pressures, state intervention 
and technological developments also play a role in the repartition 
of tasks between occupations in medicine. The analytical task of 
accounting for the medical work structure remains a gigantic and 
a long term one to which the analysis of the role of professionalism 
in the division of labour can contribute.
In this thesis, I will examine one field of activity, 
that of dental health care. I wish to account for the formation of 
an occupational monopoly in dentistry in the first two decades of 
the century in Britain and for the subsequent development of a 
differentiated occupational structure in which there are now five 
occupational groups: dentists, dental surgery assistants, dental
hygienists, dental therapists and dental technicians.
Dentistry was chosen as a case study for a number 
of practical reasons. The first is that it is an area of work 
which is limited in scope and which has well defined boundaries; 
thus it is possible for one student to examine the field in its 
entirety, which would be unthinkable, for instance, for medicine. 
Another reason is that the considerable amount of political activity
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by dental pressure groups before the closure of dentistry in 
1921 by Ein Act of Parliament (3) produced much written material 
which was available to me. Yet another reason for my choice of 
dentistry, is that dental occupations have been much understudied, 
as most health occupations other than medicine and nursing have 
been until very recently. To me this apparent lack of interest 
was not justified, in view of the importance of dentistry in 
terms of the manpower it absorbs and the expenditure on it and 
for the health of the people.
My interest in dentistry was particularly prompted 
by my dissatisfaction with the impression conveyed by many nedical 
sociologists unfamiliar with the field that dentistry is only a 
branch of medicine and that what is known about medicine equally 
applies to dentistry. The sociological literature on dentistry • 
shows that this view is a rather simplistic one (4); in countries 
like the United States, France and Canada where dentistry developed 
in an autonomous manner, it constitutes a specific occupational 
field with its own culture, traditions, social structure and 
institutions, very different from that of medicine. Dentists 
differ from doctors as to their social origins, work expectations, 
and attitudes to health care, the organisation of health services 
and their profession, differences which, in my view, are worth 
studying.Although I will limit ray analysis to dentistry in Britain, 
I will make as many cross-national comparisons as possible to 
pinpoint its specific historical features.
In the first part of the thesis, I propose to 
examine the recent literature on the professions,especially that
—  ^  —
dealing with health occupations. I want to contrast, in a 
critical manner, the alternative explanations for the emergence 
and development of professionalism in order to single out those 
interpretations which seem best supported by historical evidence 
and which can be useful in the historical study of dentistry. In 
reviewing the literature, my aim is to locate ray own theoretical 
stance which focuses on one major variable, "collective occupational 
strategies". I will also spell out the advantages and limits of 
such an approach.
In the second part, I shall try to account for 
the closure of dentistry in Britain by tho Dentists Act, 1921,
After a brief description of dentistry at the end of the last 
century, I will analyse in more details the twenty years preceding 
the Dentists Act. Three sets of collective strategies will be • 
analysed: 1) those connected with the development of viable and
credible professional associations of registered and unregistered 
dental practitioners to promote their common interest (5)» 2) those
aimed at gaining formal recognition and state support through 
legislation; 3) finally, those related to the expansion and to 
the stabilisation of the market for dental service.
Although it was a most important development in 
the history of British dentistry, the restriction of practice by 
legislation to registered persons did not automatically secure 
for those dentists a protected market, a higher social status or 
complete independence. The professional territory theoretically 
secured by the 1921 Act still had to be strengthened and to be
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defended if dentists were to have the effective control of 
dental care services. Most occupational strategies developed 
by associations of dental practitioners after 1921 had this 
object. In the third part of the thesis, therefore, I will 
examine some of the collective actions of dental practitioners 
between 1921 and the mid-fifties when fresh dental legislation 
was passed (6). One of the main features of British dentistry 
in the early 1920*s was the division of practitioners in three 
groups; the qualified dentists who were organised, the 
unqualified recently registered who were also organised, and a 
substantial number of quauLified and unqualified dentists, 
representing aoout half of the register, who were not affiliated 
to a professional association. Relationships between dental 
associations were tense and the apathy of the unorganised 
seemed unshakeable. Even if all agreed, implicitly at least, 
that a divided dental profession was a weak one, attempts to 
unite dentists remained fruitless for nearly thirty years. To 
this day, internal struggle has remained one of the permanent 
traits of British dentistry. The first chapter of this section 
will deal with the attempts and failures to unify the profession 
end with the impact of internal divisions and conflicts on the 
development of the dental rare system.
In another chapter devoted to dental legislation 
after 1921, I show that it has been a constant preoccupation of 
associations of dentists to protect their interests by means of 
legislative measures and government regulations. The 1921 Act was 
amended in 1923 (7) and 1927 (8) and almost every year new proposals
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were brought up to further amend it, until 1951 when a new Dental 
Bill was introduced in the House of Commons; it took five years of 
discussion and negotiation before it reached the Statute Book.
In 1942-44, the whole situation of dental services was reviewed 
by a Departmental Committee (Teviot Committee) and in 1956, the 
more specific question of the recruitment of dentists was 
examined by another Committee (McNair Committee). On each 
occasion, dental societies pressed the state to modify the 
conditions of practice of dentistry in their favour.
As in the second part, a good deal of attention will 
be paid in Part I H  to the waiket situation in dentistry. First,
I will describe the economic aspects of dental practice, especially 
the conditions of practice under the National Health Insurance 
legislation and, after 1948, under the National Health Service. Then 
I will deal specifically with the issue of operative ancillary 
personnel; I will discuss dentists* strategies to exclude some types 
of ancillary workers altogether from the dental system, on the one hand, 
and to subordinate some others, on the other. In British dentistry, 
the control of the division of labour has been an issue since the 
mid 1910*s and still is one nowadays. It is worth studying it 
as, in particular, it enables us to see how the ideology of 
professionalism is translated into strategies and actions.
Attitudes and actions towards ancillary manpower are best 
understood in connection with the analysis of the market for 
dental services, the control of which is what professionalism is 
about after all. The medical and dental work structures are 
determined not only by scientific or technical developments.
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which certainly play some part in the process of the division 
of labour, but mostly by social, political and economic factors, 
internal and external to medicine and dentistry.
In the fourth and concluding section of the 
thesis, I will first examine the conditions which led British 
dentists to form occupational pressure groups and maintain their 
support of them over several decades. Then I will study some of 
the factors that enabled dentail organisations to achieve most of 
their professional goals. Finally, I shall tiy to establish what 
role professional organisations played in the shaping of dental 
services in Britain and also evaluate the usefulness of the 
approach developed in this thesis for understanding and explaining 
more generally the division of work between occupations in fields 
of activity where professionalism is present.
Two main documentary sources have been used to 
substantiate my analysis: the records and documentation, published
and unpublished, of the dental associations themselves and public 
records. These sources include professional journals, news-letters, 
memoranda, minutes of meetings, registers, lists of members; also 
public reports and papers, unpublished material, correspondence 
and other documents available in the Public Record Office ; and 
legislation relating to dentistry and the Parliamentary debates 
and questions recorded in Hansard. In addition to reviewing 
documentary material, I have consulted informants familiar with 
the subject to check both the reliability and the comprehensiveness 
of my information. Secondary sources dealing with health services 
in general have also been used; my main concern, however, has been
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to rely on firsthand data, whenever available, and to provide 
as accurate and objective an account of the development of 
dental care services in Britain as possible.
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PART I; THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONALISM
Before analysing the evolution of British 
dentistry as an area of occupational interaction, I will 
first review the recent sociological literature on 
professionalism. In doing so, I want both to locate my own 
approach, and to draw from the knowledge available whatever 
facts and ideas can usefully increase my understanding of 
the formation and development of the dental profession in 
Britain along the specific lines it took. This review will 
also allow me to introduce ray own theoretical frsunework, 
justify it and point out its limitations.
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CHAPTER I: THE LITERATURE ON PROFESSIONS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The rise of some occupations to the status of profession 
has been widely investigated by sociologists since Talcott Parsons 
published, forty years ago, an essay on 'the Professions and Social 
Structure* (l) which was to influence so many students of the professions. 
Until recently, many writers have tried to find explanations for the 
professional phenomenon in the characteristics of the professional 
groups themselves. In so doing, they have either searched for certain 
distinctive 'traits* or attributes which professions were held to 
possess (2) or asked whether they had gone through the successive steps 
of some linear process of professionalisation (3). Other authors tried 
to combine the two approaches, arguing that 'all occupations can be 
placed on a continuum ranging from the non-professions on one end to 
the established professions on the other* (4): the process of
professionalisation, then, was seen as one by which an occupation 
moved on such a continuum towards the status of 'established profession*. 
From such an approach are derived terms such as 'semi-professions', 'sub­
professions*, 'would-be professions', (3), etc.
These approaches have been often criticized during the 
last decade, mainly for their failure to distinguish the professions' 
ideological statements from their real qualities, and for taking for 
granted the professions' self definitions (6)» A more ciitical approach 
developed from 1970 onwards, following the publication of 
Eliot Freidson's major essays on the medical profession (7)- A 
profession, from Freidson's point of view, should be studied in the 
context of the occupational structure in which it is located; it
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cannot be isolated from its social context. To him a profession's 
main characteristic is autonomy over its work and control over 
related occupations through a legal monopoly over a set of 
activities. Consistent with this view is T. Johnson's; he defines 
professionalism as one type of institutionalised form of control of 
the tension existing in the consumer - producer relationship whereby 
'the producer defines the needs of the consumer and the manner in 
which these needs are catered for' (8). He further argues that 
'professionalism then becomes redefined as a peculiar type of 
occupational control rather than an expression of the inherent 
nature of a particular occupation. A profession is not, then, an 
occupation but a means of controlling an occupation' (9). Seen in
this perspective, professionalism can be said to produce a typical
division of labour based on the control by some occupation of the 
activities and members of others. Hence, the division of labour is 
not the mere result of a natural or neutral process stemming from the 
development of knowledge and technology. It is socially produced 
through the transactions of groups with specific interests and power 
resources (10).
This view implies that a good deal of attention should
be paid to the strategies put forward by the professional group to
attain, and thereafter maintain, an occupational control over its 
work and that of related occupations. Many writers have stressed the 
importance of studying professional strategies to understand 
professionalism (11), but the literature is still not very extensive 
on this topic. Recent works have been devoted to the acquisition by 
a group of an occupational monopoly, but very little attention has yet 
been paid to the issue of the maintenance of control over a set of
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activities once that monopoly has been acquired.
In this review, I will restrict the discussion to 
works which focus on the social and political processes through 
which professional status is achieved and maintained (12). I will 
concentrate mainly on those writers who deal more particularly with 
health-related occupations, a sector of the division of labour where 
professionalism has played so crucial a role for more than a century. 
More specifically, I will be concerned with the problems of accounting 
for the respective position of different occupations in the medical 
division of labour and of assessing the role of variables like an 
occupation's cognitive base, its political power, collective 
strategies, social origins of members, state intervention or external 
patronage, in the creation of a hierarchichal structure of occupations 
in health services.
PROFESSIONALISM AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR; TWO APPROACHES
The new perspective on the professions inaugurated 
by Freidson commands a definition of the division of labour which 
stresses the importance of the power relationships between occupations 
in a field of activities. Among those 'critical students of the 
professions', one can broadly distinguish those whose theoretical 
stance stems from a Weberian tradition in that it emphasises 
occupational group interaction as structuring the division of labour, 
and marxist writers (I use the word marxist in a very broad sense here) 
who rather emphasize class interaction as thé main veiriable in this 
process.
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£• Freidson's arguments provide a good illustration 
of the first approach. In The Profession of Medicine, he holds that 
the main characteristic of the division of labour in the field of 
health - related activities, is that it is arranged in a hierarchy 
_•ordered by the politically supported dominant profession* (13)t 
medicine. Medicine is called * dominant * because *it has the 
authority to direct and evaluate the work of others without in turn 
being subject to formal direction and evaluation by them* (l4).
The work structure it dominates is organised along 
the 'occupational principle' rather than by the 'administrative 
principle* as in most other fields. The authority of expertise, 
politically supported, is substituted for the authority of administrative 
office (13). Elsewhere, Freidson describes the structuring of this 
network of relationships between occupations as 'a process of social 
interaction in the course of which the participants are continuously 
engaged in attempting to define, establish, maintain and renew the 
tasks they perform and the relationships with others their tasks 
presuppose* (l6).
If the health field is a hierarchy dominated by 
medicine, how can we account for the origins of professional power 
and dominance and for the fact that 'a particular kind of work - 
practice of the tasks of healing for example - can be organised as a 
profession at one point in history and not at another, auid in one nation and 
not another'? (17) Freidson, for one, considers class analysis too 
gross to answer these questions; rather,he argues that 'to understand 
better the division of labour and the institutions of production and
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to understand the crucial differences among occupations.•• 
requires instead an emphasis on the degree to which (the 
professions) as occupations rather than classes, have gained 
the organised power to control themselves the terms, conditions 
and content of their work in the settings where they perform 
their work* (l8).
Berlant also reflects that view when he applies 
Weber's theory of monopolization to the study of medicine in the 
United States and Great Britain (19). He suggests that the 
concept of a 'constellation of interests' provides a useful tool 
to explain the position of medicine. He adopts Weber's view 
'that social institutions are rarely if ever the product of any 
single group's interests but are usually the product of interaction 
among multiple social groups pursuing their interests. Institutions, 
then, persist because of the compromise of interests which powerful 
groups arrive at and seek to maintain on a tenuous basis' (20). 
Monopolization is achieved through the coincidence of interests 
of the professionalising group and those of powerful social 
groups whose support is necessary.
Parry and Parry (21) also implicitly agree when 
they examine the strategies of 'social closure* used by medical 
doctors in Englscid. The Weberian definition of the professional 
division of labour as 'negotiated* can also be found in Kronus's 
(22), Eitzer's (23) and Klegon's (24) works.
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Until recently marxist analysts did not pay 
much attention to the professions on the grounds that there 
is no such thing as a 'professional* division of labour 
distinct from the general capitalist division of labour.
Recent marxist writings, however, suggest that if there is 
such a professional division of labour, its sources must be 
sought in the requirements of capitalism itself.
C. Brown writes that 'unlike traditional 
craft industries (such as construction) whose unions are 
independent )f one another, the crafts and professions of 
health services are hierarchically ordered and controlled* (23). 
She chooses to explain this phenomenon in terms of the process 
of economic exploitation that characterises the capitalist mode 
of production; 'that the specialized occupations are controlled 
by superior occupations and that occupations compete with each 
other are both due to the profit-based economic system, in 
which one's benefit depends on another's loss' (26).
More recently, Johnson, repudiating his earlier 
essay on Professions and Power stated that professionalism cannot 
be understood outside an ac.equate theory of class relations. He 
argued that professionalise; can arise as a form of control, only 
if it meets the requirements of capital in the process of 
reproduction (27).
Similarly, McKinlay writes that the explanation 
of the position of an occupation in the health structure, in the 
U.S.A. at least, should be sought outside the health system
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itself because 'the primary structural exigency of the medical- 
industrial complex in the United States is the realization of 
an acceptable level of profit not the delivery of medical care 
in the public interest' (28). Furtheraore*...under capitalism, 
the explanation for the special position of physiciems is to 
be found in their productivity not in their effectiveness or 
social usefulness' (29). His view of medicine in a class 
perspective is shared by Navarro in many essays; he states 
that in order to understand 'the behavior and dynamics of 
the actors in the health sector, we have to understand their 
positions within the overall economic and political scheme 
of our societies, i.e., their class positions' (30).
Krause in his book. Power and Illness; The 
Political Sociology of Health and Medicine Care, after 
categorising the 'health-worker groups' in five types 
hierarchically organised, says that 'in power terms, the 
relationship between the physician group and each of these 
other groups needs to be understood in licensure terms (who 
has the responsability for whose work) ; in every day power 
terms (including attempts to change power relations); in terms 
of recruitment pathways, as these relate to the group's ability 
to further their position in the hierarchy; and most important 
of all, in terras of ownership and control of the means of health 
service production' (31).
A last illustration of this approach is found 
in Larson's analysis of the rise of professionalism (32) which I 
discuss later.
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By and large, the two approaches reviewed here 
essentially define the division of labour in health as a 
hierarchy dominated by medicine, but they differ when they 
come to explain the origins of medicine's power. I now turn 
to some works which deal, specifically with this issue of the 
emergence of professions.
HOW PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE IS ACHIEVED?
The process of achieving professional dominance, 
whether one uses the term to refer to the position of an 
occupation in the division of labour (Freidson) or to its 
control of the labour market (Larson), involves interrelations - 
that can be labelled 'political' - between the professionalising 
occupation and other social groups, such as competing occupations, 
the potential clientele or the state. What we need to explain 
is why and how, historically, an occupation has achieved control 
over its own work and over the work of others in a given area 
of production. C. Kronus puts the question the following way: 
•What is the basis of occupational power? What resources - 
economic, political or social - are crucial in the attempt to 
win control over personnel, tasks and training? How are these 
resources amassed, negotiated for, or won? What roles do other 
political and social institutions, such as government, employers, 
clients, play in the battle for occupational dominance?' (33)•
I have already argued that the answers to these 
questions must not be sought only in the professions' qualities.
- 23 -
They are to be found in the sociological analysis of the 
history of the professions, which is only in its beginnings.
I now review some works analysing the origins of professional 
dominance, in health in particular.
GILB ON PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT
Writing about the relationships between 
professions and government in the United States, Corinne Gilb 
(34), a political scientist, argues that a profession derives 
its power mainly from 1) its ability to form a strong and 
cohesive group and from 2) external sanctions of educational 
institutions and government. In short, she maintains that the 
professions, up to the mid-nineteenth century, realised by 
experience that to gain recognition they needed the public's 
confidence and respect. This meant 'there had to be better 
screening at the outset and some method of disciplining, when 
necesscury, those who were already members of the group' (35)- 
Finding that they could not accomplish such aims by themselves 
•they turned to state action, willingly, not reluctantly, 
because they could not control purely through private sanctions 
either their own members - working independently for fees or 
for many scattered employers - or their rivals and competitors 
who were equally dispersed. It was they who sought to have 
licensing laws and examining boards - laws that they drafted 
and boards whose members they helped to select and whose work 
they scrutinized' (36).
—  24 —
But before having any hope of being sanctioned 
by the state, a profession had first to create group 
solidarity and to develop ethics of non-competition among 
its members. Gilb suggests that the professional associations* 
activities in organising weekly or monthly meetings, in 
maintaining club quarters or in holding large regional or 
national conventions, on the one hand, and in providing 
'welfare* services to their members (insurance, legal advice, 
group travel plans, etc.), on the other,created a vocational 
community with which members could easily identify. Second, 
a profession had to gain, at least in a minimal way, the 
public's confidence through 'public relations' activities.
If a profession was successful in improving its 'imsige', it 
could turn to the state and press for its support, this 
depending, in turn, as Eckstein states, on the association's 
capacity to influence the state's decision-making structure (37).
This political analysis of professional power 
is interesting in two ways: first,it throws light on some
basic prerequisites in the process of gaining professional 
power, such as creating.cohesion in the occupation and gaining 
public confidence, and second, it points to the professions' 
search for ;?tate support as a conscious strategy. On the 
other hand, it does not take into account socio-economic factors 
of prime importance like the kind of product or service offered 
by an occupation, the economic situation, the social origins of 
members or the ideological climate of the society at the time when 
. professionalisation is attempted.
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FREIDSON ON PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE
Freidson*s comments on professional dominance 
are well known: he, too, argues that the process of
professionalisation is political in so far as *it is the 
power of government which grants the profession the exclusive 
right to use or evaluate a certain body of knowledge and skill. 
(...) It is in that sense that the professions are intimately 
connected with formal political process* (58). A profession 
does not gain autonomy and authority over a field of work 
•naturally* because of some intrinsic qualities or attributes, 
like formal training institutions or a code of ethics (39)» 
Rather,*a profession attains and maintains its position by 
virtue of the protection and patronage of some elite segment 
of society which has been persuaded that there is some special 
value in its work. Its position is thus secured by the political 
and economic influence of the elite which sponsors it - an 
influence that drives competing occupations out of the same 
area of work, that discourages others by virtue of the 
competitive advantages conferred on the chosen occupation, and 
that requires still others to be subordinated to the profession* 
(40).
In the case of medicine, and other *consulting* 
professions, in contrast to scholarly or learned scientific 
professions, monopoly could not be gained solely by the 
conjunction of professional association and state support, for, 
in addition, *consulting professions have to take the test of 
practical problem solving applied by their clientele* (4l).
—  2.6 —
As there were msuiy groups claiming to offer the service of 
healing, medicine had first to establish its public identity 
and its visibility and, then, to try to have itself designated 
as the legitimate group of experts by the state, and in that, 
it needed the elite’s support. The same is true of dentistry 
where persons trained as dentists always had to compete with 
many kinds of alternative healers, especially in the domain 
of extractions and artificial dentures.
The recognition of one group as the legitimate 
holder of a virtual monopoly of the provision of medical 
services created the conditions for the formation of a work 
structure in which new health occupations would develop as 
subordinate to medicine. Freidson argues that paramedical 
occupations - he discusses mainly the case of nursing, but 
his argument applies to all paramedical groups - have 
difficulty in attaining a more independent position because 
they gain their legitimacy from their association with medicine 
which already controls the task of healing and its related 
institutions. Thus, ’to attain the autonomy of a profession, 
the paramedical occupation must control a fairly discrete 
area of work that can be separated from the main body of 
medicine and that can be practised without routine contact 
with or dependence on medicine* (42)
Few occupations have achieved that and even 
fewer seem in a position to achieve autonomy. Dentists, for 
example, have dealt with dental care in an independent way
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for more than a century now, largely because dental health 
was not perceived as a matter for concern either by the 
potential users or by doctors; moreover,dental services 
had long been identified as a commercisil service, as the 
provision of artificial teeth, and doctors did not 
consider the practice of dentistry as "professional". By 
the turn of the century, dentists were developing a body 
of knowledge and techniques of their own and after a long 
political struggle they succeeded in obtaining the closure 
of their area of work. The result was that, from a comparatively 
early period, dental services have been provided through 
institutions and through an occupational structure separate 
from medicine and largely controlled by dentists.
There have been other occupations in a not 
dissimilar position. Chiropodists, and to a lesser extent, 
opticians, though in a more limited manner than dentists, 
have also developed as comparatively autonomous paramedical 
occupations. Pharmacists in some countries, like Canada for 
example, have pressed very hard for the right to interpret 
doctor’s prescriptions and to make substitutions within 
certain limits. If they succeed in obtaining such rights, 
this will constitute an erosion of the doctors’ right to 
prescribe which would have been unthinkable one or two decades 
ago. However, few other groups seem to be in a position to 
become autonomous,though some, like nurses, may enlarge their 
area of responsibilityi It is unlikely however,that in the 
short terra they will cease to be subordinate to medicine.
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KRONUS ON THE EVOLUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL POWER
In a study of the relationship between medicine 
and pharmacy in England and America, C. Kronus analysed the 
evolution of occupational power using an "open systems" analytical 
framework. Both occupations are studied within the context of 
their relationships to legislatures, neighbouring occupations, 
employers and clients. She summarised the rationale of her 
argument thus: ’assuming that the goal of the system is to
survive, each system must successfully negotiate with other 
systems to attract input resources (money, manpower, information, 
raw materials) and ’sell* its products and services (output) to 
others, such as employers or clients (...). In order to establish 
or continue selling this output to others, the occupational system 
must prevent other units from duplicating its output by carrying 
out the same operating activities. Hence, one of the most 
important activities of an occupation is to build and maintain 
boundaries around its operating activities or tasks’ (43)- In 
other words, to amass occupational power is a system goal for an 
occupation.
Such a goal is more likely to be achieved by 
those groups with access to formal education, and whose size 
(number of members) and products or services coincide 
with the market’s requirements, that is with the requirements of 
a clientele. Kronus further argued that there appeared to be a 
pattern of how occupations used their resources to establish or 
defend their territory: ’the common strategy was to appeal to
the government (...) to divert its dominant resource of legal
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authority to delegate licensing authority to the occupational 
association and / or drive out poachers (the unlicensed) with 
fines and imprisonnment* (44). This strategy was more likely 
to be successful if the occupation already had a powerful 
clientele convinced of its usefulness and expertise.
Finally, she noted that although ’conscious 
actions’ of the professionalising associations appeared to 
be necessary to the process of gaining occupational power, they 
were not sufficient. First, to become powerful a group needed 
certain resources, of which a solid client base is most important; 
it then had to develop political strategies to secure formel 
recognition of its territory.
BERLANT ON MONOPOLIZATION
Assuming that it is important to look at the 
political and economic prerequisites of the success of groups 
in society, Berlant suggests that Weber’s theories of economic 
action and monopolization offer satisfactory conceptual tools to 
understand how medicine’s monopoly has been institutionalised.
Groups engage in economic action in order to 
acquire the scarcities necessary to satisfy their needs; these 
scarcities include human,financial resources as well as the 
social relationships necessary to pursuing satisfaction. Whether 
a group is motivated by the pursuit of self-interest (expediency) 
or by the avoidance of negative sanctions (legitimacy), it tends 
to come into conflict with other groups. It may engage in violent
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conflict (when there is use of force) or in peaceful conflict 
(that is in competition). Conditions of conflict may require 
that groups alter their qualities to increase their chances of 
success, either by expsmding or restricting their membership.
Monopolization is a tactic for restricting the 
number of competitors and it can be achieved in different ways; 
but ’apparently, the most efficacious means of closure is for 
the associational group to persuade the legitimate agents of 
force within a political community to recognize and enforce the 
group’s monopolistic claims’ (43). A group which is successful 
in obtaining the legal right to hold a monopoly is, then, called 
a ’legally privileged group’.
The success of a group depends on 1) the group’s 
tactics of competition, and 2) the conditions of competition,one 
of which is the role of the state: ’since the body of norms for
which the state acts as an enforcement staff is the legal order, 
politically oriented action by competitive groups must take into 
account the constraining effects of law and the competitive advantages 
of being able to influence legislation’ (46).
Berlant suggests that in both the English and 
the American cases, state involvement in medicine represented a logical 
solution to , the failure of the profession to eliminate 
competitors adequately without the help of the state.
But the question remains why the state befriended 
the medical profession, rather than any other occupational group.
- 31 -
Of five contributing factors to medicine’s successful 
monopolization, 1) the capacity of the group to get its 
members’ adhesion to monopolistic policies, 2) its 
capacity to restrict membership size, 3) its capacity to 
eliminate competitive groups, 4) its favorable legal context 
Eind 5) its sharing of a constellation of interests with 
powerful social groups, the last appears, to Berlant, to be 
the most important. He writes; ’to the degree that there is 
a favorable constellation of interests between the profession 
and elite groups, the collective interests of the profession 
can be furthered through progressive monopolization. It is 
for these reasons that I emphasize the explanatory role of 
the function of medical services for particular social groups 
rather than for society at large when considering the problem 
of professional institutionalization’ (4?).
Berlant’s conclusion ’that social institutions 
are usually the product of interaction simong multiple social 
groups pursuing their interests’ is precisely the kind of 
general assumption that many marxist analysts dispute. To them, 
group interests are subordinated to class interests and, in 
the end, occupational power is determined by the capacity of a 
group to fulfill the global functions of capital in the process 
of reproduction (48). But before turning to this approach, I 
review a last work which I include in the first approach.
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PARRY AND PARRY ON THE RISE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
Here,professionalism is defined both as a 
form of social closure and as a strategy of collective 
mobility typical of capitalist societies where social 
"mobility is not legally or formally sanctioned. The Parrys 
argue that, historically, occupational groups formed 
associations and endeavoured to control the market for their 
services under the threat of outsiders whose arrival in 
their area of work,they feared,would swamp existing occupational 
opportunities and at the same time depress the price of labour 
(49). Professionalism they see as one strategy for controlling 
an occupation (unionism is another); it relies on self-government 
and whenever possible on state support. It is one of the 
institutions producers have designed to reduce the uncertainties 
inherent in a market economy; ’the occupational association... 
has become a fundamental social institution which men have 
constructed and reconstructed in their search for a means of 
achieving some measure of control over the market in a capitalist 
society (...). The occupational association, as a social 
institution, has provided a measure of security through 
structuration in an uncertain world’ (30).
The success of an occupation in achieving such 
control depends mainly on the aptitude of its members to overcome 
the strategies of closure adopted by higher-status group and ’at 
the same time... j^ toj construct barriers which will restrict the 
chances for outsiders to enter their own occupation’ (31). 
According to them, doctors achieved professionalism in the middle
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of the 19th century in Britain because they managed to use 
the state - which was not then involved in medicine - to 
strengthen their protection against unqualified competitors 
and to legitimise their control of the market of medical care. 
The Parrys do not explain, however, how state power was brought 
to play in favour of doctors.
LARSON ON THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM
Larson’s analysis which may be labelled marxist 
in a broad sense defines professionalisation as ’a process by 
wnich producers of special services sought to constitute and 
control a market for their expertise’ (52). She also sees the 
process as one of collective upward mobility and as part of the 
structuring of what she calls ’social inequality’.
She identifies some prerequisites to the 
constitution and control of professional markets. First, a 
distinctive commodity has to be produced. As most professions 
produce intangible goods - their product being bound to the 
person and the personnality of the professional - services 
have to be differentiated from competing products: thus,
standardisation provides the consumer with stable criteria of 
evaluation..
On the other hand, standardisation raises the 
problem of the control of competing products and therefore 
compels the profession to solicit state protection and state-
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enforced penalties against unqualified competitors. Third, 
•because the standardization of professional services is 
bound to the production of producers - that is to say 
education - it depends upon inducing new recruits to 
accept the economic and social sacrifices of traiining* (53)*
Thus, a minimal protection of this investment by trainees has 
to be offered from the beginning and it is best found in the 
form of a monopoly or at least of special protection by the 
public authorities. Here again, the relationship to the state 
is crucial to the professional objective, in so far as the 
occupation’s control of the production of producers is not 
sufficient to secure the control of the market, for the raaricet 
is ’determined by economic and social developments and also 
by the dominant ideological climate at a given time’ (54). Her 
conclusion is that the chances of success for a professionalising 
group are better when;
1° the more salient, and universal, and the less visible, 
the service meirket is;
2° the less competitive the market is and the more independent
the market is from the capital and goods market (on the other
hand, the more competitive the market is, the more the 
profession is induced to organise along monopolistic lines);
3° the more ’universal’ and the less organised, the clientele is;
4° the more scientific the cognitive basis is;
5° the more institutionalised, standardized and controlled ’the '
production of producers’ is;
gO in terms of power relations, the more independent the professional 
market is from other markets, the more the state is compelled to 
protect the public by eliminating incompetents;
7° the more the profession’s particular ideology coincides with 
the dominant ideological structures.
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Finally, she stresses that ’occupations address, 
the ’public as a whole’ only in ideology’; in practice, the 
professionsseek the sponsorship of specific groups whose power 
cam help them to get access to a market for their services.
OTHER MARXIST VlgVS ON THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM
Marxist analysts reject the Weberian view that 
factors like group interaction, expertise, support of elite 
groups can explain professionalism, or more generally, the 
development of the division of labour in health; their main 
argument is that the ’power elite paradigm^, in the words of 
V. Navarro, does not recognise the role of forces from outside 
the health sector. McKinlay, for example, in a critique of 
Freidson, wrote that ’understanding the magnitude of the forces 
behind and now present in the House of Medicine, the logic they 
impose on this particular economic sector, and the resulting 
disjunction between production for profit and fulfillment of the 
collective needs of the public, provides, I believe, the 
analytical key for understanding the medical-industrial complex 
and the changing position of physicians (and all other workers) 
within it’ (55)» Those forces are financial and industrial 
multinational corporations and the interests controlling them 
as well as the state which sets the rules of the game ’to 
ensure that medical care, as an area of investment, remains 
conducive to the realization of profit’ (56) and organises the 
provision of services accordingly. McKinlay argues that doctors 
too have to submit to the rules of the capitalist game and that 
their dominant position stems from their contribution to the
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production of profit. To him, class analysis is important to 
understand both the location of medicine in the capitalist 
mode of production and the internal structure of the medical 
profession which reproduces class differences, particularly 
through selection procedures.
Navarro strongly supports this view in his 
analysis of the British health care system; he states that 
social class is an essential category of analysis of social 
and political behaviour and that antagonisms and alliances 
among classes are the main determinants of social change. He 
gives the Medical Act, I838 as an illustration and writes;
’the alliance of general practitioners with the middle classes 
(whose political arm - the Liberal Party - controlled the 
government) determined the passage in Parliament of the I838 
Medical Act’, (57) presumably against the opposition of the 
physicians in the Royal Colleges and their allies in the 
dominant classes.
Johnson in a review of his own work and of 
Freidson’s, points out that their main common weakness is 
their failure to link the medical division of labour to the 
capitalist class structure and mode of production. The latter 
must be seen as a dualistic structure involving two fundamental 
processes; the creation of real value, that is the "labour 
process" and the production of surplus value, which is a process 
specific to capitalism. The two processes, and not only the 
first as Freidson seems to say, determine the social division of 
labour. Thus, professionalism, as originally defined in
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Professions and Power, must be seen as a process ’integral 
to class structuration and reflecting a dominant mode of 
production; that is to say that professionalism, involving 
the colleague control of work activities, can arise only 
where the ideological and political processes sustaining 
indetermination coincide with the requirements of capital, 
that is, when care work activities fulfill the global 
functions of capital with respect to control and surveillance, 
including the specific function of the reproduction of labour 
power’ (58). Medicine and its monopolisation of "official" 
definitions of health and illness, as illustrated by the 
doctors’ right to issue certificates to legitimate the 
withdrawal of labour, provides a good example of this process.
In sum, marxist analysts believe that the 
Weberian approach is too narrow to account for the occupational 
structure in health care and for the respective position of 
different occupations in it. To them, this sector of the 
social division of labour must be analysed, like any other 
one, in the broader context of class relationships and of the 
dominant mode of production.
So far, I have merely presented, without a 
critical assessment, the views of authors who have attempted 
to account for the hierarchical development of the medical 
division of labour. Before making specific criticisms, I wsmt 
to make some general comments on the literature on professionalism 
in health care at both the theoretical and the empirical level.
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Both Marxist and Weberian analysts acknowledge 
that the occupational structure in health is a hierarchy and 
that an important sociological issue is how medicine gathered 
the power necessary to establish itself in a dominant position 
and to control this hierarchy. All agree that the explanation 
of the professionalisation of health services is multifactorial, 
but there are disagreements as to the role played by specific
variables. A first problem is how to assess the relative
importance of the specific sources of the power of an occupational
group, that is the characteristics of the group itself such as 
its membership and its economic resources, its capacity to 
produce supportive ideologies and to develop appropriate 
professionalising strategies; the kind of service it offers, 
and its cognitive base; its clientele or the support it gets 
from powerful sponsors; the level and type of competition it 
encounters from other occupations or the support it can obtain 
from the state.
The extent to which each of these is necessary 
for the process of professionalisation to succeed is a fundamental 
question. At the saune time to say that professional dominance
is achieved through the sponsorship of powerful social groups, 
through the alliance with ruling or influential classes or 
through the coincidence of an occupation’s interests and ideology 
with those of dominant elite groups, leaves many questions 
unanswered about the dynamic process by which sponsorship is 
gained, alliances made, and ideologies produced-
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A general criticism I also wish to make is 
that most authors speak of medical occupations like medicine, 
pharmacy or nursing as homogeneous entities, without taking 
into account internal segmentation, intra-occupational 
struggles aind tensions, or social class differences. In so 
doing they overlook important variables relevant to the 
questions I have raised. Titles like medicine and nursing 
now refer to large occupational categories including sub­
groups with little or no common interests,applying specialised 
knowledge to various problems in a variety of settings where 
they do not meet, groups with their own sub-culture, their own 
frames of reference, their own scientific associations and 
pressure groups. For example, only at a very general level 
can we assimilate the pathologist, the neurosurgeon and the 
general practitioner under a single title or the general 
nurse, the psychiatric nurse and the ’administrative’ nurse 
under another. Historically, neither medicine, dentistry or 
nursing developed as homogeneous occupational groups free of 
internal tensions and this fact must be given more attention 
by analysts of the emergence of professionalism.
At the empirical level, the main weakness of 
most works on professions is their lack of historical evidence. 
In some cases, as in the works of McKinlay, Krause, Kronus, 
Navarro, little importance is given to historical developments; 
in other instances the authors rely heavily if not exclusively 
on secondary sources. If what we ought to explain is how 
historically an occupation, like medicine, or dentistry in the 
case of this thesis, achieved control over its work and the work
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of others and to account for cross-national differences, 
generalisations about class alliances or coincidence of 
ideologies must be well documented. The fact that most 
of the theorists whose work has been reviewed were not 
familiar with first-hand data on the evolution of health 
occupations has prevented them from recognising the internal 
differences, divisions and debates to which I have already 
referred. As much of the historicsil literature on health 
deals with medicine only, they neglected smaller or less 
powerful health occupations and overlooked the actions 
of groups which were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
bbtain a share of the occupational territory now held by 
medicine. In fact, the main trend has been to look at health 
as an area of work through the sole analysis of medicine and 
to minimize the importance of intra-occupational relationships 
in the shaping of the health hierarchy.
Clearly, sociological analysis of professionalism 
has now to turn to historical anailysis to substantiate its 
arguments and test its hypothesis. For example, Freidson*s 
view that professions have *to take the test of practical 
problem-solving applied by their clientele* before claiming any 
control over an area of work is hardly supported by evidence 
in the case of British euid American Medicine. In effect, 
medicine gained state recognition at a time when its cognitive 
basis was far from unified and was mainly empirical, and when 
its procedures were most unpleasant and often more harmful than 
curative (59). Furthermore, the view that ’the protection and 
patronage of some elite segment of society’ is crucial in the
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achievement of occupational autonomy and dominance needs 
further documentation. In Britain, the battle for medical 
registration has been a long and complex struggle in which 
the upper class physicians can hardly be said to have been 
the clear ’winners’ despite support and patronage from 
dominant economic and political groups (60). Freidson’s 
points apply more to twentieth century medicine than to 
medicine at the time it was taking its first steps toward 
professional dominance.
Likewise, Johnson’s, Navarro’s and McKinlay’s 
argument that medicine came to its dominant position because 
of its contribution to the fulfillment of capital’s requirements 
can be accepted only on the grounds that it logically fits their 
theoretical framework. Only sketchy historical and empirical 
evidence is supplied in support of their views; above all the 
contention that professionalism (in medicine at least) is a 
particular feature of capitalist societies and no others is in 
no way tested. Freidson for instance argues that it is not 
so and demonstrates his point by analysing the role of medicine 
in the Soviet Union which does not have a capitalist political 
economy. He then argues: ’should my evidence and reasoning be
correct, political economy and class relations explain some 
things but not others, and certainly not everything. Occupational 
organization auad the knowledge, skill and technology composing 
the means of production also explain some things’ (6l).
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The main difference between the two approaches 
I have examined lies precisely in the problem of the specificity 
of professionalism as a principle of organisation of v/ork. The 
marxist approach views professionalism as but one of the forms 
the capitalist division of labour takes, and others like Freidson 
and Berlant particularly see it as a specific work structure 
that can be found in political economies other than capitalist.
The marxists tend to minimize the importance of variables such 
as the cognitive basis of an occupation, its degree of organisation 
or its capacity to amass political power in the process of 
professionalisation. Such a view leaves open too many questions, 
for the moment at least, to be retained; for example, it does not 
explain why it is medicine and not another group of healers that 
succeeded in gaining control of the delivery of health care, 
nor does it account for the role played by other occupations, 
like nursing and more recently many new paramedical occupations, 
in the structuring of health services. These groups have not been 
inactive; on the contrary,they have tried continuously to 
influence circumstances in favour of their own interests. The 
behaviour of the consumers of health services has also to be 
taken into account; medicine, pharmacy and dentistry did not 
develop independently of people’s attitudes and beliefs about 
health and illness.
Finally, in the case of dentistry, one has to 
explain why in some countries dentistry developed independently 
of medicine whereas it remained under medicine’s control in others, 
irrespective of the type of political economy. My own view
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coincides with Berlant*s when he writes that social institutions 
are the product of interaction among multiple social groups 
pursuing their interests. I see the division of labour in an 
area of work like health services more as a negotiated order 
than as an order imposed by the logic of capitalism. In taking 
that view I do not deny the importance of the economic context, 
but I want to stress that there are other factors at work in 
the process of professionalisation. In sum, though one finds 
msmy stimulating and useful hypotheses in the recent literature 
on professions, more work is needed to substantiate them so as 
to enable one to discriminate between historical facts and 
speculation.
MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE
Few authors have concerned themselves with 
what happens to sin occupation after it has achieved ’professional 
dominance’; most seem to assume that it csin rely on the power 
it derives from its special position in a work hierarchy to 
maintain and even further improve its status.
It seems obvious that the protection of the law 
and the support of institutions like universities or state 
agencies are important assets in the fight for autonomy and for 
the control of a market (62). However,these are by no means a 
guarantee against internal and external challenges to dominance 
which, in everyday reality, are almost permanent. In health, 
changes in medical knowledge and technology, as well as changing 
patterns of morbidity and mortality, result in important modifications
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in the practice of medicine, dentistry and pharmacy (63).
Some roles become obsolete, others emerge: specialisation
breaks occupational homogeneity and groups with conflicting 
interests appear, thus weakening professional solidarity and 
potentially threatening the profession’s dominant position.
External challenges come from different sources; other 
occupations, whether they are in direct competition or in a 
position of subordination to the dominant group, also try to 
improve their status and increase their work autonomy.
Medicine’s power, for example, has been and is still challenged 
by chiropractors, nurses, radiographers, social workers, 
opticians and other groups who either want to establish 
themselves as full-fledged professions or simply reduce 
their legal and institutional dependence ’vis-à-vis’ medicine.
Another external source of potential challenge 
is the clientele of a profession; in health services, it has 
traditionally been assumed that the fact that the client is an 
individual who seeks a personal and intimate service contributes 
to reinforce the professional power of the expert. But as clients 
become better educated, more knowledgeable about health care 
and less indoctrinated by professional ideologies, such an 
assumption seems to loose ground (64). In America, particularly, 
consumers of health services have formed pressure groups to defend 
their interests as they see them and a growing popular literature 
on the ’evils’ of professionalisation and the benefits of self-help, 
has emerged in support of an attack on health professionals’ 
authority. Finally, the state is deeply involved in the
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organisation and financing of health services and professional 
autonomy or occupational monopoly have become notions hardly 
compatible with its administrative requirements (65).
Historiccilly professions like medicine and 
dentistry have almost continuously experienced internal 
tensions and tensions in their relationships to their clientele, 
to related occupations and to the state. They have responded 
in engaging in collective strategies aimed at strengthening 
themselves as occupations and at eliminating external threats; 
it is to those strategies that I now turn.
THE CONCEPT OF OCCUPATIONAL COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES
Three main sources of professional power have 
been identified; the occupational group itself, its clientele 
and sponsors and the state. How power is derived from those 
sources is the question we must now exsunine. I suggest that 
this can be done, at least in part, by examining the collective 
behaviour of groups engaged in the process of raising their 
occupational status and gaining control of their own activity 
and of the institutions through which it is performed. Persons 
practising the same activity and wishing to obtain recognition 
and legitimacy as a group have developed, consciously or not, 
sets of strategies and tactics to attain this objective. I 
suggest that the study of these collective strategies is a good 
starting point for the understanding of the development of the 
division of labour in areas of work like medicine or dentistry 
where the ’occupational principle’ is present.
- 46 -
In analysing the occupational structure of 
dentistry, I will focus on three areas where occupational 
strategies have been at work: the development of strong and
credible pressure groups, the market for dental care and 
services and legislation. My ultimate objective is to show how 
and to what extent the work structure in dentistry is the product 
of interaction among social groups involved in the provision 
and in the use of dental services.
In the first area, two important sets of problems 
had to be dealt with: the recruitment of suitable members and
tne creation and maintenance of occupational cohesiveness. The 
control of membership achieved by defining the qualities required 
to be a member, mainly in terms of training and qualification, 
was used to establish standards in order to justify claims to 
recognition, a tactic Gilb calls ’patrolling the entrance gate’.
In organising formal training and in instituting qualifying 
procedures, professionalising groups try to give credibility 
to their claim that only their members have the competence to 
perform certain tasks or to deliver certain services* Many 
devices are used to create and sustain solidarity and cohesiveness, 
among them journals, protection schemes, meetings, conferences and 
so on. Unifying ideologies which stress the common interests of 
all members and minimize their differences are produced and spread 
to reduce potential conflicts among segments of the occupations.
A widely used tactic, in.that connection, is to declare war on a 
group of actual or potential competitors and to insist on unanimity 
and solidarity as a protection against outsiders.
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As regards the market for professional 
services, strategies are designed both to create a demand 
for the services and to restrict access to the clientele 
to members of the group. Customers must be first convinced 
in some way that the service is worth purchasing and that 
there are no adequate substitutes. For example, the small 
group of trsdned dentists who wanted to organise on 
professional lines in the second half of the 19th century in 
Britain had first to differentiate their services from those 
offered by people like pharmacists who pulled out teeth 
occasionally as a relief service or by untrained persons 
who had engaged in the practice of extracting teeth for 
commercial purposes only. In a way, a new definition of 
dentail health and dental care as a preventive and conservative 
measure had to be substituted for the old perception of 
dental care as the mere extraction of painful teeth. Once 
the credibility of a service has been established, it has 
to be kept up in the eyes of the public; various tactics of 
public relations - going as far as sponsoring television 
programmes as has been the case in America - are used to 
enhance the visibility and the value of a service.
Exclusive access to clientsis secured through 
control of competitors: historically this has been done or
attempted by either excluding competitors altogether, i.e. by 
having their activities made illegal (66) or by subordinating 
them, i.e. by bringing their activities under control through 
mechanisms like work on prescription, accreditation of training 
institutions or certification of graduates (67). In health care
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dominant groups have secured their position by having 
exclusion and subordination institutionalised in health 
insurance schemes and hospital administrative structures 
particularly.
Finally, professionalising groups have 
usually engsiged in political activity and sought state 
recognition to legitimise a monopolistic control of certain 
activities. They have formed pressure groups to lobby 
Parliament ; they have produced professional ideologies to 
give coherence and am air of legitimacy to their claims and, 
at the same time, to counter the claims of their competitors 
or rivals. As no group ever obtained full control of its area 
of work and that new chaillenges arise regularly, from other 
occupations, from the state or from consumers of professional, 
services, legislative activity has tended to be of a rather 
permament character in professionail associations amd as such 
it deserves a particular attention.
In sum, my objective in this thesis will be 
to understand how professionalism, in the form of a legal 
monopoly, was brought into British dentistry and how it influenced 
the development of a work structure still dominated by dentists. 
The five occupations in the field of dentistry in Britain aure 
orgamised in a hierarchy under the control of dentists and the 
division of labour between them determines what dental services 
aire to be rendered and how they are to be rendered- It is
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therefore important to evaluate the role of professionalism 
in the shaping of dental services and to understand how it 
was established in the first place.
My attempt to throw light on the 
professionalisation of the practice of dentistry will focus 
on the activities of professional associations of dental 
practitioners. I will examine, more particularly, the 
collective strategies they developed in three areas; firstly in 
that of professional organisation, secondly of developing a 
market for dental services and thirdly of legislation.
The decision to focus on the role of 
professional groups rather than on that of the state or of 
the consumers of dental services,both of which were important, 
has been made in view of the fact that the process of 
professionalisation of dentistry was initiated by dentail 
practitioners themselves, not by the state or by the consumers.
It is they who took the initiative to form associations, to try 
to influence the market for their services, to induce the state 
to legislate in their favour; in sum, to ’manipulate the social 
position of their occupation’ (68). In stressing the crv.cisü. 
importance of occupational strategies, I do not want to imply 
that all developments in British dentistry can be explained by 
them; these remain the outcome of the social interactions 
between dental occupations, their actual and potential clientele 
and the state and the study of collective occupational strategies 
is merely a useful device with which to throw further light on 
these interactions.
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PART II; THE CLOSURE OF DENTISTRY IN BRITAIN, (1900-1921)
In Britain, the practice of dentistry was 
restricted to qualified and registered persons by an Act of 
Parliament in 1921. This part of the thesis examines the events 
that led to the creation of dentists* legal monopoly. First, 
the conditions of dental practice at the turn of the century 
are described to outline the social context in which dentists 
started their campaign for the closure of their occupational 
territory. Then I analyse how they formed and developed 
professional organisations and how these engaged in a cam^ >a5gn 
to amend the law regulating the practice of dentistry in 
Great Britain. Finally, I describe the endeavours of dental 
orgsinisations to expand and stabilise the market for dental 
care through promotion of public dental services and control 
of competition.
- 51 -
CHAPTER 2: DENTISTRY AS AN OCCUPATION AT THE END OF THE 19th CENTURY
Though historians of dentistry like to trace 
its origins to many centuries before the Christian era (1), 
it cannot be saiid to have emerged as a full-time occupation 
until about 150 years ago. Until the second half of the 19th 
century, tooth extractions were usually performed by medical 
doctors and pharmacists and also by blacksmiths, jewellers and 
barbers among others. There were also itinerant extractors 
without any training or qualification who travelled from village 
to village and performed in public on market places (2).
By and large, dentistry was seen as a commercial 
activity by most of its practitioners. Doctors were indifferent 
to dental problems which were not in their own training seen as 
related to general health: teeth could be pulled out and replaced
by artificial substitutes without any apparent harmful effects 
on the body. Moreover dental problems seemed hardly preventable 
and not curable by drugs or potionsj hence derived the perception 
of dental decay and of the loss of teeth as unavoidable, almost 
•normal*.
In the introduction to his report on dental 
education in the United States and Canada - which has been to 
dentistry what the Flexner Report had been to medicine -,
W.J. Gies describes the attitude of doctors as follows: *until 
recently, medicine viewed dental problems with about as much
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concern as that excited by loss of hair from the scalp and did 
little more to understand or to control the influence responsible 
for the one than for the other* (3)*
Not surprisingly, when a small number of doctors 
practising dentistry and other *high standard* non-medically 
qualified practitioners tried to raise the status of their 
activity in the l830*s in America, they found little support 
among the medical profession. They decided to go their own way 
and the first dental school was founded in Baltimore in l840.
The next year the first dental legislation was passed in Alabama 
and from then on dentistry developed independently from medicine.
Some twenty years later in Britain, during the 
agitation which preceded the Medical Act, I838, (4) two rival 
groups of dental practitioners were formed in I835 and I856. The 
members of the first, the College of Dentists of England wanted 
to establish dentistry on an independent footing as in America, 
and the second, the London based Odontological Society wanted 
to develop dentistry under the aegis of the medical profession. 
Each group successfully sponsored a different clause of the 
Medical Act in line with their objectives. The Medical Act, I858 
was designed as *an Act to regulate the qualifications of 
Practitioners in Medicine and Surgery*: it introduced medical
registration and established the privileges of registered 
doctors, the most important ones being the right to recover . 
charges in any court of law, to hold certain appointments and to
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sign medical certificates. A General Medical Council was also 
created to supervise medical training end practice. Clause 48, 
sponsored by the Odontological Society, empowered the Royal 
College of Surgeons of England to grant licences in dental 
surgery (5) and clause 55» sponsored by the College of Dentists, 
protected the rights of dentists actually in practice (6).
The Royal College of Surgeons of England held 
its first examination for dentists in i860 and granted about 
300 licences in dental surgery during the following decade. In 
1865, the College of Dentists amalgamated with the other society 
to form the Odontological Society of Great Britain (?)• It 
became a scientific society dominated by London based medically 
qualified dentists. Later, more and more dentists felt that what 
dentistry needed was an association similar to the doctors* 
British Medical Association. A *Dental Reform Committee* was 
accordingly formed in 1875 and immediately, started to campaign 
for the registration of dentists; its political activities soon 
resulted in the passing of the Dentists Act, I878.
A Dentists Bill, sponsored by the committee, 
having as its object, *to protect the public against quacks by 
giving them an opportunity of ascertaining whether dentists were 
properly qualified* (8) was introduced in the House of Commons in 
January I878. The Bill, in particular, proposed restricting the 
use of the title * surgeon dentist* to registered persons only 
and limiting registration to licentiates in dental surgery and 
persons in practice at the time of the passing of the Act.
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Immediate opposition arose from medical 
quarters, mainly from a small society formed exclusively of 
fellows and members of the Royal College of Surgeons of 
England, called the Association of Surgeons Practising 
Dental Surgery. This society, founded in I876, wished to 
promote a higher standard of dental practice by requiring 
full surgical qualification of would-be dental practitioners. 
Their view was that dental surgery was merely a branch of 
surgery and that its practice should be regulated along the 
same lines as medicine and surgery; it was supported by the 
medical associations and the medical journals.
The promoters of the Bill saw medical opposition 
as a threat to its passage and agreed to drop the clauses 
limiting dental practice by doctors. The first dental 
legislation passed by British Parliament therefore provided 
for the constitution of a dentists* register under the General 
Medical Council and restricted the use of the titles 'dentist* 
and *dental practitioner* to registered persons (9)* references 
to the titles * dental surgeon* and * surgeon dentist* having 
previously been dropped in the compromise with the medical 
profession. Registration was opened to already qualified 
dentists and to persons stating that they were engaged in the 
*bona fide* practice of dentistry either separately or in 
conjunction with the practice of medicine, surgery or pharmacy 
at the time of the passing of the Act. Such persons had to 
produce a formal declaration and false declarations were made
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liable to imprisonment for up to twelve months. Failure to 
comply with the provisions of the Act could lead to a maximum 
penalty of £20, on summary conviction. Registration privileges 
included the right to recover fees in any court. The Act also 
stated that its provisions did not apply to legally qualified 
medical practitioners.
The first Dentists' Register was published in 
1879 and contained 5289 names: 483 persons were licenciâtes in
dental surgery and 4806 were bona fide practitioners. About 
51^ of the latter group stated that they only practised dentistry 
and 39^ that they practised in conjunction with pharmacy (10). 
During the following twenty years, the number of qualified 
practitioners grew regularly and the number of bona fide 
practitioners was cut by almost 2000. The I9OO register shows an 
overall decrease of registered dentists, with 4749 names only,
1758 holding the L.D.S. and 2965 being bona fide practitioners 
or '1878 dentists' as they were now called (there were also 26 
colonial and foreign dentists) (11). This fall in the number of 
registered dentists does not indicate a real decrease in the 
number of persons practising dentistry since after I879 the 
practice of dentistry was by no means restricted to registered 
persons. Nothing in the I878 Act prevented anyone from 
practising dentistry as long as he did not use the restricted 
titles and did not pretend to be specially qualified or 
registered under the Dentists' Act. Hence the discrepancy 
between the census figures and the register's: in I89I the census
enumerated 5561 dentists and dentists' assistants and, in I9OI,
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6170. The corresponding register figures were 4817 in 189I 
and 4509 in I9OI (12). The number of persons describing their 
occupation as 'dentist* exceeded the number of registered 
dentists by 15^ in I89I and by 57^ in I9OI. Given that many 
pharmacists were still registered as dentists and would 
probably describe themselves as pharmacists or chemists in 
the census enumeration, and assuming, as it seems reajsonable 
to, that many unregistered practitioners would not state 
that they were dentists for census purposes, the gap between 
the register'' and the census figures probably reflects only 
part of the magnitude of unregistered practice.
At the end of the century there were two main 
societies of persons practising dentistry in Great Britain: 
the British Dental Association, founded in I88O by the members 
of the Reform Committee, had a membership of IO89 registered 
dentists in I9OO (13) and the Incorporated Society of Extractors 
and Adaptors of Teeth Limited, founded in 1894, represented the 
interests of about 400 unregistered practitioners committed to 
the 'ethical' practice of dentistry (l4). The Odontological 
Society was still active as a scientific body, but was not 
involved in 'dental politics'. Thus nearly 80^ of registered 
and unregistered dentists were left unorganised.
The BDA which originally formulated its object 
as 'to watch over the interests of the profession with special 
reference to the proper carrying out of the provisions of 
Dentists' Act I878' (15) soon became concerned with the ease
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with which anyone could get round the law. Persons without 
any training or qualification could call themselves 'dental 
consultant*, * dental specialist*, * dental expert*, * dental 
pioneer*, etc., (l6) and advertise * painless extractions* 
almost with impunity. The practice of such persons was 
limited to the extraction of teeth and to the saile of dentures 
which was the really lucrative part of it. By advertising 
their services blatantly in local newspapers and in other 
ways they threatened the livelihood of those, like BDA 
members, who considered advertising as unprofessional and 
unethical. The BDA engaged in a fight against such 
practitioners both by prosecuting some of them under the I878 
Act and by trying to amend the Dental Act in such a manner as 
to restrict their activities. Between l884 and I9OO, it 
prosecuted 62 persons, 55 successfully, for either having used 
the restricted titles or having posed as being specially qualified 
to practise dentistry. The BDA spent £1575 between l884 and I9OO 
on prosecutions and on other legal activities related to the 
modification of the law governing the practice of dentistry.
This represents an average expenditure of £98 per year or about 
12.0% of the sum yielded by subscriptions to the Association (17). 
This was the Association's biggest single expense after the 
publication of its journal and the organisation of its annual 
general meeting.
In addition to its legal activities, the BDA 
tried to raise the status of dentistry through seeking recognition 
by the armed services and through promoting school dental services.
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Although the first suggestions that soldiers and sailors 
should receive dental care were made as early as I885, no 
dentist was appointed before 1904. As to school services, 
the first dental appointment took place in I885. In I89O, 
the BDA set up a Committee to Investigate School Children's 
Teeth and, two years later, held a conference in Cambridge 
to discuss the results of its inquiry. The Committee issued 
seven reports between I89O and I898 when a School Dentists'
Society was formed under the patronage of the Association to 
further the objectives of the Committee on School Children. By 
1900 the Society had a membership of 38.
As to the unregistered,the first recorded attempt 
to organise them was made by the 'Unregistered Dental Practitioners' 
Association of Great Britain' in I892, The use of the words 
'dental practitioners' in the title brought immediate reactions 
from the BDA which opposed the registration of the title and the 
new association failed to get started. Two years later, an 
'Incorporated Society of Extractors and Adaptors of Teeth Limited' 
was formed in Manchester with a membership of 35* This title had 
been chosen to facilitate the registration of the society, as a 
trade union, by the Board of Trade.
The Incorporated Society was formed, as its 
promoters put it, to protect and promote the status of the 
unregistered and particularly 'to obtain parliamentary or other 
legal acknowledgment of the rights of the members in case of suiy 
alteration of the Medical and Dental Acts and to help forward
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any Bill that recognise them...* (l8). Admission to the Society 
was restricted to unregistered practitioners who had served an 
apprenticeship or pupilage of 3 years to an associate (3 years 
in practice were required from the founding members) or to a 
registered dentist. Members had to undertake not to use the 
titles of 'dentist* and 'dental practitioner* and not to 
advertise. The Society claimed to recruit only among the 
•ethical* unregistered and committed itself to the protection 
of their vested interests in dental practice. By 1900, the 
Incorporated Society was still a small association but it had 
a well organised secretariat and good financial support from 
its members: it was soon to become a very influential dental
pressure group.
Another association of unregistered practitioners 
which left virtually no trace of its short existence was the 
British Dental Assistants' Association which petitioned the 
General Medicsil Council in 1895- It claimed to represent 400 
assistants who 'through a misunderstanding on our part at the 
time of the passing of the Dentists Act, I878', as their request 
put it, did not take then the opportunity to apply for registration.
They asked the GMC to consider registering them 
as bona fide practitioners engaged in dental practice at the 
time of the Dental Act. The GMC refused to receive a deputation 
and stated that it did not wish to reopen the question of non­
registered dentists settled I6 years before (19)* That seems to 
have put an end to the activities of this association.
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THE PRACTICE OF DMTISTRY IN 1900
In 1900 dentistry was practised in Britain 
both by qualified and unqualified persons. The register 
included both categories by virtue of the 'grandfather* clause in 
the Dentists' Act I878 which opened the register to all in 
practice at the time of its passing. Of all the names 
included in the twenty-second Dentists* Register, only J>7% 
were those of qualified dentists.
Unqualified persons who came into practice 
after 1879 joined the growing ranks of the unregistered which 
included a wide range of practitioners, from the former dental 
apprentice who had decided to settle in practice on his own and 
had a basic training, to the commercially minded tout without 
any sort of training who was prepared to do anything to make 
profits out of the sale of artificial teeth. Virtually anyone 
could offer dental services and perform dental operations as 
long as he respected the provisions of the Dentists Act. To 
become a registered dentist was a different matter however.
There were four registration bodies in Great 
Britain; the Royal Colleges of Surgeons of England,of Edinburgh 
and of Ireland and the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Glasgow. Their qualification requirements were three years of 
training in dental mechanics, either in a dental hospital or 
by apprenticeship to a registered dentist, and two years of
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practice of dentail surgery at a recognised school. Foreign 
qualifications, with the exception of those given by the 
universities of Harvard and Michigan, were not recognised.
There were sixteen teaching institutions, four of them in 
London, and ten genereuL hospitals with dental departments 
recognised by the registration bodies (20).
Tuition fees varied from school to school; 
in 1900, the Dental Hospital of London and School of Dental 
Surgery (Leicester Square) charged £105 for a two years* 
training and I50 guineas for 3 years* tuition in mechanical 
dentistry. The National Dental Hospital and College, also 
in London, charged about £138 for the two years*training. The 
Liverpool Dental Hospital and School of Dental Surgery, £?2,ls. 
(£105 for the 3 years* pupilage) and the Incorporated Edinburgh 
Dental Hospital and School,£90,7s; instruments, at an estimated 
cost of £25, had also to be bought by the dental student.
Qualification for dental registration,therefore, 
was a rather long and costly process especially when it was 
legally possible to circumvent this process and settle in 
practice without having to undergo these costs. In addition, 
the unqualified and unregistered practitioners could advertise 
their services freely and compete with the registered dentists. 
Although advertising by the latter was not altogether banned, it 
was restricted and generally considered as 'unprofessional* and 
unethical. The BDA was reluctant to prohibit advertising 
completely or to bring cases of advertising dentists before the
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GMC because it feared opposition by dentists outside London 
and the main centres who had to cope as they could with 
competition of the unregistered. A petition signed by 
about 100 members and pressing the BDA to act on 
advertising was presented to the Association's Representative 
Board in I895 (21) with no suscess.
It is very difficult to assess the economic 
situation of dentists in 1900; presumably it varied very 
much from an area to another. Generally speaking, the demand 
for dental services was on the increase, if only because of 
the growth of the population of Great Britain. From 20.8 
million in I85I it grew to 29.7 million in I881 and to 37-0 
million in I9OI (22), Wages almost doubled in real terms 
between I83O and 1909 (23) and prices went down (24). This 
permitted an increased consumption of processed foods and in 
particular of sugar; there was a 240% increase in the 
consumption of sugar between I83I and I9OI when it reached 
91.39 pounds per capita (25).
Given what is now known about the relationship 
between sugar, soft foods and dental caries, this undoubtedly 
led to a greater potential demand for dental services. The fact 
that unregistered dental practice developed on a large scale 
in the last two decades of the 19th century is itself a clear 
indication that the market was attractive. The basic investment 
was minimal (a dental chair cost between £l6 and £20 in I9OO 
according to advertisements in dental journals), no training or
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qualification were necessary to start in practice, and the 
public was. prepared to trust itself to anyone claiming to 
have some knowledge of 'American dentistry' which was very 
much in the fashion. In a letter to the Journal of the BDA,
'a honest poor mechanic' explained the dilemma of mechanics 
and apprentices; 'when a man is working hard for 40s. per 
week, the temptation of £40 a week, and more is rather strong; 
and now that it is possible to evade both the Dental Act and 
legal proceedings by registering as a company, the temptation 
to start an "Anglo-American Dentorium" or a "Fine Art Teeth 
Laboratory" is still stronger' (26), The figure of £40 is 
certainly inflated and probably not many dentists, whether 
registered or not, earned that much; but the argument remains 
valid and is important to the understanding of the economic 
situation in dentistry at the beginning of this century.
The phenomenon of large-scale unregistered 
practice was also made possible by the fact that the cognitive 
and technical basis of dentistry had still to develop as more 
than a set of mechanical techniques which anyone could learn by 
experience. That it is not to say that there were no scientific 
developments in dentistry: in the l880's and iS^O's the Journal
of the BDA, for example, ran a column under the heading 'New 
Inventions'. In the domain of anaesthesia, the use of nitrous 
oxide gas was introduced in the early l880's for general 
anaesthesia and cocaine was in use for local anaesthesia in 
the 1890's. Electrical engines were made available from I883 
onwards, but their use generalised only by the turn of the century:
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that allowed considerable development in conservative dentistry 
and increased the efficiency of drilling devices. The use of 
radiographs, available by I896, spread only slowly at the 
beginning of the 20th century, but it led to significant 
advances in the diagnosis of dental diseases. More generally, 
as The Lancet noted in its last issue of the century, there were 
signs that* the problems awaiting solution in dental surgery 
are being attacked in a more scientific manner than heretofore* 
(27). The Lancet also saw favourably the gradual undertaking 
of the mechanical training of dentists by dental schools and the 
corresponding decline of mechanical apprenticeship. But it was 
far from convinced that dental trsdning in its actual form was 
valuable in itself; the comment on the state of dentistry went 
on; ... a distinctly hopeful sign of the future is that year 
by year more men are add&d to the rainks of the dental profession 
who have received a sound medical training* (28). The Lancet 
was also of the opinion that only persons with both medical and 
dental qualifications should be eligible for dental hospital 
appointments (29). Another sign that the medical profession was 
not entirely convinced of the scientific character of dentistry 
was the reluctance of the GMC to admit a dental representative 
among its members. Despite years of representations, it was 
only in I898 that a dentist first sat on the Council and he was 
still a crown nominee rather than the elected representative of 
dentists.
Thus it is not surprising that the public 
considered the dentist as 'more or less a man who pulls out 
teeth when they ache or look ugly, and supplies artificial
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teeth in their place' (30) and did not discriminate between 
qualified dentists and others. Dentistry was seen as a 
mechanical trade both by the public and by a majority of its 
practitioners: conservative dentistry was developing but
it was considered as unnecessary, complicated and above all 
more costly than the mere extractions of teeth and their 
replacement by artificial dentures.
DENTISTRY IN OTHER COUNTRIES
British dentistry did not develop in complete 
isolation: Ameri.can influence, in particular, was very
important, as indicated by the large number of American articles 
reprinted in British journals and the volume of news about 
American dental politics. American dentistry had developed 
autonomously and was much more independent of medicine than 
British dentistry was. Dental education from the middle of 
the 19th century had focused on operative and prosthetic 
dentistry, and dentists trained in American dental schools 
became rapidly renowned for their technical ability; hence 
the frequent references to Américain dentistry in the titles used 
by unregistered dentists in Britain to attract clients.
By 1900, every American state had passed 
legislation controlling the practice of dentistry by way of 
licensure: 13 states had such legislation by I880, another 22
by 1890 and the last I3 by I9OO. The number of licensed dentists 
by then was about 30,OCX), nearly tenfold the I85O figure (31) •
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The first national association of dentists was the American 
Society of Dental Surgeons founded in l840, and it was 
followed by the establishment of many state associations. No 
national association really managed to organise American 
dentists before the very end of the century. The American 
Dental Association, formed in 1859* had less members than 
most state associations until it really took off after its 
merger with the Southern Dental Association in 1897- 
Interest ingly enough, the ADA looked to the BDA, then, for 
a model for its reorganisation (32), There were 67 journals 
currently published in the United States in 1900 (33)» some 
like Cosmos hrcving a considerable international influence* 
Cosmos's articles were often reprinted and quoted and its 
editorials were regularly commented on in British journals.
As to dental schools, there were 57 of them ranging from 
those in prestigious universities to proprietary schools 
which sold diplomas by correspondence, in some instances for 
fees only. Many so-called 'American dentists' practising in 
Britain were holders of such diploma obtained without having 
set foot in America. The phenomenon was also widespread in 
France and Germany, much to the resentment of properly trained 
American dentists practising in Europe (34),
Across the North American border Csinadian 
dentistry developed much on the same lines as in the U.S.A.; 
in 1900, there were about I3OO dentists in Canada (35), many 
of them trained in American schools as there were only two 
Canadian dental schools, one in MontreaG. and one in Toronto.
- 67 -
Legislation banning unregistered practice had been in force 
since I868 in Ontario and I869 in Quebec, the other provinces 
passing similar dental laws during the l880*s and early l890's. 
Close relationships were maintained with American dental schools, 
and especially with the National Association of Dental 
Examiners whose regulations Canadian dental schools conformed 
to. Small and spread over a large territory, the Canadian 
dental profession benefited from its association with its 
United States colleagues in terms both of the development of 
its cognitive and technical base and of its internal 
organisation for the furtherance of occupational interests.
By and large the main debates were the same in 
British and American dentistry, namely control of unregistered 
practice, dentistry in the armed forces, education, and 
organisation of the profession. However, the emphasis was not 
on the same subjects. British associations of dentists were 
most of all concerned with unregistered practice and its 
elimination, whereas their American counterparts debated 
organisation suid unity problems and the standardization of 
dental educational facilities.
Elsewhere, prohibition of unregistered or 
unlicensed practice was enacted in I88O in New Zealand, from 
1884 in Australia (Tasmania, l884, Victoria I887, New South 
Wales, 1892), and in I892 in France. In Italy as from I89O, 
the practice of dentistry was restricted to persons holding 
a diploma in medicine and surgery and to those who had taken
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a special one year course in dentistry after the 6 years'» 
medical course: since then dentistry or stomatology as it
was henceforth o called has been a specialism within medicine 
rather than a separate occupation. The same situation 
existed and still exists in Austria, Poland and Portugal and 
stomatology as a medical specialty has traditionally been 
practised, as well as independent dentistry, in Bulgaria,
France and Czechoslovakia.
At the end of the 19th century, the social 
status of dentistry in Britsdn can be described as very low.
The dentist was generally seen merely as a craftsman ei^aged 
in the business of extracting teeth and replacing them with 
artificial ones. The notion of 'dental health' was not 
recognised by the public who consulted a dental practitioner 
in the last resort only to relieve pain or for aesthetic 
reasons. The choice by the client of a particular practitioner 
was more likely to be motivated by his fees and his claims to 
perform painless extractions than by the fact that he was 
qualified or registered. For most people, a visit to the 
dentist was considered as an ordeal-and often it was - which 
should be put off as long as possible. The public's disregard 
for 'dental health' was shared by the great majority of doctors 
and dentists. Few doctors and dentists believed that there were 
links between the health of the teeth and general health and 
they saw dentistry as a mechanical trade rather than a medical 
activity. The fact that dentistry was practised in many instances 
by companies confirmed the public image of dentists as akin to 
businessmen.
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Dentists were also rather weakly organised as 
an occupational group. As the existing occupational bodies 
merely represented between them 20% of the registered and 
unregistered dentists, they had difficulty in making their 
voice heard. The BDA's claim that dentistry was of great 
value to British society and that its practice should be 
restricted to properly trained persons was seen as part of a 
monopolistic project threatening the vested interests of 
thousands of persons who were lawfully engaged in the practice 
of dentistry. The decline of the Dentists* Register and 
the growth of unregistered practice between 1879 and 1900 
indicated that the trend was not yet towards the formation 
of a professional structure similar to medicine's; rather 
it showed that a great proportion of dental practitioners did 
not see themselves as 'professionals' but as craftsmen concerned 
with securing their livelihood by the means commonly used in 
the market place.
Finally cross-national comparisons show that 
the legal status of British dentistry at the time was singular: 
even in British dominions, dentistry was regulated in such a 
way that unqualified practice was banned whereas in Britain 
anyone could set up a dental practice almost without restriction. 
The explanation for the differences in the legal situation of 
dental practice and consequently in the organisation of the 
delivery of dental services between Britain and other western 
countries, must be sought in the socio-political processes 
involved in the framing of health services. Here I only wish 
to acknowledge this as it is not my purpose nor ray claim to
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provide an explanation for these global differences in this 
thesis. I shall rather focus on one variable and try to 
investigate to what extent the activities of groups of persons 
practising dentistry succeeded in modifying the legal 
situation in British dentistry. Thus I now turn to the 
I9OO-I92I period and to the attempts of dental practitioners 
to develop viable and credible occupational pressure groups 
to further their common interests.
- 71 -
CHAPTER 3; THE DEVELOPMENT OF DENTAL ASSOCIATIONS
As chapter 2 has shown, by 1900 a small but 
significant proportion of dental practitioners had begun to 
cooperate to further their common interests in a collective 
manner. Both the BDA and the Incorporated Society shared 
the objective of restricting the practice of dentistry to 
properly trained persons. The BDA claimed as a matter of 
principle that only registered persons should have a legitimate 
right to practise whereas the Incorporated Society claimed 
that unregistered persons actually in practice and who complied 
with the regulations of the I878 Act had a vested interest 
which should be first recognised before dentistry became a 
closed occupation.
To attain their ultimate end the leaders of 
the two associations concentrated their efforts on three 
short-term objectives: securing the viability of their
association, establishing its credibility and maintaining its 
cohesiveness. I make a distinction between these three sub­
objectives for Einalytical purposes only; the tactics used to 
achieve them are not so clearly differentiated in everyday 
reality. Wtien I refer to strategies aiming at developing 
viable and credible occupational pressure groups I do not imply 
that the tactics I will describle were consciously laid down 
and brought forward by persons acknowledging a sort of causal 
relationship between their actions and the long terra objectives
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of their group. Rather, I only wish to make sense of some of 
the activities of dental associations - whether they were 
recognised as part of an overall strategy or not by their 
promoters - and to locate them in the process of achieving 
control of dentistry as an area of work.
THE MAKING OF VIABLE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
Given the nature of their stated aims, dental 
associations had to do more than merely survive; particularly 
they had to attract enough members and to organise in such a 
way as to guarantee continuity if they were to be recognised as 
representative bodies entitled to speak on behalf of an occupation. 
Thus, a first task they had to carry out was the recruitment of 
a sufficient number of dentists who could supply the financial 
and human resources required for the pursuit of collective 
objectives.
The BDA already had a membership of more than 
1000 in 1900 but this still represented only a quarter of its 
potential membership which consisted of all registered dentists.
The president of one of its branches could appeal in I9OO to the 
'professional patriotism' cf dentists (l), but his call was 
only slowly answered as the following figures show. Between 
1901 and 1921, the membership of the BDA increased from ll84 to 
3100 whereas the number of registered dentists grew from 4309 to 
5610. In twenty years the BDA managed to double its representation 
of registered men but 43% of them still remained unorganised.
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The task was a difficult one: from its beginnings,
the BDA was perceived and in fact was a society of qualified 
dentists. In the early years of the Dentists' Register, 
qualified men represented only a small proportion of registered 
dentists: from 9-1^ in the first register, their number grew to
23.4% in 1891, to 40.8% in I9OI and gradually reached 80.1% at 
the time of the passing of the Dentists' Act, 1921. Even so, 
the BDA had difficulty in increasing its membership at the same 
pace as the proportion of qualified dentists on the register 
increased. Reasons for this are difficult to unravel but among 
plausible explanations is the fact that many young dentists felt 
insecure in the face of the competition of unregistered dentists 
and did not wish to abide by rules prohibiting advertisement to 
which their competitors were not bound. The BDA leadership was 
also perceived in many quarters as a group of academics who did 
not feel this insecurity, not being engaged in private practice 
and its day-to-day struggle for custom: to many dentists, the
rewards of being a member of the BDA seemed not to be worth the 
costs, which were much higher for private practitioners whose 
livelihood depended directly on hours spent at the chairside, and 
for whom hours spent on other professional activities simply 
represented loss in financial terms.
The organisation of the 'I878 men', those 
dentists registered as bona fide practitioners in I878, was 
also a rather difficult task. Many, as the figures of the first 
register have shown, did not practise dentistry as their principal 
occupation: this group not only included doctors, surgeons and
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pharmacists who were registered as practitioners combining 
dentistry with their usual occupation, but also many persons 
who took advantage of the I878 Act to regularise their 
activities as dentists even if they were carried out only on 
an occasional basis. Among the newly registered were also 
many apprentices who were too young to practise but whose 
parents thought it a good precaution for the future to 
register them.
The task of screening all requests for 
registration was an enormous one and a check on every individual 
application was almost impossible. The Registrar expressed 
the view that, given difficult circumstances 'ranging from the 
great difficulty of deciphering names and addresses, to the 
greater question of deciding whether an applicant to whom forms 
of registration had been sent five or six times but who had 
returned such forms each time with something defective therein, 
was merely careless, perverse, culpably ignorant, or was 
resolutely trying to press through in the final crush without 
subjecting himself to the penalty for obtaining registration of 
false pretences* (2) and given the short time available to him 
the first stage of registration had been * fairly satisfactory*.
The reality was that many persons had abused him: the BDA
found the names of about 300 persons who stated that they were 
engaged in the practice of dentistry in conjunction with 
pharmacy who were not registered as pharmacists (3)« In addition, 
the sharp decline in the number of *1878 men* in subsequent 
registers - from 48o6 in 1879 to 2669 in I9OI - indicates that, 
in addition to the natural wastage by death or retirement, there
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were many people who failed to keep their name on the register, 
either because they had given up the practice of dentistry 
altogether or did not feel the need to register to carry out 
their dental activities.
The *1878 men* still in practice between 
I9OO-I92I were not regarded as peers by qualified dentists 
who had invested their time and money in their training, and 
the BDA never really made efforts to recruit them. The list of 
BDA members for I9OI included 1155 persons practising in Great 
Britain: l46 of them, or 12.69^, were *1878 men* (about 40 of
the l46 were doctors and surgeons practising dentistry in 
hospitals). Twenty years later, out of 3105 BDA members, 8l or 
2.6# were *1878 men*; in all, 5-5# of I878 dentists were members 
of the BDA in I9OI and 7-5^ in 1921 (4). Presumably few of the 
non-qualified registered dentists saw themselves as *professionals* 
nor were they attracted by a society they had done without for so 
many years.
To attract members the BDA emphasised its 
dedication to the raising of the status of the profession and to 
the fight against unregistered practice (5)« It defined itself as 
an association of professionals adverse to anything,like blateint 
advertisement,that would label dentistry as a trade. The 
Association also offered its members services, like the publication 
of a Journal (The Journal of the British Dental Association renamed 
the British Dental Journal in 1904), and from I883, a benevolent 
fund to support members in financial difficulties. A Dentists*
-  76 -
Provident Society was created in 1908 to help members in case 
of sickness or accident and secure some economic independence 
in retirement; in 1913 a Dentists* Assurance Committee was 
set up as part of the Provident Society and offered general 
insurance services to members. In 1920, a library, also a 
service advocated for many years, was created and a postal 
book-lending service inaugurated.
The BDA formed regional branches from its 
beginning, to pursue its activities at a local level; there 
were 15 branches in 1921. A Representative Board of the 
delegates of the branches was created and given the responsibility 
to carry out the main functions of the Association, such as the 
organisation of the annual meeting, the prosecution of 
contraveners of the I878 Act, the lobbying of members of 
Parliament and more generally the promotion of dentistry. These 
activities were carried out mainly with revenues from the 
members* subscriptions (1 guinea until 1919, 2 guineas thereafter) 
which grew steadily from about £1200 in I9OO to just over £5000 
in 1919 before jumping to £6000 in the following year, when the 
new subscription fee took effect (6).
As to the Incorporated Society of Extractors, it 
recruited among the * ethical unregistered* to whom it claimed to 
offer the only protection available and a status to be proud of, 
that of membership in a society recognised by the Board of 
Trade (7)* This society was in the first place a defence society 
committed to the protection of the livelihood of its members.
Its founders argued that they had a legal right to practise as
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nothing in the Dentists Act, I878 restricted the practice of 
dentistry, and claimed that their vested interests were 
threatened by the BDA*s actions. From about 35 members at 
the time of its formation, the Society grew steadily despite 
relatively tight conditions of admission. It reached a 
membership of 1000 in I9IO when its president was led to 
state enthusiastically that the Society was *on the road to 
being numerically the largest, financially the wealthiest and 
politically the strongest dental organisation in British Isles' 
(8). He was to be proven wrong as to the first part of his 
statement for its membership reached only about I6OO in 1921, 
about half that of the BDA; but his forecast as to the 
financial and political strength of the Incorporated Society 
was accurate as will be shown later.
Part of the strength of the Society came from 
its very centralized organisation.Although formed of branches 
theoretically autonomous, representing every district in the 
British Isles(23 branches in 1920: I6 in England, 2 in Wales,
3 in Scotland, 2 in Ireland), it was run by a small circle of 
men whose influence spanned almost forty years. The dominant 
figure was Fred Butterfield, secretary from 1895 to 1935 (on a 
whole time basis from 1905); W.F. Bowen was president from 
1895 to 1924 and again in 1935-36; W. Crowthers edited thé 
Society's journal. The Mouth Mirror from 1904 to 1930 (he was 
also president in 1925); and P. Robinson was solicitor to the 
I.S.E.A.T. for more than twenty years. Most officials were
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reelected without opposition year after year and it is clear 
that the affairs of the Society laid mainly in the hands of 
these men.
An illustration of their dominance is provided 
by a notice published in The Mouth Mirror stating that members 
'were particularly requested to refrain from entering into any 
correspondence with any dental organization or publication upon 
subjects relative to dental politics, except through and by 
permission of the secretary' (9). Butterfield, in putting such 
a straightforward request to members, could refer to his past 
successes and the example of a BDA weakened by internal divisions 
was a constant reminder of the value of concerted action. One of 
Butterfield's and his colleagues' achievements was a test case 
brought to the House of Lords which decided that only the use of 
the statutory titles of "dentist" and "dental practitioner" was 
prohibited by the I878 Act, not the use of the word "dental" (10).
A few months after this decision, the I.S.E.A.T. changed its name 
to 'The Incorporated Dental Society' (I.D.S.) (11).
Members of the I.D.S. were prepared both to
accept the rule of a small group Eind to pay the costs to the
protection of their right to practise. The BDA's fight against 
unregistered practice was a direct threat to their livelihood and 
thus provided a strong incentive to them to unite behind those who
could offer protection. Defence of their interests took the form
of political and legal activities to assert their right to practise 
and to counter BDA's actions against unregistered practice. It also 
included from 1904 services like the provision of professional risks 
insurance.
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But more than protection, the IDS offered to 
its members a sense of belonging, of identity and of legitimacy.
Members had their own association, legally incorporated, their 
journal, their annual meetings, a library lending books by 
post (from 1904-05); and, foremost, a voice in dental politics, 
thanks to the continuous activity of Butterfield, Bowen and 
Robinson and to a large accumulated fund, which according to 
Butterfield's annual reports was increasing year by year (12) 
and which allowed the IDS to gather strong political support in 
Parliament. The IDS leaders' strategies proved successful in 
1921 when the new Dentists Act recognised the members of the 
Society and put their names on the register without condition.
Attempts to organise dental practitioners were 
not limited to the BDA and IDS; but the relative success of 
these two bodies made further attempts much more difficult,< 
as the following examples will show. In I908, a group of 
registered dentists, including some members of the BDA, formed 
a "British Dental Defence Association" to 'supplement'.the BDA 
which, in their opinion,was not doing a proper job of protecting 
the interests of registered dentists (I5). The Association, which 
changed its name to the 'Society of British Dentists' a few 
months after its foundation, set as its object the promotion 
and protection^the interests of registered dentists by enforcing 
the provisions of the I878 Act throughout the United Kingdom.
It committed itself to prosecute each and every contravener of 
the law. This objective was pursued for a time but became 
pointless after the Lord's decision in 'Bellerby vs Heyworth and 
Bowen' which limited severely the chances of success of prosecutions (l4)
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This attempt to provide an alternative to the BDA resulted at 
least in keeping the latter more alive to the dissatisfaction 
of many registered dentists. In fact, the life of the SBD, 
which seems to have come to an end after its third annual 
meeting in December 1911, coincided with the years of 
discussion within the BDA of a draft of a new dental Bill to 
prohibit unregistered practice.
Another attempt to supersede the BDA was 
undertaken, in 1911, by persons critical of the BDA for being 
unable to raise the status of the profession, but it failed 
when a meeting called to form a 'Dental Reform Association' 
drew only 12 persons (15).
On the unregistered side, the political 
activities of the BDA during the first decade of the century 
led to the formation of two other societies, the National Dental 
Corporation and The Chemists' Dental Society. The NDC originated 
as Ein attempt to unite registered practitioners and the 'good 
unregistered' (l6); a 'British Dental Union' was formed in July 
1909 to set up examinations and create a new register accessible 
to all. Its promoter, A.L. Burlin, was an unregistered practitioner 
trained in Germany, and its president was a qualified dentist. The 
name of the society was changed in September 1909 to the 'National 
Dental Corporation Limited' to avoid misunderstandings surrounding 
the word 'union' in the previous title. For less than a year it 
published a weekly paper. The Dental News which ended in financial 
disaster. In 1910, the editor of The Dental Surgeon, hitherto 
published as an independent journal, transformed it into the official
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organ of the NDC, which he wanted to change into an "Ethical 
Dental League" (17). The corporation failed to attract registered 
dentists and slowly degenerated partly because of a lack of 
services to offer and partly because of weak leadership. When 
the war began, its membership had fallen to under 100.
After the creation of a Departmental Committee 
on Dentistry in 1917 (l8), the NDC was revived under the new 
title of "National Dental Association* with the object of securing 
the registration of its members when a new Dental Act, as 
recommended by the Committee (19), was passed. At the end of 1918 
it had 310 members in 12 autonomous branches and in 1919 it 
amalgamated with the British Dental Union (Scotland), a small 
society of some 122 unregistered members mostly in Aberdeen and 
Dundee. Thanks to relaxed conditions of admission, it had grown 
to l684 by March 1921; but the increase was held by some to be 
at the expense of quality, and the open door policy led to 
internal conflicts. When the Dentists Act, 1921 was passed the 
NDA was not recognised as a representative society and.its members 
had to seek entry to the register on an individual basis, despite 
the support of a parliamentary agent in the House of Commons and 
the promise of help by a minister (20).
The "Chemists* Dental Society of Great Britain and 
Ireland" was started in 1910. As its name indicates it was 
initiated by pharmacists who feared that fresh dental legislation, 
as called for by the BDA, could threaten their right to draw teeth. 
Their practices, well established for many decades, especially in 
industrial working-class areas, were needed to supplement the low
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income they derived from their practice of pharmacy* Both the 
BDA and the IDS opposed such practices; the IDS secretary once 
coldly replied to a suggestion of the editor of the Chemist and 
Druggist that chemists should try to become members of the IDS 
to protect their right to practise dentistry, that the mere fact 
of occasionally extracting a tooth did not entitle them to lay 
claim to a moral right to practise dentistry (21). When it 
became clear that no new Dental Act was in sight, the CDG 
reduced its activity considerably but it still remained in 
existence. In 1915» its members unânijraously opposed, by 
referendum, an offer to amalgamate with the National Dental 
Corporation.
It was reactivated in 1917 at the time of the 
Departmental Committee on Dentistry whose report, published in 
1919» it opposed strongly as it did not recognise the legitimacy 
of their claim to practise. They put their objections in the 
following terms: ’Dentistry has been practised by chemists from
time immemorial. Dental operations were performed by them as 
their proper work long before dentistry became a separate 
specialised profession and many chemists have continued to 
practise down to the present time. Their position relative to 
dentistry has never been interfered with by statute, and seeing 
that they have never desired the distinctive title of "dentist", 
they were not as a body affected by the Act of I878. They have 
gone on since the Act just as they did before, except that 
dentistry has become more highly specialised, fewer chemists in 
proportion have devoted themselves to it. But in thickly populated
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industrial areas where registered dentists are few and their 
fees prove prohibitive to the lower classes, a greater call has 
been made on the dental service of chemists, they have rendered 
useful and efficient public service" (22).
In the end, a compromise was reached and their 
vested interest partly recognised by the Dentists* Act, 1921; 
registered pharmaceutical chemists and registered druggists were 
then allowed to extract a tooth * where the case is urgent and no 
registered medical practitioner or registered dentist is available 
and the operation is performed without the application of any 
general or local anaesthetic* (23). In addition, those who Iriad 
*a substantial practice* as dentists at the time of the commencement 
of the Act could apply for registration as bona fide practitioners.
In sum, the very existence of two reasonably well 
organised associations of registered and unregistered dental 
practitioners made the formation of rival associations very difficult, 
The BDA for instance,although inviting severe criticisms from some 
of its members from time to time (24),remained the only force 
among the registered. Among the unregistered, the NDA and the 
Chemists* Dental Society had limited success and were never 
formally recognised by the state or other institutions as the IDS 
was. The main feature of the 1900-1921 period, however, was that 
more than half of the dentists practising in Great Britain were not 
organised in any way, thus making the dental associations* task of 
establishing their credibility and their representativeness very 
arduous.
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THE ROAD TO CREDIBILITY
In the process of obtaining social and legal 
recognition, cin occupational group needs some sort of external 
support; its clients, the state and other social groups and 
institutions must be led to believe to some extent that it is 
legitimate that only the members of the group should claim the 
right to perform certain activities. This is achieved only by 
groups whose credibility has reached a reasonable level and can 
sustain favourable comparisons with competitors in that respect.
As regards the establishment of their credibility, the dentsOL 
groups engaged in the process of closing tneir profession to 
outsiders in Britain before 1921, used means such as controlling 
entry, promoting the qualification of their members and discrediting 
outsiders and competitors.
From the start, the BDA was in a better position 
than the IDS as regards its respectability. It was an association 
of state registered persons who, for the most part,were qualified 
licentiates in Dental Surgery. To be admitted to the BDA, a 
registered dentist had to be recommended by three members (this 
was reduced to one member later), be of good character and undertake 
not to condr.ct his practice *by means of exhibition of dental 
specimens, appliances or apparatus in an open shop or in a window 
or in a show case exposed to public inspection, or by means of 
public advertisements or circulars describing modes of practices 
or patented or secret processes; or by the publication of his 
scale of professional fees* (25), which says much about advertising 
methods in use in 1900. The BDA could claim, in short, that its
- 85 -
members were both recognised by the state and by the prestigious 
Royal Colleges of Surgeons and that they were formally committed 
to ethical, ’professional* practice.
The IDS was in a more difficult position. As 
a society of unregistered practitioners, it could not rely on 
any external recognition and so had to establish its respectability 
by means of internal control. A first step in that direction was 
to set conditions of admission such as to differentiate its 
members from quacks and unethical practitioners. Applicants had 
to be 21 years of age, to have been an apprentice to a registered 
dentist or to a member for at least three years, to be of good 
character, to be engaged in dentistry as a principal occupation 
and to go through a searching test. In addition, members had to 
undertake, in writing, not to advertise their services. In 1915, 
conditions were tightened when an examination in mechanical 
dentistry was added.
In their attempts to present a good image to the 
public, the IDS and the BDA took different directions, mainly 
because they had rather different conceptions of dentistry. To 
the IDS, dentistry was basically a mechanical discipline and its 
techniques had to be learned by practice. The Mouth Mirror devoted 
many pages to the latest technicail developments and innovations; 
an important feature of IDS meetings was also the presence of 
dental companies with exhibits of their materials end equipment. 
This presence was particularly welcome as it provided an implicit 
sanction for the practice by the unregistered. In I908, the IDS 
claimed to have organised *the most extensive and comprehensive
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exhibition of dental inventions ever engineered in the world*
(26). They were particularly proud of the attendance of many 
registered dentists and many BDA members. Attempts were made 
in series of articles in The Mouth Mirror to develop mechanical 
dentistry as a discipline in its own right (27). In 1915» the 
Society instituted a *British School of Dental Technology* to 
prepare applicants for the examination required for admission 
to the IDS.
Connected with the importance of extractions in 
their practice, members of the IDS had also a keen interest in 
anaesthetics. In 1915» they formed a *Society of Dental 
Anaesthetists*. The founders said its object was * to promote 
honourable and efficient practice* (28) but it is worth noting 
that its formation coincided with the setting up of a government 
committee of inquiry into the use of cocaine in dentistry and 
that there were fears that the use of cocaine in anaesthetic 
preparation could be restricted to registered dentists.
The BDA, on the other hand, saw dentistry as an 
important branch of medicine which had its own cognitive basis 
and techniques, like other medical specialisms. University 
degrees in dentistry were granted by ten universities in 1921.
Formal recognition had come from the Royal Commission on 
University Education in London which had stated in its 1913 report;
* dentistry is a profession and therefore the University ought to 
train for it* (29). At first, however, there had been an internal 
debate between those who feared that dental degrees would devalue 
the title of L.D.S. and those, like the members of the Odontological
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Society (which in I906 became the section of Odontology of the 
Royal Society of Medicine), who said that a medical degree, as 
well as a dental degree, should be required before a person is 
allowed to practise dentistry (30). That an intimate link between 
dentistry and medicine should exist was justified by the alleged 
role of oral diseases in the aetiology of a number of systemic 
diseases. This argument was first developed at the turn of the 
century by a British physician, William Hunter, who made it famous 
under the label of 'theory of oral sepsis' (31). Hunter was 
convinced that bad teeth were a source of infection that poisonned 
the system and caused diseases in orgeins of the body apparently 
unrelated to the mouth. His thesis found some supporters among 
medical men but it is with dentists that it had great success.
The mouth, they argued, was a breeding ground for infection, *a 
perfect incubator, heat and moisture being always present,... a 
veritable nursery garden for disease germs' (32). This was 
accepted as self-evident and rapidly a large body of literature 
on the effects of oral sepsis developed. Oral sepsis was said to 
cause or to play a contributory part in causing gastric troubles, 
rheumatism, arthritis, tuberculosis, cancer, even alcoholism and 
mental illness and all sorts of diseases, all of which were later 
shown to have little if any connection with bad teeth (33).
However, at the beginning of the century, no one 
seriously questionned the theory and qualified dentists used it 
extensively to enhance their credibility. The BDA spokesmen 
stressed the potential role of dentists for the good of the nation 
and argued that the state should concern itself with the problem 
of dental disease. As one of them noted, 'the ravages of dental 
caries threaten to become a national problem wfiich must sooner or
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later be dealt with by the state if we are to maintain our position 
as the foremost nation* (34). According to another leader of the 
BDA, in campaigning for state action in the field of dentistry, 
the Association was * a real factor of utility in the promotion of 
a sound national life* (35).
The BDA called for state action in two directions. 
First, the state should establish public dental service and regard 
the preservation of the teeth of the people as contributing to 
safeguard the health, safety and prosperity of the nation (36).
Second, the state should address itself to the control of unqualified 
practice of dentistry. The following statement was typical: 'that
the public shall no longer be made the happy hunting ground of the 
unsuccessful dark,of the unscrupulous charlatan but that it shall 
in the future be entrusted to the hands of those - and those only - 
who have studied the subject in all its branches and have reached 
the stcindard recognized by law, as well as by common sense, for 
registration* (37).
Thus the theory of oral sepsis provided the qualified 
section of the dental profession with arguments to enhance its 
credibility and project an image of expertise and professionalism. . 
At the same time it fitted well in the third set of tactics to which 
I have referred which consisted in discrediting outsiders.
At first, the BDA declared war on all unregistered 
practitioners in an undiscriminative way, insisting on the complete 
ban of unregistered practice on the grounds that it constituted a 
public hazard. The argument was not baseless as many court cases 
had shown. Two government reports, one in 1910 and the other in 
1919 also stressed the dangers of unregulated practice. The 
Committee on 'The Practice of Medicine and Surgery by 
Unqualified Persons' (38) particularly denounced the so-called
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"Hygienic Institutes" where useless extractions of sound teeth 
were performed, free of charge, to increase the sale of 
dentures. The report also listed cases of injuries inflicted 
by quacks and charlatans. In 1919» the Departmental Committee 
on Dentistry reported similar occurences. As one member put it, 
the BDA wanted to get rid of 'the barnacles of our profession 
and to become the foundation of a new and purer dental profession' 
(39;) • However, the BDA had ultimately to recognise that it would 
have to discriminate among the unregistered. All of them were 
not dangerous and some had reasonable training and experience.
In addition, it became clear that, in view of the large dental 
needs of the population, it had to be accepted that the 
prohibition of unregistered practice would not come until after 
the recognition of the more capable of the existing unregistered 
practitioners.
The reaction of the IDS to the BDA's claims was 
to agree that quacks should be banned and practice restricted 
to properly trained persons. But the Society insisted that its 
members were not quacks and always described dentistry as "our 
profession", "our vocation", "our calling". They reminded the 
BDA that most of the IDS members had been trained by registered 
dentists who had no hesitation in leaving them in charge during 
holidays or when they were on the golf links, that many had long 
years of experience with a satisfied clientele and that all were 
committed to ethical practice (40). The IDS also insisted on 
its clean record of having had no member successfully prosecuted 
for an infringement of the 1878 Denteil Act. A final argument was 
that, as the great majority of dentists registered in I878 were not
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qualified in any way, membership of the IDS with its stringent 
requirements offered a greater protection to the public than 
registration itself.
To improve their image as "professionals", 
dental associations expressed concern for the needs of some 
categories of population like school children or working classes 
and more or less successfully tried to put on relief schemes for 
them. For example, the IDS announced the creation of a hospital, 
•The Incorporated Institute for the Treatment and Restoration of 
the Teeth* in Manchester in I906 where all services would be 
free to patients *in poor circumstances* (4l); but no action 
followed. The BDA initiated, with more success, dental services 
for school children in Cambridge in 1907, an experiment repeated 
in a few other cities.
Further attempts to organise public dental services 
on a large scale for those who could not afford dentists* services 
are examined in chapter 5» Another action worth of mention here, 
however, was the provision of free dental services to recruits to 
the armed forces during the 19l4-19l8 war by both BDA and IDS 
members as their contribution to the war effort.
In sum, the two main dental societies made 
continuous efforts to make it known to the public that their 
members were well trained and competent practitioners and that 
their prime motivation was the good of the public rather than 
personal profit. Over the years, they succeeded in making their 
case credible enough to induce the state to pass legislation in line 
with their demands and to gain social recognition.
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MAINTAINING COHESIVMESS
The capacity of an occupational group to engage 
in collective strategies of professionalisation is also related 
to its cohesiveness. It can be argued that the extent to which 
members of a group have common needs and expectations and share 
goals as well as an occupational ideology that provides a 
coherent definition of the group and its relationships to other 
groups in the saune area of work, will determine the group's 
ability to pursue its objective in a united way and will affect 
its chances of success.
Such devices ajs professional journails,regular 
meetings, dinners, all play an important part in the development 
of occupational solidarity and help to produce and diffuse 
professional ideologies. However, cohesiveness is very much 
related to the characteristics of the occupational group itself, 
and specially to its homogeneity in respect of the social origins 
of its members, their training, their work activities and other 
characteristics. A homogeneous group is less likely to experience 
internal conflict; if conflict occurs, its resolution is also 
likely to be easier.
Clearly, the BDA was less of a homogeneous 
association than the IDS which recruited from a population with 
a fairly similar background. Many members were former apprentices 
now practising in industrial areas; they were usually well 
established gind reasonably well off and they all aspired to 
formal recognition. BDA members, on the other hand, included a 
few unqualified*1878 dentists* $a majority of Licentiates in Dental
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Surgery and a substantial number of fellows of the Royal Colleges 
with medical training in addition to dental training. There were 
rich Harley Street or South East Coast resort dental, surgeons 
as well as dentists struggling against the competition of the 
unregistered in smaller towns. There were academics, advocates 
of conservative dentistry and advocates of mechanical dentistry, 
and so on. Various needs and expectations coexisted and tensions 
between them led to many internal conflicts. Those who were 
engaged in successful urban practices or in teaching and 
research tended to see their society plainly as a scientific and 
professional body devoted to the promotion of dentistry, whereas 
others felt that it should play a more active political role in 
protecting their livelihood from the attacks of unregistered 
competitors and in securing a reasonable return on their investment 
in their training. BDA annual meetings were almost always 
occasions to debate controversial issues, and leaders and 
officials had to show great skills in trying to maintain a climate 
of "professional fraternity". A long time leader of the Association 
wrote that the social gatherings at those meetings, the annual 
dinner in particular, have been of great value * in promoting 
union and sometimes in mitigating the bitterness of political 
conflict* (42). On the major issue of the control of unregistered 
practice, for example, members of the BDA were deeply divided as 
we will see in the next chapter.
Dissatisfaction with the Association's policies led 
to the formation of the Society of British Dentists (I908-I9II)
Sind to the unsuccessful attempt to form a Dental Reform Association 
in 1911. The BDA recovered relatively easily from these challenges.
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but later, in 1919, had to face a much more difficult one. During 
the discussion on the Report of the Departmental Committee on 
Dentistry, a group of London dentists opposed the Committee's 
recommendation that the names of all practitioners recognised 
by future dental legislation, i.e. those already registered 
under the I878 Act, members of the IDS and other bona fide 
practitioners in practice for at least 5 years as the report 
suggested, should be put on the same register. When it became 
clear that their point could not be made and that the BDA's 
official policy of accepting the Departmental Committee's 
recommendation would not be altered,, the opponents formed a 
'Dentists* Committee*, a sort of internal opposition group under 
the chairmanship of SirFrank Colyer (L.D.S., F.R.C.S.), a prominent 
teacher, researcher and former dean of the Royal Dental Hospital 
Dental School. They started an impressive campaign in the 
professional and lay press for what they called *a separate 
list*, i.e., 'for the registered, a clean register and our present 
title and for the unregistered, a close list and special description* 
(4-3). They refused to be associated on the same register with 
unqualified persons and they wanted a special description applied 
to themselves so as to make sure that the public could discriminate 
between trained and untrained dentists. The Committee finally lost 
its fight and the Dentists' Act, 1921 created a single register 
and conferred the same status on all dentists. Nevertheless, the 
Committee survived and, in 1922, became the 'British Society of 
Dental Surgeons' with the aim of preventing admission to the BDA 
of the non-qualified practitioners registered in 1921.
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The IDS never experienced similar division: 
its members had strong common interests, and their association 
was above all a pressure group whose specific function was to 
protect their livelihood. As long as their leaders proved 
efficient in securing their legal position, autocratic 
procedures raised no objections. Year after year, annual 
meetings of the IDS were well organised displays of unanimity: 
the pattern was always the same with technical papers, a large 
exhibition of dental products and equipment and all political 
matters dealt with by Bowen, Butterfield and Robinson. Members 
were asked to back their leaders' political activities both in 
providing financial support and in living up to the standards 
of the association: in return, they were promised security
and social recognition, and as the next chapter will demonstrate, 
the goods were delivered.
In sum, cohesiveness is necessary to secure the 
viability and the credibility of an association. The failure of 
the National Dental Association to develop as a strong group in 
its early years, for example, was partly due to the difficulty of 
reconciling the interests of its registered and unregistered 
members- Conflicts among its leaders, who accused each other 
of promoting their personal interests, - coupled with the 
condemnation to prison of its initiator A.L. Burlin in a strange 
and risible case of bigamy! - resulted in a complete loss of 
credibility from which the NDA never recovered. The NDA was anyway 
at a great disadvantage since it had to find recruits among 
practitioners who already had shunned two rather well established
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associations- It was obvious right from the start that potential 
recruits could be convinced to join only with great difficulty.
The NDA did not really have anything specific to offer that the 
BDA and IDS could not already offer: only when it relaxed its
conditions of admission on the eve of a new Dental Act did it 
manage to recruit large numbers of unregistered who hoped that 
membership of a dental association would open the doors to 
registration when a new Dental Act was passed. As we have 
already seen, this hope failed to be fulfilled in 1921.
In this chapter, I have sought to show how the 
two main dental associations in existence in I9OO in Britain 
dealt with the problem of their development as viable, credible 
and united associations. At a time when the social status of 
dentistry was rather low and the future of the occupation 
uncertain, organising dental practitioners was crucial. Both 
the BDA and the IDS needed more members and more funds to 
establish themselves on a solid basis and to fight their legal 
battle. Both were committed to obtaining the recognition of 
dentistry as a discipline contributing to the health and welfare 
of the British population, and the recognition of their members 
as legitimate providers of dental services. Leaders of the two 
associations knew that this would not be achieved withoui a good 
deal of support from the public; hence their efforts to project 
a convincing image..
Most of the strategies and tactics I have examined 
were improvised and by no means part of any sort of long term plan. 
Rather, leaders of dental associations designed their policies in
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accordance with their perception of the political situation in 
dentistry, of the actions of their rivals and of the mood of 
their own members. The BDA in particular had to cope with 
internal struggles and with the indifference of the majority 
of registered men. Also those who wished to raise the status 
of dentistry as an occupation had to deal with the ignorance 
and prejudices of the medical profession and of the public in 
general.
Within these limitations, dental associations 
tried as best as they could to create the conditions whereby, 
as pressure groups, they could manipulate their social position. 
Only those who first occupied the field of dentistry really 
succeeded: all attempts to create strong and influential
associations after 1900 failed. One of the ways in which 
the BDA and IDS tried to improve their social position was to 
alter their legal status, and they were particularly active at 
that level. I now turn to these political and legislative 
activities.
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CHAPTER 4: THE CAMPAIGN FOR COMPULSORY REGISTRATION
During the twenty years preceding the Dentists 
Act, 1921, dental associations devoted most of their time and 
financial resources to political and legal action. The 
occupational closure of dentistry was their overt objective 
euid their main concern was to design the appropriate collective 
actions to attain it. In this area of "dental politics" 
occupational strategies were discussed and debated at length 
and were pursued consciously, whereas the strategies relating 
to professional organisation and to the market for dental services 
were more or less improvised.
All associations I have already mentionned had 
been formed in the first place for political purposes; the BDA 
'to carry out the provisions of the I878 Act'; the IDS 'to obtain 
parliamentary or other legal acknowledgement of the rights of the 
members'; the National Dental Corporation to reform the I878 Act; 
the Society of British Dentists to enforce to the limit the 
provisions of existing dental legislation; the Chemists' Dental 
Society to oppose the BDA's Draft Bill of I908-I909; and finally 
the Dentists' Committee to oppose certain provisions of the Dentists 
Bill, 1920. With the exception of the BDA, all devoted the greatest 
part of their activities to "dental politics" in one way or another.
For more clarity it is convenient to consider 
separately the period which preceded the inquiry of the Departmental 
Committee on Dentistry and the following period when attention was 
focusing on the preparation of a new Dental Act. Between I9OO and 1917, 
dental associations used three sorts of tactics; one consisting in
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testing the Dentists Act, l8?8, i.e. in bringing cases before the 
courts to clarify the interpretation of the Act; another in 
attempts to modify the interpretation of the Act or to add to it 
by having clauses dealing with dentistry inserted in other 
legislation dealing with matters more or less remotely related 
to dentistry (Companies Act, for example); and the third in 
promoting a new Dental Act.
DENTAL POLITICS BETWEEN I9OO and 191?
By the end of the 19th century, it was difficult 
to find dental practitioners other than charlatans or those 
practising in the so-called Hygienic Institutes who were completely 
satisfied with their legal situation. The increasing volume of 
unqualified practice was a clear reminder of the limitations of 
the Dentists Act, I878. Nevertheless while there was general 
dissatisfaction, opinions varied very much as to the course of 
action to take to remedy this situation. BDA members were split 
in two groups. There was first those who thought that the I878 
Act had at least achieved the formal recognition of dentistry as 
a separate profession and that further efforts should be made to 
test the provisions of the law in the courts, particularly the 
clauses concerning the use of titles implying that the holder was 
'specially qualified to practise dentistry'. The other group held 
that only substantial amendements to the law or its replacement by a 
new dental Act could definitely settle the issue.
Among those of the latter opinion, some thought 
that the sympathy and support of a majority of members of Parliament 
could be easily and rapidly obtained in view of the intrinsic value
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of such a measure (l); but this was challenged by those who,
more realistically, believed that parliamentary support was seldom
easily obtained and who warned that the BDA would need much
unity and great political skills to convince the many
legislators who believed that the BDA was seeking new
legislation only to protect the interests of dentists themselves (2).
On the unregistered side, the IDS* interpretation 
of the 1878 Act had always been that it did not preclude anyone 
from practising dentistry as long as the regulations concerning 
the use of certain titles were strictly observed (3)» At first, 
when the BDA took steps to restrict unregistered practice, the 
Society reacted defensively and relied on its parliamentary 
support to oppose the BDA's actions; later, it took the initiative 
to test the I878 Act in higher courts and in 1912 it drafted its 
own dental Bill to oppose the BDA's.
"TESTING" THE DENTISTS ACT, I878
Between I9OO and 1910, the BDA played an active 
role in the prosecutions of 91 persons for contravening section 
3 of the Dentists Act (4). During this period, the courts in 
England, Scotland and Ireland took 11 decisions which added to or 
altered the interpretation of section 3 (5)* Six concerned the 
practice of dentistry by companies and the rest concerned the 
interpretation of the words 'specially qualified to practise 
dentistry'. A controversial decision in 1903, in O'Duffy v Jaffe 
Surgeon-Dentists Limited, ruled that the word 'person' in the Dental 
Act must be confined to natural persons and did not include companies
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or corporations, thus enabling the latter to carry out the 
business of dentistry outside the constraints of the Act. A 
direct consequence of this decision was the formation of a 
multitude of one person companies (6). A year later, another 
court reversed the decision by ruling that the Registrar of
Joint Stock Companies could not register a name containing
the word "dentist* when no shareholder was a registered dentist 
(?)• Three further decisions in 1905» 1907 and 1909 confirmed 
this decision and companies with a name implying that their business 
was carried out by registered practitioners were restrained by 
injunction (8),
As to the implication of being "specially qualified 
to practise dentistry", the BDA used an "agent provocateur" to get 
the evidence necessary to bring cases to courts of justice. This 
practice was relatively successful though complicated and costly.
In many cases, the infringment of the law was clear and the judges had 
no difficulty in convicting the offender. In 1908, however, a
border line case was judged and one Barnes was convicted of having
held himself out as "specially qualified" (9). There was no evidence 
that he had used the descriptions of dentist or dental practitioner 
nor was his personnal skill in question. The decision was taken on 
the proof that he had advertised himself in the following manner:
"H.J. Barnes, Finest Artificial Teeth at Moderate Prices. Extractions, 
Advice Free. Hours 10-7* English and American Teeth, Advice Free, 
Painless Extractions". His appeal was also dismissed and the 
meaning of "specially qualified to practise dentistry" was thereby 
considerably extended.
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What constituted a great success for the BDA 
was a major threat to the unregistered and the IDS, To 
challenge this decision, the solicitor of the IDS arranged a
test case with the intention of pushing it to the highest
court of the country to obtain a definitive interpretation.
The case was that of a partnership which included Bowen, the 
president of the Incorporated Society and presented facts 
similar to Bames v Brown. A clause in the partnership 
agreement provided that anything done by any of the partners 
(Bellerby, Bowen and Heyworth) in contravention of the Dentists 
Act, 1878 should be ground for dissolution of the partnership.
So Bellerby clsdmed that a notice used by Heyworth was infringing 
the Dental Act and asked for the dissolution of the partnership
which the two other partners refused to accept.
The Chancery Division which first heard the case 
agreed with Bellerby; Bowen and Heyworth appealed of that decision 
and the Court of Appeal agreed, thus reversing the previous decision 
and overruling Barnes v Brown. To consolidate this decision, 
Bellerby took the case a step further, to the House of Lords, 
who confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal; they ruled 
that "the words "specially qualified to practise dentistry..." 
import a professional qualification entitling the holder to 
registration under the Act and not merely skill or competence.
There is nothing in the Act which prevents any man from doing 
dentist"s work and informing the public that he does such work"
(10). The same day, the Lords turned down an appeal in Minter v 
Snow, another test case, arranged by the BDA this time (11). This 
was a definite blow to the BDA"s contention that the spirit of the 
Dentists Act, 1878 was that only registered persons should practise
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dentistry. The Lords in Bellerby vs Heyworth and Bowen opted 
for the more literal interpretation that only the use of certain 
titles was restricted and that nothing in the law prevented 
anyone from practising dentistry, thus deciding in favour of 
the IDS and the unregistered. From then on, the BDA had to 
put its hope of controlling unregistered practice exclusively 
in the amendment of the law itself as the use of the courts of 
justice had been shown to be inneffective.
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT UNREGISTERED PRACTICE
Before I908, no direct attempt to obtain sin 
amendment or replacement of the Dentists Act, I878, was made; 
instead, concurrently with its actions in the courts, the BDA 
chose to try to have clauses concerning dentistry inserted in 
Bills forwarded by other groups which were thought to have greater 
chances of becoming law. In I908, the Scottish Branch of the BDA 
put forward a draft of a new dental Bill and thus initiated a 
long and arduous debate within the Association and outside.
THE MEDICAL ACTS AMENDMENT BILL, (1904-1906)
The BDA had first tried to take advantage of a 
Bill not directly concerned with dentistry. This was during the 
discussions preceding the passing of the Companies Act, 1900, when 
it wanted to add a clause banning dental companies to the Bill; 
but this was rejected. In 1904, the Medical Acts Amendment Bill, 
drafted and sponsored by the British Medical Association, provided 
the BDA with a unique opportunity to introduce legislation to check
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unregistered practice. The BMA agreed to include in its Bill 
provisions concerning dentistry. The main ones were (i) that 
the principle of direct representation of the medical profession 
on the General Medical Council should be extended to the dental 
profession; (ii) that a "one-portal* system of admission to the 
mediccuL and dental registers by means of a final state examination 
under the absolute control and sole management of the Medical 
Council should be instituted; and (iii) that dental practice by 
companies (12) and by unregistered persons should be prohibited 
(13)• The Bill was then put in the hands of a Parliamentary 
Committee of MPs interested in medical matters to be introduced 
to Parliament as soon as possible.
The IDS" immediate reaction was to oppose the 
Bill on the grounds that the provision concerning unregistered 
practice did not consider the vested interests and, indeed, the 
rights of ethical and competent unregistered practitioners- The 
Society also argued that the public did not want such legislation 
which would reduce access to dental treatment. The editor of the 
Mouth Mirror summed up the argument by saying that this Bill was 
nothing but the offspring of "monopoly seekers" (l4). Bowen, the 
president of the IDS was unexpectedly cheerful when he discussed 
the issue in his address to the annual meeting of the Society in 
1904. He said: "honestly, I do not altogether dislike Bills 
cropping up at intervals because they bring us together, unite us 
in a common cause, stir up more interest in our calling, stimulate 
us to better efforts and we emerge from the ordeal stronger and 
better fitted to maintain our position in the world and justify 
our existence in the calling or profession we follow" (15)*
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A few months after the publication of the Bill, 
the IDS tried to make a deal with the BDA, offering to support 
financially and in other ways the presentation of a Bill which 
would prohibit unregistered practice but would preserve the 
rights of the members of the Society (l6); the offer was 
promptly declined. In 1905, the general feeling in the BDA was 
that the prospects of the Bill they were promoting were good, 
"thanks to a fairly large following in Parliament" (17), but its 
passage through Parliament was delayed by the general election of 
1906. On that occasion, the BDA and the BMA put their case to all 
candidates, "not only as voters", wrote the BDJ. "but as trusted 
advisers upon the highest possible ground" (I8). At the same 
time, the IDS stepped up its campaign against the Bill, pointing 
out that in view of "the omission to recognize that section of the 
profession upon which the bulk of the working classes depend for 
dental aid, the Bill as drafted is reduced to an insult" (19). The 
Society suggested the formation of a Commission of Inquiry to 
examine the whole situation of the practice of dentistry and 
blamed the BDA for weakening the profession in defending a Bill 
which divided dental practitioners and had no chance whatever to 
become law (20). On the latter point, the IDS was right and 
in the end the Bill was never examined by Parliament.
THE DENTAL COMPANIES (RESTRICTION OF PRACTICE) BILL, (1907)
An interesting development occurred in 1907 when 
the General Medical Council, which had never shown any interest in 
dental matters, promoted a Bill to control the activity of dental 
companies. The Dental Companies (Restriction of Practice) Bill, 
which was introduced in the House of Lords and then sent to the
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House of Commons, had been drafted by the Council without any 
consultation with the BDA; it did not abolish dental companies 
but restricted the right to form one to registered dentists only. 
The BDA reacted strongly, regretting the "amazing" lack of 
consultation by the Council and, above all, the wording of the 
Bill which made great use of the expression "the business of 
dentistry". The BDJ wrote: "a great wrong will be done should
the Commons endorse the Bill as sent down from the Lords. Every 
effort must be made to procure the amendment or rejection of 
this monstruous Bill, as raischievious as it is unnecessary, 
which was begotten by the Medical Council, misconceived by the 
Committee of the House of Lords and deserves no better fate than 
to be engulfed for ever in the dark waters of oblivion" (21).
The BDA made it clear in adopting a resolution at its annual 
meeting that only the complete abolition of the practice of 
dentistry by companies would be acceptable (22).
The IDS was not pleased with the Bill either; in 
restricting the right to a form a company to registered dentists, 
it impinged on the rights of the unregistered which the IDS could 
not accept. For the IDS the solution of eliminating dental 
companies altogether was preferable and the Society joined the 
BDA in its opposition to the Bill. Eventually, the Bill was 
dropped at the end of 1907 and dental companies remained in 
operation.
DRAFT DENTAL BILLS (1908-I9l4)
The uncalled for intervention of the General 
Medical Council convinced some members of the BDA that the
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Association ought to take the initiative of any amendment to 
the Dental Act and that the strategy of relying on others to 
further its objectives was a bad one. The view that the best 
means of raising the status of the qualified dentist and of 
putting the profession on a solid footing was to replace the 
1878 Act,had been held by many BDA members for a long time.
In 1900, a leading member argued that it was 
the only sensible strategy and recalled that it was a conclusion 
arrived at by many some years before (23). Not all, however, 
agreed on the chances of an approach to Parliament in that 
direction; some like Charles Tomes, the only dentist on the 
General Medical Council,were pessimistic. He said he would 
rather support a tactic of going forward together with the 
medical profession when it engages in legislative action (24).
In 1902, the BDA*s Representative Board 
appointed a Committee "to consider what additional legislation 
was necessary to prevent the practice of dentistry by unregistered 
persons and to suggest a "modus operandi" for obtaining such 
legislation" (25). This was done rather reluctantly and with 
little hope. Not long afterwards,the BDA seized the opportunity 
provided by the BMA's Medical Acts Amendment Bill and "pushed 
forward with the medical profession". The failure of this 
attempt was a great disappointment as was the initiative taken 
by the Medical Council on dental companies: it discouraged raainy
but others were thus persuaded that direct action by the BDA 
itself was the right solution.
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In 1908, the Scottish Branch of the BDA took 
the initiative to move its own "proposed amendments of the 
Dentists Act". It argued "that the profession should agree 
to ask for; 1) a Dental Council to manage our own affairs 
and expend our money; 2) a register of our own;... 3) a 
state examination; 4) and prohibition of practice by 
unregistered persons under heavy penalties; (then) we should 
have an irrestible case founded alike on justice, expendiency 
and comraunual welfare" (26).
The Scottish proposals received with mixed 
reactions; strong opposition came from those who did not 
believe that Parliament was prepared to change the existing 
dental legislation and who thought that it would be a mistake 
to part with the protection of the General Medical Council, 
however limited it wasi They also pointed to the vagueness of 
the proposals on the fate of the unregistered persons presently 
in practice. The Metropolitan and Irish branches expressed overt 
opposition (27) and Charles Tomes reaffirmed his scepticism 
saying that there were not "the smallest ghost of a chance" that 
a Dental Council be entrusted with powers similar to that of the 
Medical Council (28).
The Scottish Branch, under the leadership of 
William Guy, was not deterred by adverse reactions and it moved 
a resolution incorporating its legislative proposals at the annual 
meeting of the BDA in May 1909 (29). During the long and vigourous 
discussion which followed, the resolution was amended, and, in 
particular, the proposal for a General Dental Council was 
replaced by one that there be elected dental representatives on 
the Medical Council. So amended, the resolution was carried by a
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small majority of ?0 to 58. The Representative Board then 
formed a Committee to prepare a Bill to be presented to members 
at the next annual meeting (3O).
The draft Bill, which offered some limited 
recognition of the unregistered already in practice, was 
opposed by a minority of those present at the meeting who felt 
that no concession should be made; in the end the Bill was 
approved by 110 to 58 (31)• This decision brought an immediate 
flow of letters to the BDJ expressing anger at the prospect of 
the unregistered obtaining any form of recognition and disputing 
the representativeness of a small assembly of l58 members. There 
were also requests for a referendum on the Bill (32) and two more 
branches (South Wales and Wessex) took a collective position 
against it.
The Representative Board had to agree to a 
referendum by postal ballot, a step described by the BDJ as 
"marking the first great crisis" in the history of the Association 
(33). The Bill obtained the support of nine past presidents of 
the BDA who sent a collective letter to the journal (34); some 
branches, like the Eastern Counties Branch (35), joined the 
Scottish branch in its endeavour to bring the Association behind 
its legislative proposals. In the end, the "yes" votes had the 
day but in a very unconvincing manner; 685 voted in favour of 
the Bill and 654 against, and approximately 65O members did not 
bother to vote on what was considered by the leaders of the 
profession as a crucial issue. The referendum left the Association 
divided and the Representative Board tried to remedy by this setting
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up a committee, which, included promoters and opponents of the 
Bill, "for the purpose of considering and endeavouring to 
compose the differences of policy which the result of the 
referendum has revealed" (36). The Committee took some months 
to reach a compromise, but by then the will to press for a new 
Dental Act was weakening. The attention of members was now 
directed to the National Insurance Scheme and to the preparation 
of the forthcoming International Dental Congress, to be held in 
London in 1914. Finally, with the outbreak of the war, it became 
clear that the chances of a Bill such as the "Scottish Bill" being 
introduced in Parliament were virtually non-existent.
Shortly before the war, the IDS and the NDC also each 
drafted their own dental Bill; in late 1912, the Council of the 
IDS approved a Bill prohibiting unregistered practice after 
admission to the Register of its own members and of all unregistered 
persons engaged in the practice of dentistry for at least five 
years (37). The NDG adopted a Bill drafted on similar lines in 
1913 (38). The two Bills were intended merely as a reply to the 
BDA and as an explicit expression of their views on the future of 
dentistry and the two associations invested very little effort in 
promoting them.
OTHER ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL IlNREGISTERED PRACTICE
The BDA had been disappointed that neither its 
alliance with the British Medical Association in 1904-1906 nor its 
own attempts to move fresh dental legislation from I908 onwards had 
produced tangible results. In fact, by the end of the first decade
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of the century, the Lords* decision in Bellerby v Bowen and 
Heyworth had made the control of unregistered practice more 
difficult than ever. Nevertheless, the association of 
registered dentists was not prepared to miss any opportunity 
to restrict the field of practice of unregistered practitioners.
For example, during the discussion on the National Insurance Act, 
1911, which was not to include dental services among statutory 
benefits as dentists would have liked but only as additional 
benefits, the BDA sought recognition of the principle that 
under state insurance only persons already recognised by the 
state as properly qualified should have their services reimbursed 
(39).
Similarly in 1914, it opposed the practice of 
the Board of Education which sometimes accepted certificates of 
dental fitness required by candidates for recognition as teachers 
by the Board from unregistered practitioners. A Departmental 
Committee was formed to examine the issue and it recommended 
that persons presenting a certificate signed by an unregistered 
practitioner should be further examined by a school medical 
officer (40). The committee rejected a demand of the IDS that 
certificates given by its members should be recognised in all 
circumstances and not only, as was the practice which the committee 
did not want to change, when a registered dentist was not available 
within reasonable distance of the home of the candidate. The 
committee also recommended that the government consider the whole 
problem of unregistered practice as soon as possible. The BDJ 
reacted bitterly to the committee’s partial recognition of 
certificates signed by unregistered persons and commented; "the
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public seem unable to realize that the more recognition that is 
given to untrained and unregistered practitioners, the less 
will be the inducement for entrance into a highly trained and 
educated profession bound down by a code of ethics honourable 
to itself and advantageous to the interests of the community as 
a whole* (4l).
A last attempt to curtail unregistered practice 
through government regulations was made in 1917* The occasion was 
a governmental inquiry into the use of cocaine in dentistry, 
launched after reports that many soldiers had become addicted 
to the drug. The BDA wanted the use of cocaine as an anaesthetic 
to be restricted to registered persons, but the Government did not 
agree (42). Instead, it proposed the creation of a special register 
of bona-fide unregistered practitioners who would then be allowed 
to purchase preparations of cocaine, the sale of which was to be 
severely controlled in the future. The loss of the right to use 
cocaine would have been a severe blow to unregistered practitioners 
who would have lost access to their most efficient anaesthetics; 
but again, the IDS put their case convincingly and,with the help 
of its political contacts, blocked this further attempt to restrict 
the activities of its members.
INQUIRY ON DENTISTRY AND A NITW DENTAL ACT (1917-1921)
The war provided fresh opportunities to raise the 
problem of the regulation of dentistry. The dental status of 
recruits was appalling, the number of qualified dentists too small 
to cope with the actual demand and the number of dental students
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decreasing; finally comparisons with other countries like 
Canada and the U.S.A. showed that Britain was a long way behind 
in her efforts to improve dental health, and that it was costly 
at a time when healthy servicemen were much needed.
THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON DENTISTRY
In 1916, the General Medical Council, which until 
then had not been very sympathetic to the dentists* claims, 
acknowledged the gravity of the shortage of dentists and the 
difficulty of recruiting dental students. It addressed an 
«.ppeal to the Privy Council to amend the Dentists Act, the 
weakness of which was said to be the main cause of the dental 
problem (43). Following the GMC*s advice, the Lord President of 
the Privy Council appointed a Departmental Committee of nine 
members' *to Enquire into the Extent and the Gravity of the Evils 
of Dental Practice by Persons Not Qualified under the Dentists 
Act*, under the chairmanship of the right hon. F. Acland, MP.
The members were Lord Knutsford, chairman of the London Hospital, 
Sir Arthur Newsholme, Medical Officer of the Local Government Board, 
Sir George Newman, Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education, 
Charles S. Tomes, L.D.S., member of the General Medical Council 
since. 1898, W.H. Dolamore, L.D.S., president of the BDA, Sir 
Almeric Fitzroy, MP,. G.P. Blizzard, MP and Mr F.H.O. Jerram who 
acted as secretary to the Committee.
It was obvious that the composition of the 
committee did not presage anything good for the unregistered and 
the I.D.S. immediately prostested through its * parliamentary agent *,
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M.W. Raffan, MP,. . that it was unfair to leave the unregistered 
unrepresented. This protest was accepted and two late 
appointments were made: Mr W. Bowen president of the IDS and
Sir Francis Lowe, an MP known for his support of the unregistered.
The Committee, formed on July 2, 1917, met 27 
times; it examined 27 witnesses representing associations of 
registered and unregistered dental practitioners (44), the General 
Medical Council, The Royal College of Surgeons, and promoters of 
the use of dressers in school dentistry; Mr Sidney Webb who also 
gave evidence presented the only *lay* point of view to the 
committee.
The Departmental Committee published a carefully 
worded report in February 1919 (45); it was unanimous after many 
compromises had been arrived at. The members were agreed that the 
only way to obtain a new Dentists Act was to present a united 
front, which meant that both the registered and the unregistered 
had to make concessions.
The report acknowledged the inability of the I878 
Act to regulate the practice of dentistry, and attributed the 
existence of various grades of unregistered practice to it (46).
It also condemned the practice, of dentistry by incorporated . 
companies (47); it did not recommend their total prohibition but 
only that they be controlled and operated by registered dentists 
(48).. The practice of dentistry by unregistered persons was said 
to have lowered the * status and public esteem* of the dental 
profession, thus provoking a shortage of registered dentists
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•owing to the unattractiveness of the profession*. It was also 
held to have caused personal damages to a great number of persons 
and to have spread in the public mind *the belief that there is 
no advantage in preserving the natural teeth and that these 
should be allowed to decay and when trouble arises have all the 
teeth but and substitute a plate of artificial ones* (49). The 
committee also emphatically argued that dental health was of 
paramount importance for the nation (50). By and large the 
report reflected the views of the BDA and, to a large extent, 
of the IDS, on the state of affairs in dentistry. As to the 
shortage of registered dentists, the committee concluded that 
the shortage was mainly affecting the working classes, and that 
it was attributable to (l) the unsatisfactory state of the law,
(2) to the length of the training required for registration (3) 
and to the cost of such training (51).
The committee made a series of recommendations 
concerning the control of dental practice, the provision of 
dental treatment to expectant mothers and to children under the 
age of five by the Local Government Board, and the establishment 
of both an adequate school dental system and a public dental 
service for the adult population. It proposed that they be manned 
by registered dentists assisted by dressers trained to perform 
routine operative procedures. The report also recommended the 
prohibition of unregistered practice and the appointment a 
special committee to admit unregistered practitioners in practice 
for five years, without examination to the new register. Those 
in practice for a shorter period of time would be required to pass 
a test within 2 years (52). It was also suggested that *the
- 115 -
committee would be able to lessen its labours without sacrificing 
the public interest by giving careful consideration to the 
documents and other evidence placed before us by the Incorporated 
Dental Society Limited*• If the committee was satisfied that 
the conditions of admission to that society were a reasonable 
guarantee of good standards then it should admit the members of 
the IDS * en bloc* (55)- The unregistered admitted to the register 
would acquire the same legal rights and privileges conferred on 
other registered dentists.
Concerning the control of the profession, the 
committee, while agreeing that * every profession should be self- 
governl (54), recommended that a statutory Dental Board under 
the GMC be set up for the government of the dental profession.
The BDA and IDS representatives agreed that association with the 
medical profession was good for the profession generally and that 
it would be much more difficult to receive powers comparable to 
those already exercised by the Medical Council (55).
Finally the committee suggested measures to promote 
recruitment to dental schools and to increase dental research and 
education of the public in dental matters, before concluding as 
follows; *we wish to state very strongly that, in our opinion, 
the state cannot afford to allow the health of the nation to be 
continuously undermined by dental neglect. Steps should be taken 
without delay to recognise dentistry as one of the chief, if not 
the chief, means of preventing ill-health, and every possible means 
should be employed for enlightening the public as to the need for 
conservative treatment of diseased teeth. The dental profession 
should be regarded as one of the outposts of preventive medicine, 
and as such encouraged and assisted by the state* (56).
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REACTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE* S REPORT
The IDS promptly approved the recommendations of 
the report and expressed hope that their * friends on the other 
side* do so as well (57). The first reaction of the British 
Dental Journal was satisfaction that the report acknowledged the 
importance of dental treatment as well as the evils of unqualified 
practice and the necessity of prohibition. As regards the *dental 
dressers scheme*, the BDJ suggested a policy of wait and see, as 
it was only an experimental one. Regarding the admission of the 
unregistered, the journal warned members of the BDA that they 
had to be prepared to waive some of their opinions as part of 
the price they had to pay to secure prohibition (58). Charles Tomes 
wrote to the BDJ to stress the fact that the committee had been 
unanimous and that opposing the report would mean * dropping the 
whole thing and letting matters stay as they are* (59).
Nevertheless the BDJ received a flow of letters from dentists 
indignant at the prospect of the admission to the register of 
persons they had fought for decades (60).
The Representative Board of the BDA held a special 
meeting in March 1919 to discuss the report. The main points at 
issue were the recognition of the unregistered and the training of 
dental dressers. An official position was finally arrived at:
* that this Board commends the Report of the Dentists Act Committee 
to the BDA as a basis for legislation. It considers that the 
following changes would be improvements in the Report and should 
be incorporated in any Bill intended to give legislative sanction 
to the recommendation of the Committee:
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Practice by companies should be prohibited altogether; 
Existing companies should be given one year to liquidate.
The Board considers that the work suggested for dental 
dressers or nurses would need careful definition and 
efficient safeguards in the interests of the patients. (...)
The names of unregistered persons to be added to the 
Register should be placed in a separate section of the 
Register (...)* (6l).
The Board also asked that the use of the title 
* dental surgeon* be restricted to qualified persons.
The BDJ acknowledged the differences in opinion 
within the Association and warned that these disagrements might 
prove dangerous and result in missing *an opportunity as 
magnificent as it is unexpected - the opportunity of gaining at 
one stroke, so to speak, the prize of a properly protected and 
properly controlled profession* (62). W.H. Dolamore, who had 
represented the BDA on the Departmental Committee, wrote that 
the use of the titles * dentist* and * dental practitioner* by 
unregistered persons should not be seen .as hurting the pride 
of qualified dentists but merely as a means of controlling 
every practitioner of dentistry and preventing the use of other 
titles as in the past (63).
In May 1919 an extraordinary general meeting of 
the BDA was called to discuss the recommendations of the 
Representative Board. The main issue was again the fate of the 
unregistered: a motion to put their names on a separate roll and
to prevent them from using the titles "dentist", "dental surgeon" 
or "surgeon dentist" was defeated by 195 to 175, again showing how
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divided the Association was (64). The BDJ commented: * there are 
many who seem to imagine - having had no experience in parliamentary 
work - that the Association has but to lift its hand, so to speak, 
to get its wishes attended to* (65). The members were warned that 
if they failed to agree on a measure to be brought to Parliament 
by the whole profession, they might end up with nothing at all.
In view of the division expressed at the general 
meeting, the Representative Board decided to hold a referendum 
which proved as disappointing as the previous one on the *Sccttish 
Bill*. Less than I8OO members out of 3C00 saw fit to vote, 963 
voted in favour of the resolution adopted by the general meeting 
and 800 against. Hence, this position, although formally supported 
by only 30^ of the BDA members, became the official position of the 
Association which notified it to MPs and to the Ministry of Health.
The other dental association of some numerical 
importance, the NDA (820 members, in September 1919) was by and 
large pleased with the report but for the question of the recognition 
of the IDS. Letters were sent to the Minister of Health and a 
deputation met the IDS representatives to secure their support to 
obtain for NDA members a similar treatment as regards the admission 
to the register. Both the Ministry of Health and the IDS opposed 
this request and in the end members of the members of the NDA had 
to seek individual registration.
Another organisation interested in the report was 
the General Medical Council which, while being in general agreement 
with the report, adopted resolutions pressing for alteration of some
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recommendations; one of these was that the titles "dental surgeon" 
and "surgeon dentist" should be reserved to licentiates in dental 
surgery, as demanded by the BDA.
Finally, the press expressed opinions favourable 
to the report, acknowledging - probably for the first time - the 
importance of dental health and strongly supporting the prohibition 
of unregistered practice and the establishment of a school dental 
system. Regarding the implementation of a public dental service, 
some newspapers reacted cautiously because of the public expenditure 
involved, but all agreed that in principle the measure was a 
reasonable one (66).
NEW DENTAL LEGISLATION
Despite such widespread support for a new Dental 
Act, a Bill amending the I878 Act was introduced only a year later 
in December 1920 at the very end of the parliamentary session. Two 
months earlier, Mr Raffan, MP, on behalf of the IDS, had called a 
meeting of MPs interested in the matter: more than 100 attended
and a resolution urging the government to legislate on the lines of 
the Departmental Committee*s report was passed. A deputation, 
formed of MPs representing the major dental associations met the 
Leader of the House, Mr Bonar Law, the next day. They were then 
told that the government*s intention was to introduce a Bill 
before the end of the session (67).
The Bill was duly introduced but there was virtually 
no time for its discussion; it was withdrawn almost immediately and
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the Minister of Health explaiined that his intention had been 
only to secure officisil publication of the Bill so that 
discussion might take place among groups interested in dental 
matters.
The Bill's main clauses can be summarised as follows:
1) unregistered practice was prohibited (68);
2) a person of good character engaged in practice as his 
principal means of livelihood for five years, being of 23 
years of age before the commencement of the Act, or having 
been admitted to the membership of the IDS not less than 
one year before the commencement of the Act to be admitted to 
the register. Any other person engaged in the practice of 
dentistry and who passed an examination within two years from 
the commencement of the Act should be treated as having been 
engaged in practice for 5 years. A duly registered chemist
or druggist who had a substantial practice in dentistry should 
be treated as a person engaged in practice for five years; 
however, he would have, after a period of five years, to cease 
practising pharmacy and dentistry concurrently;
3) the titles to be used by the registered dentists to be "dentist" 
and "dental practitioner";
4) company practice not to be abolished but restricted to registered 
dentists only;
5) a dental board, including dentists, medical practitioners and
lay members to be created to control the register and to regulate 
the practice of dentistry.
No provisions were made for the establishment of 
a school dental system or a public dental service. The Bill was 
welcomedby The Mouth Mirror, in the following terms: 'the general
opinion amongst members is that it is a very good Bill. The omission 
of those dangerous complicating proposals relating to a costly scheme 
of public service, postponed until more favourable times, has come 
as a relief* (69).
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The Representative Board of the BDA met behind 
closed doors (1st and 8th January 1921) and came out with a 
proposal to amend clauses of the Bill concerning admission of 
unregistered. The members of the IDS would be admitted to the 
register but other unregistered persons would be placed on a 
special list, with the title "dental practitioner" and would be 
allowed to pass a test of proficiency within 2 years if they 
wanted to have access to the main register. The support of the 
IDS for such an amendment had been secured at a previous meeting 
between the two associations. It was then suggested that it was 
now up to the members of the BDA to adopt a "wise attitude* and 
support their Representative Board's position as, according to 
one of its most prominent members, the passage of the Bill as 
amended through the House could easily be secured if there was no 
organised opposition to it.
At an important meeting of the Metropolitan 
Branch of the BDA, Mr R. Lindsay urged the members to consider that 
they now had *a government in power that was favourable to their 
ideals; a Parliament and a public which had been impressed by the 
report of the Dentists Act Committee; they had the support of the 
General Medical Council; and they had succeeded in neutralizing 
the opposition of the important unregistered society*. He then 
asked: 'Did they think that by wrecking the Bill or by postponing
it they would improve the position of the profession?» (70).
Sir Frank Colyer, who had initiated the movement 
against the registration of any unqualified person by forming the
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Dentists*Committee, replied that if the BDA accepted the 
registration of the members of the IDS, there was no hope of 
agreement with his Committee and that there would be organised 
opposition: *,, we intend to fight to the last ditch against 
the Bill; if it comes to wrecking the Bill we cannot help 
that. The Association can be united if it comes over to our 
way of thinking* (71). Nevertheless, when the assembly took a 
vote of confidence in the BDA*s policy, 120 dentists voted for 
and only 31 against. This failure to obtain more support did 
not prevent the Dentists* Committee from starting a campaign 
against the Bill largely through letters to the main daily 
newspapers. * This led the BDA to write a long letter to newspapers 
to state its official position and to stress that Sir Frank's 
Committee was in no way representative of the profession's policy 
(72).
Further steps were taken to secure the passing of 
an amended Bill. A memorial signed by 237 leading members of the 
profession was sent to the Minister of Health and copies, of the 
proposed amendments were circulated to the Committee of the House 
to which the Bill was sent after its réintroduction in May 1921.
In the early months of 1921, the Minister of Health 
had been pressing the dental associations to agree on the Bill before 
it was reintroduced (73). In April 1921, the appointment of a new 
Minister of Health seemed to bring a change in the government's policy. 
In his answer to Mr Eaffan, enquiring .about his position, the new 
Minister, Sir Alfred Mond, said that as he was informed that there 
was little chance of%eing any agreement between dental associations.
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it was not his intention to introduce a dental Bill (74).
Mr Raff an organised another meeting of MPs at which all dental 
associations, with the exception of the Dentists* Committee, 
were represented. It was then put to the BDA that the Minister's 
condition for the introduction of a dental Bill was its agreement 
to the_Bill presented in December 1920; it now seemed almost 
certain that further opposition would endanger the Bill, and 
the BDA agreed to withdraw its proposed amendments (75).
In early May 1921, the Minister stated that he 
was now prepared to introduce a Bill before the end of the session, 
adding; *if, as I am assured will be the case, the second reading 
is not opposed, I hope it may be found possible to proceed with it*
(76). So on May 3th 1921, a Bill * to amend the Dentists Act, I878 
and the provisions of the Medical Act, 1886 amending that Act*
was presented.
It was a slightly amended copy of the 1920 Bill, 
the main alterations being first, that unregistered persons engaged 
in practice for 3 of the 7 years preceding the passing of the Act 
could gain recognition; that clause was introduced to take into 
account war circumstances. Second, that chemists were no longer 
required to undertake not to practise dentistry and pharmacy 
concurrently after a period of 3 years, and thirdly, that a 
definition of dentistry was included to clarify the boundaries 
of the territory henceforth reserved to registered dentists.
After its second reading, the Bill went to a Standing Committee 
where the Chemists* Dental Association and the NDA tried unsuccessfully 
to include clauses admitting their members *en bloc* to the register
(77). Two amendments, however, were agreed by the Minister; the
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first concerned company practice, and provided that only a 
majority instead of all directors but all the practising staff 
were required to be registered dentists; the second was a 
shorter definition of dentistry (78).
The Bill was finally passed on July 1st, 1921 
in an almost empty House, at the very last moment of the session.
As the BDJ reported: 'The Black Rod was on his way to interrupt
the sitting and the last amendment to the second schedule was 
disposed of after he had passed the Bar and almost reached the 
mace* (79).
In the end, the Dentists Act, 1921 was passed 
after a great deal of lobbying and after much pressure had been 
put on the government. However good the impression made by the 
Departmental Committee's report and sympathetic the opinions of 
the press, the problem of the unregistered practice of dentistry 
never became a really sensitive political issue. At the time of 
the discussion of the Dentists Bill the Government had more 
difficult problems, like a coal strike, to deal, with and it was 
only after skillful dealings that the Bill became an Act. This 
piece of legislation,however, was not an unimportant measure: it
created a legal monopoly which gave dentists the control over 
private dental services in a way which was unprecedented in 
English Law.
For unregistered practitioners, the Act was a great 
victory: the IDS, in particular, had fulfilled its commitment to
obtain the admission of its members to the register (80). The
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other society representing unregistered persons, the National 
Dental Association, failed to achieve that object; but soon 
afterwards it obtained some indirect recognition of its efforts 
when its president was appointed a member of the new Dental 
Board.
Among BDA members, there were more mixed feelings. 
The official attitude of the Association was that the Act was a 
good foundation for the future of dentistry and worth the 
concessions made. On the other hand, the supporters of the 
Dentists' Committee continued to stand against recognition of 
unregistered practitioners and to condemn it. In 1922, they formed 
the British Society of Dental Surgeons to promote the use of the 
title 'dental surgeon' by qualified men and to prevent the 
admission of former unregistered men, now called '1921 men* , to 
the BDA. Peace between the BDA and the '1921 men' was still a 
long way ahead; a settlement was only achieved almost ^0 years 
later in 19^9 when the two associations amalgamated.
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CHAPTER 5: THE MARKET FOR DENTAL SERVICES
At the end of the 19th century, the demand for 
dental services - mainly for extractions and supply of dentures - 
was increasing rapidly as a result of a combination of factors, 
including higher standards of living, greater consumption of 
sugar and of processed foods and the more common use of local 
anaesthetics which considerably reduced the fear of pain 
associated with dental operations. At the same time, the supply 
of dental practitioners was developing in an uncontrolled way, 
much to the dismay of dentists who had invested time and money 
in a long and expensive training only to find themselves subject 
to harsh competition from untrained persons.
The BDA, as an association of qualified dentists, 
was particularly unhappy that its members were treated no better 
than were 'quacks*. As 'professionals' they also resented the 
image of commercialism attached to the sale of dentures. As 
from its formation, the BDA had engaged in seeking recognition for 
its members and other registered dentists as the only legitimate 
practitioners of dentistry. Clearly its objective was to control 
competition in the market place. Basically, dentists were 
individual entrepreneurs concerned with obtaining a return on 
the investment made on their training and also on equipment which 
was becoming more sophisticated and consequently more expensive. 
Dentists to whom dentistry was a life-time career, as was the case 
for trained dentists, were aware that uncontrolled competition 
limited their capacity to attain the secure financial situation 
that would allow them to face times of hardship or to contemplate 
a peaceful retirement.
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On the other hand, members of the BDA and of 
the IDS knew that the closure of dentistry to the unqualified 
and restriction of practice rights to the qualified could not 
be advocated on such grounds; the restriction of practice had 
to be shown to be in the public interest in the first place 
and to serve dentists' interests only coincidentally.
Accordingly attempts to check competition were made in parallel 
with efforts to stress the value of dentistry for British society. 
These efforts.were aimed at changing the popular views on dentistry 
and also at convincing the state that the regulation of dental 
practice and the statutory provision of dental services in 
certain circumstances would benefit the whole nation. In this 
chapter, I examine how dentail associations endeavoured to expand 
and stabilise the market for dental services and to control 
competition within it.
THE PROMOTION OF PUBLIC DENTAL SERVICES
At the beginning of the century, dental health 
was seen by the public and by most dental practitioners as well, 
as of little relevance and as unconnected to general health. 
Dentistry itself was generally thought of as a mechanical trade. 
Only a small number of farsighted dentists had started emphasising 
the links between dental diseases and systemic diseases and the 
importance of the potential contribution of dentistry to the 
well-being of the nation. Concepts of prevention, early diagnosis, 
and public dental services for certain groups like school children • 
were discussed at meetings and in professional journals more and 
more frequently. The sincerity of these advocates of public dental 
services is not in question here and it is clear that their concern
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for the health of the nation was genuine* It is obvious, however, 
that their proposals served professional purposes well, both in 
terms of expanding the market for dental services and of giving 
credibility to the BDA's claim that dentistry should be recognised 
as a public service provided by qualified persons only. In that 
respect, the attitudes of dentists to the needs of certain groups, 
such as school children, servicemen and the poor are relevant to 
the study of the professionalisation of dentistry.
THE BRITISH DMTAL ASSOCIATION AND SCHOOL DENTISTRY
First references to the need for a dental schime 
for school children as a first step toward a dentally fit adult 
population go back to I885, and in I89O, the BDA officially 
showed its interest in school dentistry by appointing a committee 
to investigate the dental health of school children. The committee 
produced seven reports between I89I and I898 (l) and was then 
disbanded. The results of its inquiries revealed a rather grim 
picture; less than 20^  of the children examined were found to 
have sound teeth (2). The situation was especially bad among 
children attending public schools and in better-off areas, 
presumably because of their higher consumption of carbohydrates.
By and large, those reports were received with indifference by 
the BDA leadership and it is only after showing much determination 
that the committee convinced them to print their reports and to 
circulate them to members and to relevant authorities (3); that 
was done in I898 and from then on school dentistry became a major 
issue in dental politics.
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In the same year, the BDA promoted the formation 
of a School Dentists'Society to organise lectures on the needs 
of school children and more generally to promote school dentistry 
(4). In 1901, for example, the society lobbied the National 
Union of Teachers and convinced it to pass a resolution in favor 
of school dentistry. The society, in conjunction with bodies 
like the Childhood Society, regularly called on the Education 
Authorities to develop dental services for children (3). In 
1904, it could report that 46 district schools were attended, 
in one way or another, by a dentist( 6). The BDA gave evidence 
before the Interdepartmental Committee on*Physical Deterioration 
aiid its arguments were convincing enough that the committee 
recommended that 'the systematic examination of the teeth of 
children by competent dentists, employed by school authorities, 
should be practised where possible...' (?)• Yet, this fell short 
of the BDA's recommendation that school children's teeth should be 
examined by a qualified dentist every 6 months (8); and when 
legislation was passed in 190? to make compulsory the medical 
inspection of school children, no reference was made to dental 
inspection by registered dentists, though the definition of 
medical inspection included inspection of the teeth (9).
Despite his disappointment, the president of the 
BDA welcomed medical inspection as 'an institution which is 
calculated to promote the health, happiness and material 
prosperity of the Nation, more than any twenty Acts of sociail 
reform or domestic legislation in any other direction, and at a 
cost, too, that is infinitesimal in comparison to the results, 
which are immeasurable ' (10). But members of the BDA kept 
arguiiig that doctors were not well trained to perform dental
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inspections and the Association decided to set up a committee 
to campaign for the qualified dentist to be recognised as the 
proper person to inspect children's teeth.
The Education Act was not amended, but the 
practice of employing a dentist, although not always a registered 
practitioner, spread. By 1914, 6l education authorities had 
dentists under employment (11). This represented less than a 
quarter of all authorities that had founded medical clinics 
and it is estimated that by then the school 'dental service was 
coping with no more than 10 per cent of the needs of only half 
the school population' (12). This slow development was attributed 
to a serious shortage of dentists, to the fact that school dental 
work was uninteresting, monotonous and badly paid (£300 per year 
was a standard salary in 1913) and above all to the reluctance of 
local authorities to finance dental clinics. Also, 'besides the 
long standing ignorance and resistance by parents and children, 
there was discouragement in the distance and train fares, the 
nature of the forms to be filled by parents giving their consent, 
and in the charges of treatment' (13). The figure went up to 151 
authorities at the time of the Departmental Committee on Dentistry 
which strongly supported the principle of establishing a complete 
scheme of school dentistry.
So far the BDA could only be pleased with such a 
recommendation, but the committee added that, in view of the great 
shortage of trained dentists and of the routine character of a 
large proportion of school dental work - a reason invoked by many 
local authorities for not employing a dentist -, dental dressers
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should be trained to perform minor operative dental work in the 
future school dental service under the supervision of a dentist 
(l4). This recommendation raised considerable opposition, and 
this issue is examined in a further section of this chapter.
In the end, the Dentists Act, 1921 did not include provisions 
for any public dental service, the Minister of Health alleging 
that it should be dealt with later when legislation on "the 
general health problem* was to be presented (13). It was only 
in 1937f finally, that all Local Education Authorities reported 
having established some sort of dental scheme (l6).
DENTAL SERVICES FOR THE ARMED FORCES
In an analogous way, the BDA campaigned for the 
provision of dental treatment by registered dentists for soldiers 
and sailors. The first discussions on Army and Navy dentistry 
started in I883 (17) but requests to commission dentists were 
repeatedly turned down. In I9OO, a committee was formed to 
comply with a resolution of the Annual Meeting requesting the 
Board to * further consider the question of asking the War Office 
and the Admiralty to provide proper dental aid to the men of the 
Army and Navy* (I8). The circumstances were particularly 
favourable as the health of recruits and soldiers sent to fight 
the Boer War in South Africa had become an important political 
issue. It has been estimated that during the war approximately 
3000 recruits were found unfit for duty and 2000 soldiers evacuated 
for dental reasons (19), the inability to chew the 'hard-tack* 
rations issued to the troops in the field having contributed to 
the catastrophic sickness levels of the campaign (20). In 1901,
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the government agreed to appoint two dentists on an experimental 
basis to attend the country's home forces and to send four 
dental surgeons to South Africa (21). This decision, however, 
did not lead to any extended scheme of army or navy dental 
services and in I908 the War Office abeuidonned the system of 
army dental surgeons in favour of treatment by civilian 
practitioners (22).
When the First World War started in 1914, there 
was still no indication of a dental corps, on the model of the 
medical corps, being established in the near future. The BDA 
and the IDS both decided to offer free treatment to recruits as 
a contribution to the war effort. As the war went on, more and 
more dental officers were commissioned, thus creating an 
infrastructure of dental services in the armed forces. There 
were no commissioned dental officers in August 1914; there were 
12 in November of that year, 36 in February 1915* 150 in August 
1915, 300 in August 1916, 463 in December 1916, 501 in December 
1917 and 850 in November I9I8 (23). An important and significant 
step was made in 1917 when a charitable society, the 'Ivory Cross', 
was formed under the chairmanship of the Duchess of Portland to 
increase the availability of dental treatment to servicemen. 
Finally, in January 1921, the Army Dental Corps was created, 
shortly followed by the Navy Dental Corps. This first formal 
recognition by the state was greeted as a great, though belated, 
victory for the dental profession and was especially significant in 
the context of the discussion on the amendment of the Dentists Act,
1878 (24).
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THE DENTAL NEEDS OF THE «WORKING CLASSES' AND STATE DENTISTRY
Another group, referred to by dentists as 'the 
working classes', was described as in need of urgent attendance 
on a large scale. To meet their needs was presented both as an 
ethical responsibility and as the only way to eliminate their 
use of charlatans and quacks. The first steps in that direction 
took the form of local dental aid schemes set up by individual 
dentists impressed by the deplorable state of the teeth of poor 
people: such schemes were set up in Reading, Dublin, Hasleraere
and Brighton in the first years of the century (23).
Earlier, attempts had been made to further the 
view that the state, rather than individuals or voluntary 
societies, should take the responsibility of meeting the 
dental needs of the poor. At first, the BDA was not prepared 
to take this view as shown by the refusal of its Representative 
Board in May I9OI to adopt a resolution, proposed by George Cunningham, 
'that a Standing Committee be appointed to be known as the Parliamentary 
Committee, to conduct and advance the relations of the BDA in all 
matters pertaining to state dentistry' (26). As early as I886, 
Cunningham had evoked the idea that the state should play a greater 
part in bringing the benefits of dental care to a larger proportion 
of the population: one of his arguments was that if dental disease
rarely if ever resulted in loss of limbs or life, it was one of 
the commonest diseases, with great incapacitating effects on those 
affected, thus causing a substantial reduction in working efficiency
(27).
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Instead the BDA decided to form its own dental 
aid society to operate not as *a commercial or charitable 
organisation or a loan office, (...) but to give the lower middle 
classes the opportunity and privilege of enjoying the full 
benefits of the services of qualified and skilled dental 
surgeons at reasonable fees upon provident lines; and the 
operation of the Society, will be carried on in such a manner 
that the positions of established practitioners and of the 
younger members will in no way be injured but improved* (28).
This is a reference to the resistance of many members to such 
schemes on the grounds of unfair competition; in the event only 
150 members attended the meeting to launch the scheme and it had 
to be abandonned.
The IDS, which had not engaged in the promotion of 
such schemes as school or army dentistry, although it had followed 
closely their development to make sure that its members* interests 
were not endangered, described the proposed aid scheme as a *fake* 
promoted by West End men * to hoodwink the public into supporting 
their parliamentary efforts* and rejoiced at the BDA's failure (29)
A further attempt was made in I908, with the 
creation of a 'Provident Dental Aid Society*. As one of its 
promoter put it, 'to aid the poor is our duty as a profession.
To efficiently do so in an organised and ethical manner would not 
be derogatory to the profession, but would be to the honour, to 
the internal and political advantage of the profession' (30). The 
Society started and developed slowly, but soon the eyes of the
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profession turned to a more sensitive issue, the organisation of 
a National Health Insurance Scheme.
The discussion on a Health Insurance Scheme (31) 
started in 1909 when David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, went to Germany to study the national sickness 
insurance scheme; health and unemployement insurance were seen 
as the natural complement of the old age pensions legislation 
passed in I908. It was planned to offer medical coverage to all 
persons with incomes under the tax limit of £l60. In 1910 that 
represented 39*000,000 persons or more than 80^ of the British 
population. State intervention on that scale was bound to arouse 
opposition and it came from almost all quarters; that is, from 
doctors who feared state control, from friendly societies, and 
predictably from industrial insurance companies who were afraid 
to lose their sickness business and particularly the very lucrative 
burial benefit, which they suspected Lloyd George wanted to include 
in his scheme.
The dental profession saw there an opportunity to 
raise its status and supported state intervention in health services, 
The BDA pressed for a state dental service, feeling that the time 
was ripe for such a public scheme. An enthusiastic supporter of 
public dental services wrote that this was a 'tooth age' and that 
everyone wanted dental care: to his colleagues who concentrated
their political activity on pressing for a new dental Act, he 
suggested that they 'would do more good if they devoted their time 
and energies to formulating a plan and providing schemes for 
selection by the government for supply of a public want, i.e..
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dentistry for the masses* (32). To him, a public dental service, 
limited to registered dentists, would do more to raise the 
status of the profession than any legislation.
However, designing a plan was one thing and 
implementing it another: as a commentator later recalled "the
difficulty confronting the profession in those days was not one 
of fees. Those interested in provident aid were prepared to 
make sacrifices both of time and money. But the well-equipped 
qualified practice, suitable for the well-to-do, was ill-fitted 
for the reception of the working man in overalls or soiled 
clothes. Moreover class prejudice was much stronger then than 
now, and the practitioner who had his waiting-room patronised by 
the industrial worker soon found that he had nobody else to treat* 
(33).
At no time did state dentistry become a public 
policy issue and, in the end, the National Insurance Act, 1911, 
defined dental treatment only as an additional benefit which 
Approved Societies could reimburse if they chose to, after having 
gained actuarial surpluses after five years of operation. Such 
'dental benefits' started to be given by some societies in 1921 
when the first valuation,retarded by the war,was finally made, 
and along with optical treatment benefits, they became very popular.
Following the failure of 1911, the discussion of 
dental services for the poor continued within the BDA, though not 
very enthusiastically. In 1913, the Annual Meeting approved the 
principles of a public dental service, operated by members of the BDA
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until the state takes over, and asked the Representative Board 
to form a committee to organise it. The committee came out with 
a voluntary scheme whereby the branches of the Association would 
be requested to put on experimental clinics to treat patients 
whose income was below the £l60 limit (34). The committee later 
expressed the hope that branches* cooperation would follow 'thus 
securing a much needed benefit to a deserving section of the 
public and materially strengthening the position of the dental 
profession and of the British Dental Association' (33)* Members 
did not respond to this appeal, especially in the industrial areas 
where the needs were greater but also where the competition with 
unregistered practitioners was harsher, and the scheme never 
really worked.
As to the organised unregistered, attitudes to the 
dental needs of the working classes were different, because most 
of them actually practised in industrial areas. Indeed the IDS 
pointed to the irony of the sudden attention paid by the BDA to 
the needs of industrial populations, stressing that its own 
members had been catering for such dental needs for years. The 
IDS was not opposed to the establishment of public dental services 
as it considered that such a service could not be implemented 
without the assistance of the bona fide unregistered because of 
the shortage of registered dentists and of the complete dependence 
of many localities upon the services of unregistered practitioners 
(36). In reply to the BDA, the IDS launched a 'United Public Dental 
Service Limited' in 1914; but as with the BDA's scheme, it also 
failed.
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Few references to public dentistry were made 
during the first years of the war. The issue was raised again 
in 1917-18 by the Departmental Committee on Dentistry whose 
report stated that 'if it be accepted that it is a duty of the 
state to ensure in the national interest that its citizens 
shall be maintained in a state of good health and working 
efficiency, we have no hesitation in stating that adequate 
arrangements for keeping the teeth of the people in a sound 
condition are one of the essentials to this end' (37). Accordingly 
the committee recommended the creation of a public dental service 
'without any delay', including a proper school dental service and 
special attention to pregnant women and to mothers of pre-school 
children. This was considered as one of the major recommendations 
of the committee, but it was dropped by the Government partly 
because of the expenditure involved and partly to avoid the 
controversy about the recommendation to train dental dressers 
to solve the problem of the shortage of dentists.
CONTROL OF COMPETITION
The main feature of the dental market before 1921 
was the great variety of suppliers of dental services. The two 
main categories were the registered and unregistered practitioners; 
but as has already been mentionned each category was very heterogeneous. 
The Dentists' Register included the names of persons who had no 
qualification whatever and who had fraudulently taken advantage 
of the 'grandfather' clause in the Dentists Act, I878, of former 
apprentices or technicians who also registered in I878, of licentiates
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of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons, of pharmacists and of 
practitioners with both medical and dental degrees. The ranks 
of the unregistered also included, as had been the case for 
centuries, persons like barbers or even blacksmiths who 
performed extractions on a casual basis only; sind there were 
also many charlatans with no training or qualification and 
whose only interest was in the sale of dentures. On the other 
hand, there was a substantial body of persons with some sort 
of training, usually two or three years of apprenticeship, 
who had lawfully settled in practice, had acquired an expertise 
in mechanical dentistry and now had a vested interest in the 
practice of dentistry. Most practitioners would practise 
'mechanical dentistry', i.e. mainly extractions and fitting of 
dentures; in that area the rules of supply and demand applied 
rather crudely since dentists were in fact selling a product, 
that is artificial teeth. In conservative dentistry, the dentist 
sold his expertise sind competed only with those who could offer 
similar services whereas, in the sale of dentures, anyone with 
minimal skills could virtually engage in this business.
Competition was harsh in this expanding market and 
it was specially tough for the practitioners who considered it 
'unprofessional' to advertise their services since so many others 
were prepared to resort to all kinds of ruse to attract customers. 
From 1880 onwards,more and more practitioners chose to cooperate 
rather than compete and joined professional associations to further 
their common interests in a collective manner. It is hardly a 
surprise that these groups set as one of their main objectives
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to regulate competition. In this section, I will briefly review 
the tactics used by registered dentists to check unregistered 
competition euid I will also describe how dental practitioners 
fought the potential competition of dental dressers in the 
second half of the 1910's.
THE CONTROL OF UNREGISTERED PRACTICE
I have already mentioned two forms of actions 
taken against unregistered practice by the BDA. The first 
related to the application of the Dentists Act, l8?8 and 
consisted in prosecutions and attempts to secure amendments 
to the Act either in the courts or by legislation. The second 
set of tactics consisted in promoting schemes of dental services 
from which the unregistered would be excluded; for example,the 
BDA proposed that only registered practitioners should attend to 
the dental needs of school children and servicemen and more 
generally that any public dental service should be restricted to 
them. Equally the BDA endeavoured to limit the practice of the 
unregistered by asking the Board of Education not to recognise 
certificates issued by the latter and by asking the government to 
prohibit their use of cocaine preparations in anaesthetics- In a 
word, the registered dentists tried to create a situation similar 
to that in medicine where, despite the fact that the profession 
was not legally closed, registered doctors had a *de facto* 
monopoly of public appointments and of the issuing of official 
certificates. By its political activity, the BDA wished to obtain 
social and legal recognition for the registered dentists and, at 
the same time, to limit and if possible eliminate the practice by
— l4l —
unregistered persons. But until this was achieved, the 
registered had to compete for customers who were ignorant 
of the intricacies of the Dentists Act; hence the recurrent 
references in the BDA meetings and in the British Dental Journal 
to the need to inform and educate the public.
The almost complete prohibition of advertising 
was perceived as too extreme a measure by many who felt that in 
view of the amount of advertising by unregistered practitioners, 
registered dentists should be able to advertise in a reasonable 
manner. A BDA member suggested a standard form of announcement;
*it is to be considered that maiiy dentists are in keen competition 
with individuals, companies and institutes, and that they daily 
witness or are informed of the advertisement of the institutes and 
individuals, of low fees and other inducements. The public seldom 
discriminate and are mainly attracted by glare and glitter and 
specious promises. Dentists are fighting against unfair odds*
(38). Others suggested that lists of registered dentists of an 
area should be sent to each registered doctor with an appeal not 
to cooperate with non-registered practitioners (39) or that such 
lists be published in the local newspaper together with information 
about the main provisions of the Dentists Act, I878 (40).
Similar suggestions were regularly made but the 
BDA never followed them up, its leaders preferring the more 
professional tactic of * educating the public*. This, it was 
suggested, could be done through personal contacts between 
dentists and their clients, popular lectures, using the lay press 
and showing concern for the needy in establishing dental hospitals
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or dispensaries (4l). Dentists were encouraged * to realise that 
their own interest, the interests of the profession and the 
interests of the public are one and the same thing; and that 
the education of the public plus their own attainments will 
do for the profession, individually and collectively what no 
legal enactments can possibly affect* (42). As a professional 
association, they had a duty to enlightened the public about 
unregistered practice and if such efforts were primarly oriented 
towards the prevention and treatment of disease, the interests 
of the profession could be advanced *without incurring the 
odium of being self-seeking* (43). It was assumed that an 
informed and educated public would not patronise the unregistered 
and that unregistered practice would gradually disappear. This 
view certainly overestimated the will and the capacity of the 
registered dentists to * educate the public*. No collective effort 
or concerted campaign was attempted in that direction, despite 
the pleas and personal efforts of many individual practitioners. 
The BDA engaged in ad hoc campaigns, like opposing the use of 
the word "dentist" in the lay press to designate persons 
practising without registration, by writing to the editors of the 
publications concerned (44); but, otherwise, the appeals to 
educate the public remained pure rhetoric and had no noticeable 
impact on the public*s use of the unregistered.
THE FIGHT AGAINST DENTAL DRESSERS (1913-1921)
The controversy about the employment of dental 
dressers started well before the Departmental Committee on 
Dentistry recommended in 1919 that such operative auxiliaries
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be employed in the school dental service to perform * minor 
dental work*. Women assistants, in some instances trained 
nurses, had been employed by dentists for many years, but 
their functions had been limited to helping the dentist to 
carry out his work more rapidly and more efficiently and 
seldom included any operative work.
British dentists regarded the training of 
nurses as dental assistants as conducive to more unqualified 
practice and, predictably, they saw with great suspicion the 
introduction in the early 1910*s in America of a new category 
of dental personnel to do prophylactic work, the * dental 
hygienist* (45).
In Britain, the first experiment in training 
young women to do simple dental work was launched by the Medicail 
Officer of Derbyshire, Dr Sidney Barwise, in 1916. Barwise 
was concerned with the difficulty of organising school dental 
services because of a shortage of dentists and because of the 
costs involved. In a discussion with the dentist who had been 
working for the Derbyshire Education Authority for some time, 
he was told by Mr Harold Smith that *the great bulk of his time 
was taken up with work which any person with intelligence would 
be capable of performing after six months tuition* (46). Barwise 
decided to test this view and hired two young women, whose 
salaries were paid by a locail philantropist, and entrusted them 
to Smith who started training them in February 1917 so that they 
could perform operations of * scaling, polishing, extraction of
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temporary teeth when this involves no difficulty, the drilling 
of superficial caries of milk and permanent teeth and the 
filling of the same* (47).
In March 1917, Barwise met the Board of Education 
and obtained its formal support. He explained his scheme and 
detailed the respective duties of the dentist and the dental 
dresser in what he thought could become an efficient school 
dental scheme. This step arouse the attention of the BDA to the 
matter, and the Association instructed a special committee of 
the Representative Board to examine the issue (48). The first 
comments in the dental press were that women assistants were 
helpful and appreciated but that it would be dangerous to allow 
them to carry out operative work: as the editor of the British
Journal of Dental Science commented crudely *once admit her to 
the position of being a recognised treater of the teeth and you 
lose control of her field of practice* (49).
A leading member of the School Dentists* Society, 
C.D. Wallis,took a similar view insisting that school dental work 
was not mere routine work but should become a specialty. He 
argued that the dental dressers* scheme was an innovation that 
would *be totally dangerous and impracticable* and warned that 
*any attempt to lower the standard must inevitably be detrimental 
to the work, to the best interests of the children, the nation and 
the profession* (50)• The special committee of the BDA reached 
similar conclusions in July 1917: it agreed that there was a
shortage of qualified dentists and added that *the Association 
would welcome any steps consistent with professional methods and
143 -
ethics that would increase the working capacity of school 
dentists* (31). Clearly Barwise*s proposals did not fall 
into this category: the idea that school dentistry was one
of a simple type was described as erroneous and the committee, 
while accepting that nurses might be specially trained to 
assist school dentists in many ways, stated solemnly that 
*no treatment of an operative character of any kind whatsoever, 
and no administration of anaesthetics, general or local, should 
be undertaken by other than qualified dentists* (32). From then 
on the policy of the BDA on auxiliaries was to be one of 
opposition to any operation in the mouth by other than qualified 
practitioners and that dentists* assistants must always work 
under close supervision.
Some education authorities,however,followed 
Derbyshire*s example and started training dental dressers. In 
the summer of 1918, the BDA was particularly irritated to learn 
that such a scheme had been initiated in Birmingham despite 
strong protests from the school dentists there. The BDA 
secretary wrote to the Board of Education and to the General 
Medical Council to complain, only to be told that those schemes 
were only experimental and that they should be given a chance 
to produce results (33). The BDA policy was stated openly in 
an editorial in the BDJ: to those who promote dental nurses 
as unharmful and helping to increase the volume of services 
*the reply is that the BDA, which exists for the purpose of 
maintaining the interests and honour of the dental profession 
would simply stultify itself if it were to look with approval on
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a course of procedure which cannot but strike a serious blow 
at those interests and that honour, - interpreting these words 
Q a ^  •..’•The interests of the profession are identical with 
those of the general public’'K54)«
It was further claimed that operative work needs 
a training ’such as can only be guaranteed by the possession of 
a qualification giving its holder a place on the Dentists'
Register* (33)• Further, the training of dental dressers was 
held to be doing a great *dis-service* to the public by lowering 
the standard of dentistry and by creating * another obstacle in 
the way of dental reform*. And again, the fear of an increase 
of unregistered practice was brought up; * nurses trained to 
operate would unquestionnably be tempted... to abuse their modicum 
of knowledge by entering upon irregular practice* (36).
Though this policy did not reflect everyone's 
view as the correspondence in the BDJ showed, it drew much support, 
especially from school dentists themselves (37). Supporters of 
the 6-12 months training of nurses or other personnel as * dental 
operators* argued that this would be the only efficient and cheap 
way to organise a school dental service corresponding to the needs 
of school children. A further argument was that women could better 
deal with children than men could (58). The opponents saw in that 
proposal an ill-timed measure which could not but lower the standard 
and consequently the status of the profession. As one of them put 
it in an invited article in the BDJ; *at the present time, when 
every effort is being made to raise the status of the profession 
and when that status appears to be in the balance it would appear 
like an almost cynical disregard of those efforts to promulgate a
— i4y -
proposal which is bound to increase the number of unregistered 
practitioners, and which in itself must convey to the public 
mind the deplorable notion that operative dentistry can be 
taught by means of six to twelve months* course of training 
at a dental clinic*(39)*
Charles Tomes, the representative of the denteüL 
profession on the General Medical Council, disapproved the 
reaction of the BDA to the Birmingham and Derbyshire schemes and 
described it as *hardly consistent with a complete grasp of 
the situation* (60). This in turn brought protests from 
different sections of the profession and the president of the 
BDA reiterated the Association*s view that *the whole scheme 
tends to the production of serai-trained, semi-skilled pseudo­
dentists, who without any of the preliminary training that is 
required from dental students, will arrogate to themselves the 
position of dentists and will add yet more to the already large 
numbers of unqualified and irregular practitioners who are a 
source of danger and a menace to the community* (6l).
Beside the concerns for the good of the community, 
there were also economic arguments, as the following quotation 
shows: *I don*t expect any L-D.S. has gone through his four
years* course for less than £900. Are we, qualified men, then 
going to allow a six months* *'novice" to be placed on the same 
level as ourselves and the fee to be "love**? (...) We get our 
degrees too hard to sell them so cheap, just as if they were a 
mere scrap of paper* (62). The £900 figure must be contrasted
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with the revenues of a dentist. In the post-war years, a 
surgery, depending on location, could bring in cash receipts 
of anything between £500 and £2000, from which the cost of 
equipment, material, rent, staff, retirement funds, etc... had 
to be deducted (63). This left an average income of £368 in 
1913-14 and of £601 in 1922-24, slightly less than a general 
practitioner’s average income of £393 in 1913-14 but much less 
than £736 average of 1922-24 (64). Still this was well above 
what most other occupations could procure at the time (65).
These figures, however, must not be interpreted 
as indicating that all dentists had high revenues; the distribution 
of dentists' income was rather uneven. In 1913-14, the average 
professional esumings of the higher decile of the dental population 
was £ll40, that of the upper quartile £600; at the other end, 
the lower quartile*s average was only £133- The corresponding 
figures for 1922-23 were £l68l, £930 and £294; the middle 
figures are probably the closest to the real incomes of the 
average full-time middle-aged qualified practitioner. The lower 
incomes were probably earned by aged dentists, women practitioners 
and practitioners in part-time or limited practice. The higher 
incomes were likely to be those of urban practitioners catering 
for the needs of the upper classes.
In another vein, a school dentist wrote to the 
BDJ to say that he failed to see any need for dental nurses; 'What 
is wanted is an efficient clerkess for bookkeeping, etc., to look 
after the instruments and on very rare occasions to hold a child's 
hands' (66).
—  i49 —
By the end of I918, C.D# Wallis had become the 
most prominent spokesman of the opposition to operative dental 
nurses. Acknowledging again the need for a better organised 
school dental service, he supported the training of a 
specialised attendant who would assist the dentist in the same 
way that medical or surgical nurses assist doctors and would not 
become a substitute for the dentist (67)- He also repeated the 
argument that dental dressers would increase the ranks of the 
unregistered; but still, the General Medical Council, after 
'careful consideration* of the BDA's views, saw no reason to 
withdraw its support for the dental dressers' scheme (68).
Nevertheless the promoters of the dental dresser, 
although probably in a minority in the profession, won a great 
victory in convincing the Departmental Committee on Dentistry 
which stated; 'The Committee are of opinion that suitably trained 
and competent dental dressers or nurses acting under the effective 
supervision of a dentist may be usefully and safely employed in 
school dental work' (69).
The first reaction of the BDA to that statement 
was rather muted after the vociferous protests of the two previous 
years. At the special meeting of the Representative Board called 
in March 1919 to consider the report, a resolution calling for 
disapproval of 'dental dressers being used for operations in the 
mouth in dental clinics' was withdrawn under the pressure of the 
chairman of the Bosird, N.G. Bennett. He was one of those who 
thought that the BDA would have to make concessions to obtain
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the closure of the profession and that accepting dental dressers 
might be one of these concessions. He therefore substituted 
the following resolution which was carried: "The Board considers
that the work suggested for dental dressers would need careful 
definition and efficient safeguards in the interests of the 
patient* (70). In editorial, the BDJ wrote cautiously that the 
recommendation on dental nurses was only experimental, which 
opened door to hope, and that the Association would be * only too 
glad* to lend its counsel and influence in establishing an 
efficient public dental service (71).
However, internal pressure soon brought back a 
more agressive attitude and the BDJ reminded its readers that 
the BDA still * unhesitatingly deprecated* dental dressers and 
only approved the training of "dental nurses* (a term now used 
specifically to describe non-operative auxiliaries) "limited to 
the performance of very useful but strictly non-operative 
functions* (72).
The BDA maintained this stance when a new Dental 
Bill was introduced in Parliament and pressed for amendments to 
the Bill in that direction (75). Finally, it had to retreat in 
view of the probable withdrawal of the Bill (74): but this
tactical move by no means put an end to the controversy which 
was reopened soon after the Dentist Bill became the Dentists 
Act, 1921. Although the Act did not make provisions for the 
establishment of public dental services, it left the door open 
to the use of dental dressers in any future public service.
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Clause 3 on ‘Prohibition of Practice of Dentistry by 
Unregistered Persons' included the phrase that 'nothing in 
this section shall operate to prevent... the performance in 
any public dental service of minor dental work under the 
personal supervision of a registered dentist and in 
accordance with conditions approved by the Minister of Health 
after consultation with the Dental Board to be established under 
this Act'. When the time came to define those conditions of 
work of dental dressers the battle started again, an episode 
which will be examined in a further chapter.
In summary, during the twenty years preceding 
the closure of dentistry in 1921, the dominant feature of the 
market for dental care was the harsh struggle of qualified 
dentists against actual and potential competitors, namely 
unregistered practitioners and dental dressers. This battle 
was fought in the name of the interest of the community as in 
so many other instances where occupational pressure groups try 
to make public spirit and self-interest coincide in a harmonious 
way. Such altruistic commitment was seen as a pre-condition to 
obtain support from the public and from the state for the claim 
that the practice of dentistry should be restricted. However, 
behind the rhetoric,market forces were at work; as individual 
entrepreneurs, dentists were having to invest more and more 
financial resources, in terms of training and equipment, before 
they could secure a reasonable return. The costs of conservative 
dentistry, which the qualified dentists were trained to carry out, 
were excessive for a majority of people: they made 'mechanical
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dentistry*, which offered a definitive treatment, more attractive 
to a population unconcerned with dental health. Qualified 
dentists had to limit their conservative practice and to accept 
competition from the unregistered on the denture market, a 
competition they were unable to win without external support.
That is probably why they showed much less reluctance than 
doctors to state intervention in health insurance. In fact they 
would have welcomed it quite happily in 1911 and called for it, 
with the support of the Approved Societies, before the Departmental 
Committee in 1917 (75)• By then, the pressure for closure was 
building up continuously as the number of qualified dentists 
grew year by year and were more evenly spread throughout the 
country and as a greater proportion than before had to face 
day by day competition with the unregistered.
The 1921 Act resolved the problem of unregistered 
practice, but not that of dental dressers. It however closed the 
market for dental care, without any costly concession from the 
registered dentists. In effect,the recognition of several 
thousand unregistered practitioners only hurt the pride of the 
registered; it did not add a single competitor to the market. In 
fact it reduced competition greatly by eliminating the charlatans, 
and the casual *tooth-drawers* and by controlling advertisement, 
thus certainly making both the members of the BDA.and the IDS 
better-off.
Thus, British dentists had a limited but significant 
success both in their endeavour to expand their market through the
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development of public dental services and in their attempt to 
check the competition from unqualified practitioners. After 
1921, the main task facing dental organisations was precisely 
that of maintaining those gains.
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PART III; THE DEFENCE OF PROFESSIONAL TERRITORY (1921-1957)
The Dentists Act, 1921 is now commonly regarded 
by British dentists as the most important landmark in their 
professional history. In banning unregistered practice, the Act 
created a virtual monopoly for qualified dentists, who, on the 
other hand, had to accept the registration of thousands of 
unregistered persons by virtue of a ‘grandfather* clause 
acknowledging their vested interest in the practice of dentistry. 
Nearly sixty years later, in I980, there were still 85 *1921 men* 
on the Dentists* Register.
In 1921, the profession was not granted full 
autonomy as the newly formed Dental Board of the United Kingdom 
was left under the control of the General Medical Council, although 
in practice medical intervention in dental affairs was very limited.
Although dentistry was legally a closed profession, 
dentists can by no means be said to have been in full control of 
their work territory after the passing of the Dentists Act, 1921.
In fact, the dental profession*s monopoly was a rather weak one: 
dentists were more than ever divided among themselves and the 
threat, from the dentists* point of view, of operative ancillaries 
was still present. The antagonism between registered and unregistered 
dentists, who were now a majority of the register, did not disappear 
overnight; in fact, it had been exasperated by the negotiations 
that followed the introduction of the Dentists Bill, 1920. The
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qualified dentists resented the fact that they had to share the 
benefits of a new dental Act with persons they had fought for 
many years as quacks or charlatans.
Most qualified men, however, accepted that to 
compromise was the only way to obtain fresh legislation in 
dentistry; the official policy of the BDA was also to accept 
the recognition of the unregistered already in practice as the 
price to pay for legal recognition of dentistry. This did not 
mean, however, that reconciliation with the unregistered should 
immediately follow; the issue of accepting *1921 men* as members 
was soon heatedly debated in the BDA with the result that the 
internal divisions which had weakened the Association so much 
before 1921 were perpetuated for many years. The leaders of the 
former Dentists* Committee refused to share the last benefit 
reserved to qualified men, that of BDA membership, and they formed 
the *British Society of Dental Surgeons* to lead the internal 
opposition to the entry of former unregistered practitioners.
So, in addition to the tensions between unqualified 
and qualified dentists, there were major conflicts among the qualified 
men themselves. These divisions left the profession in a position 
of weakness at a crucial time. The first valuation of the 
Approved Societies under the National Insurance Act, 1911 had 
finally taken place, after long delays caused by the war, in 1921 
and it was followed by a great demand for dental benefits. Also, 
it was more and more generally believed that the government would 
soon create a public dental service, and the profession had no 
united stance to defend in the negotiations that would necessarily 
take place.
- 156 -
As to the ancillary question, the Dentists Act,
1921 had left a door open to the use of operative ancillaries 
in public services. The promoters of the dental dressers 
scheme with Sidney Barwise at their head were as active as ever.
Their belief that their scheme was both necessary and practicable 
was enhanced by foreign experiments like the dental hygiene 
movement in America and the school dental service in New Zealand.
The use of young women to teach dental hygiene and to perform 
certain simple procedures like scaling the teeth was first 
proposed by a New York dentist, A.J, Fones, in the early 1910*8 
v;ho trained some * dental hygienists* himself and campaigned 
strenuously and successfully for their acceptance (l). In 1920 
there were 11 American states with laws recognising dental 
hygienists (2). In New Zealand, a school dental service had been 
initiated in 1920 with dental nurses trained to perform preventive 
and curative functions as well. At first, dentists were far from 
enthusiastic about the scheme but they soon came to accept it as 
part of organised dentistry (5). In Britain, these two experiments 
were followed with equal attention by the promoters and the opponents 
of the dental dressers* scheme.
What the problems of internal divisions and of the 
dental operative ancillaries scheme show is that dentists, although 
theoretically and legally in a monopoly position, did not become 
overnight a dominant profession controlling its area of work and 
its related occupations and institutions. The third part of the 
thesis is devoted to the collective strategies and tactics developed 
by groups of dentists to come to terras with the problem of establishing 
and maintaining control over what they regarded as their professional 
territory.
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The period studied goes from 1921 to the Dentists 
Act, 1956 which gave complete autonomy to the profession in 
creating a General Dental Council and which also included 
crucial provisions concerning the training and use of operative 
ancillaries. While I will concentrate on this period, I will 
also briefly follow it up to bring the contemporary situation 
into the picture. As in the second part, the areas of professional 
organisation, of legislation and of the market for dental services 
will be examined. A first chapter is devoted to the endeavours 
to make the dental profession a unified one. This became the 
stated objective of many individuals and groups as soon as the 
D3ntists Act, 1921 came into operation in July 1921, and was 
achieved with great difficulty, only in 1949. Moreover, it was 
a short-lived unity because in 19551 the new British Dental 
Association formed after the Amalgamation of the three main 
associations, the Incorporated Dental Society, the Public Dental 
Service Association and the British Dental Association, was 
challenged by a group of dissatisfied general practitioners who 
formed the *General Dental Practitioners' Association* to promote 
their interests neglected, so they said, by the academics running 
the BDA.
A second chapter follows the efforts of dental 
associations to consolidate their position by legislative means.
This was attempted by seeking amendments to their own Act and by 
trying to take advantage of other legislation connected with the 
delivery of health services, like the National Insurance (Amendment) 
Act, 1928 (4), and the National Health Service Act, 1946 (5). These 
two pieces of legislation greatly influenced the market situation in
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dentistry. The third chapter of this section deals with dentists' 
strategies to influence their economic condition and discusses 
the specific question of the control of the division of labour 
in dentistry. As will be shown, strategies of both exclusion 
and subordination of potential competitors were used successfully.
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CHAPTER 6: THE ISSUE OF PROFESSIONAL UNITY .
Before the publication of the Dentists' Register 
for 1925$ the first one to include the former unregistered, it 
had been almost impossible to estimate accurately the number 
of persons practising dentistry in Britain. The number of 
registered practitioners was known but figures about unregistered 
practice varied enormously. For example, the IDS estimated the 
number of unregistered practitioners as 25OO in 1905 (l), whilst 
contributors to the BDJ advanced figures of 40,000, in I9II and 
50,000 in 1917 (2). The latter were certainly exaggerated as 
were the estimates of 25,000 to 55,000 made by the Royal Commission 
on University Education in London in 1915 (3)- In 1919, the 
Departmental Committee on Dentistry reported cautiously: 'we
find ourselves unable to frame an estimate of the total number of 
unregistered practitioners: their names do not appear in local or
trade directories under any particular heading. Their total 
number is certainly much greater than that of registered dental 
practitioners' (4).
The real situation was revealed in 1922-24 when 
the unregistered applied to have their names put on the Dentists' 
register: 7269 were registered in 1922, 867 in 1925 and 210 in
1924 with the result that on the Register for 1925, the *1921 men' 
overnight formed nearly 60^ of the total number of registered 
dentists.'
Although the Dentists Act, 1921 did not add a 
single dentist to the population of dental practitioners, it
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changed the balance of power in dentistry, as the comparison 
between the figures for 1922 and 1925 shows. In 1922, there 
were 5^51 registered dentists, 82^ of them holders of a dental 
qusilification. The BDA had 5205 members or 55^ of the registered 
and could claim to be reasonably representative of the profession.
A year later, the number of registered dentists had grown to 
12,762 (44.^ of them with a dental qualification) aind the 
membership of the BDA had slightly decreased to 5172 and then 
represented only 25^ of the profession. The IDS had approximately 
2500 members by then and for some years after 1921 it increased 
its membership more rapidly than the BDA did. At one point, it 
had more members than the BDA (5757 vs 5677 in 1928); but after 
1950, the BDA took the lead back and never lost it again.
Outside the two main associations, there was still 
a majority of dentists who stayed away from professional organisations. 
This and the fact that many in the BDA resented strongly the loss 
of status through being put on the same register as unqualified 
persons were sources of division and of weakness at a time when 
the establishment of public dental services was seen as a plausible 
prospect. In 1920, for example, the Consultative Council in 
Medical and Allied Services, on which N.G. Bennett of the BDA 
represented the dental profession, had recommended the creation of 
health centres'wherein are brought together various medical services,, 
preventive and curative, so as to form one organisation' (5) 
including dental services. Moreover, many Approved Societies began 
to include dental benefits sind there was talk of dental benefits . 
becoming statutory.
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- THE BDA AND '1921 DENTISTS' -
In such a situation it became obvious to many 
that the main problem confronting the dental profession in the 
aftermath of the Dental Act was that of unity. The IDS repeatedly 
urged the profession to speak with one voice to the Approved 
Societies and other bodies with which it had to negotiate. The 
British Journal of Dental Science committed itself to the promotion 
of unity (6). The Dental Surgeon suggested the formation of an 
'Amalgamated Society of Dentists' by the existing dental 
associations (7)- The BDA, however, was divided on that question; 
the leadership of the Association took the view that the consequences 
of the 1921 Act had to be accepted and that some overture should be 
made to the '1921 men'. In August 1922, the Association's Annual 
Meeting in Newcastle resolved after a long discussion 'that 
dentists registered under section 3 of the Dentists Act, 1921, 
should be eligible for election to membership of the BDA, provided 
that they accept the ethical standard of the Association suid 
conform to its Articles and By-Laws' (8).
The resolution, adopted by 58 votes to $4, 
immediately raised an uproar in the Association. The former 
members of the Dentists' Committee reacted with particular anger.
They had fought the recognition of the unregistered and had lost: 
now, only a year later, they were clearly not prepared to open the 
doors of the BDA to persons they still considered as enemies and 
as people whose presence on the register could not but lower the 
status of dentistry. Under the chairmanship of Sir Frank Golyer, 
they formed the British Society of Dental Surgeons which met a few
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weeks after the BDA annual meeting, on October 6th, 1922 (9).
The new Society which restricted its membership to 'those 
interested in the practice of dentistry and holding a degree 
or diploma in Dental Surgery or Medicine registrable in 
Great Britain and those others whose names were inscribed in 
the Dentist's Register previous to the application of the Act 
in 1921'stated as its object 'the advancement of dentistry, the 
promotion and protection of public dental health and the 
promotion and protection of the interests of fully qualified 
dental surgeons' (10).
The Society did not see itself as an alternative 
to the BDA but rather as an internal pressure group. However, 
the formation of such a society was received with displeasure and 
immediately condemned by the BDJ which wrote: 'we believe that it
will lead to disunion, where union is desirable, to ill-feeling 
where good-will should prevail, to friction which always arises when 
the attitude of the "superior person" is adopted. We hold that 
this movement will result in failure to achieve the very ends 
that are aimed at; failure that is, to benefit either the 
profession or the public; failure because a policy of exclusiveness 
cannot but fail' (11).
The first list of members of the BSDS published in 
1923, gives the names of 307 dentists, I30 of them from London.
In 1924, it had 312 members and, in the following years, membership 
decreased gradually (12). Despite its small membership, the 
Society obtained considerable support for its views. Its first 
action was to object to the vote of 92 persons of the Newcastle
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resolution as non representative of the majority's opinion and 
to press for a referendum on the issue. This was granted by 
the Representative Board of the BDA and in December the results 
were published: 1203 members voted against admission of '1921 men'
and 754 for (13). The majority against admission was substantial, 
but it was a disappointment that nearly hOyé of members had not 
bothered to vote. The editor of the BDJ bowed to the defeat and 
hoped that the results of the referendum would lead to the 
disbandment of the BSDS (l4), a hope which was not to materialise.
The IDS commented that this discussion on opening 
BDA membershr.p to '1921 men' was premature b^  ^at least ten years 
(15). The BDA referendum confirmed the leaders of the IDS in 
their view that 'the retention of the Society would be a 
necessitous one because of the protection necessary to see that 
the rights and privileges of our members when admitted to the 
Dentists' Register were fully safeguarded* (l6). Fred Butterfield, 
speaking at the annual meeting of the IDS in 1922, included 
specifically among those rights the recognition of members' 
services for treatment to members of Approved Societies under 
the National Insurance Act, the recognition of certificates signed 
by them and access to public appointments. Those were precisely 
the areas from which the BSDS later endeavoured to exclude'1921 
dentists',as clearly stated by Wilfred Fish and Golyer ir. the 
evidence they gave against '1921 men' before the Royal Commission 
on National Health Insurance formed in 1924. This move brought a 
protest from The Mouth Mirror which appealed to the Dental Board 
for action and suggested the writing of a code of ethics for dentists 
to prevent this kind of behaviour (17).
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The IDS, after 1921, often complained that the 
BDA, or at least certain of its branches, were engaged in a 
campaign against *1921 men*. For example, some branches wanted 
separate headings in local directories for the qualified and 
the unqualified dentists, the former being described as dental 
surgeons and the latter more plainly as dentists (l8). At 
their annual meeting in 1924, the members of the IDS adopted a 
resolution authorising 'the Council to institute any legal 
proceedings that it may consider expedient for the full 
interpretation of the Dentists Acts,l878, 1921, 1923, with a 
view of putting an end to manoeuvres by qualified dentists to 
discriminate'1921 men **(19).
At the same time, the Society expressed concern 
about the disunity in the profession at a time when it was more 
and more likely that the government might implement a public 
dental system (20). The editor of The Mouth Mirror warned that 
as it would be difficult to oppose such a scheme without being 
accused of protecting self-interests, the profession should build 
up solidarity to negotiate a sound arrangement before it was too 
late (21). In the same vein, the journal described as futile 
and divisive the internal conflicts in the BDA on the issue of 
the admission of '1921 men', since no one wanted to be admitted 
anyway as long as they had the IDS to look after their interests. 
It also described the unanimous support given by the IDS Annual 
Meeting, 1924 to the establishment of the Public Dental Service 
Association, as a proof of the Society's goodwill and intention to 
promote unification (22).
- 165 -
- THE PUBLIC DENTAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION -
The PDSA had been formed in December 1922 'for 
the purpose of looking after the interests of those dentists who 
were undertaking service in the National Health Insurance (Dental 
Benefit) Scheme' (25). In fact, the new association had been 
inspired by the BDA, with the IDS Is accord, to create a forum 
where all dentists accepting patients under the National Health 
Insurance scheme could meet. Its membership, which started at 
3000 in 1923 and jumped to approximately 65OO in 1924, was drawn 
from the two main associations with only a minority of non­
organised dentists joining. Prominent members of the BDA and 
the IDS sat on its Central Committee and engaged in the process 
of building a representative society which could become the official 
voice of the profession.
The Ministry of Health, at first, felt inclined to 
recognise the PDSA as the representative of dentists instead of 
the two others associations (24), but it had to retreat in view of 
the divisions which were developing in the Association. The IDS, 
while maintaining its support, was very critical of the lack of 
organisation of the PDSA and expressed doubts about its capacity 
to deal with 'dental politics' (25). The BDA's official policy was 
also to support the Association (26), but the agitation of the 
British Society of Dental Surgeons was there to remind its leaders 
that many members were still not prepared to collaborate with 
'I92I men'.
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In 1927, another resolution was passed by the 
Annual Meeting to open the door of the BDA to them (99 votes to 
28) (27) only to be followed by another referendum. As in 1922 
the meeting's decision was reversed, this time by a vote of 1384 
to 742 (28). The BDJ reported the result without any comment, 
whereas The Mouth Mirror commented crudely: 'no dentist 1921
with a spark of self-respect would have anything to do with a 
body that has so persistently defamed him and misrepresented him 
as the BDA has done on every possible occasion' (29). Finally, 
the BSDS felt so confident that the referendum had settled the 
issue in a definitive manner, that it disbanded itself claiming . 
that its ends had been achieved.
- THE 1930*8 -
During the 1930*s, the objective of unity remained 
a major concern for dental associations, although its achievement 
seemed only a remote possibility. In 1931, Sir Francis Acland who 
had presided over the Departmental Committee on Dentistry and been 
chairman of the Dental Board of the U.K. since its formation in 
1921, spoke out in favour of unity (30). The year before a 
significant change had occurred in the policy of the Ivory Cross 
which had hitherto refused to put names of '1921 men* on its roll; 
this society had even been accused at one point, by the IDS, of 
campaigning against 'dentists 1921* on the side of the BSDS (31). 
In 1930, it reversed its policy and opened its roll to every 
registered dentist, thus helping to bridge the gap between the 
rival factions of the profession. However, 10 years after the 
passing of the 1921 Act, this division was still as deep as ever.
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Edward Samson, then beginning a career as a prolific writer on 
dental subjects described the situation as one of "acute dental 
decay" (32). To him, unity was an ethical problem and division 
into "very vulgar fractions" prevented the profession from 
standing "in high esteem with its public".
In December 1932,a'Movement for Unity' was 
launched in Manchester. The Council of the IDS approved a 
resolution expressing sympathy with the Movement (33), but 
nothing came of it. The BDA, which the IDS regularly accused of 
"separatism", merely ignored it. However, the three main 
associations a^ne together for the first time when they presented 
a joint memorandum to the Committee of Inquiry into Health Services 
in Scotland (34), in which they claimed to represent 66^ of the 
profession. Following that fruitful collaboration, the councils 
of the IDS and of the PDSA wrote to the BDA to propose a discussion 
on a resolution they had both adopted saying 'that the interests 
of the dental profession would best be served by one dental 
organisation embracing and representing the profession as a whole' 
(33). The Representative Board reported that the invitation was 
'courteously declined'. It took another three years before joint 
action took place again when a committee of the three associations 
was formed to inquire into 'the training, conditions of service 
and wages of dental technicians' (36).
By then the pressure for unity was mounting 
increasingly from the rank-and-file of the profession. In 1942, 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied
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Services, presided over by William Beveridge, issued a report 
that heralded radical changes in the distribution of health 
services (37); it made the case for unity more pressing than 
ever. The Dental Gazette, the official journal of the PDSA, 
repeated its call for one association at a time when not only 
was the profession likely to be profoundly affected by the changes 
outlined in the Beveridge report but when dental technicians were 
uniting in trade unions and there was an increasing tendency to 
employ dental dressers in the fighting services (38). The BDA, 
however, was not prepared to answer the call and from then on, 
the pressure for unification was to come from the rank-and-file 
dentists rather than from the leadership of the profession.
- THE GROUP MOVEMENT -
For the first time in the history of the profession, 
dentists irrespective of academic status joined forces at the 
beginning of the Second World War as 'Group Practice Protection 
Schemes' were formed up and down the country to protect the 
interests of dentists on war service or those incapacitated in any 
way by enemy action. The first group had been formed in Harrow in 
1940 and similar schemes were soon set up in most parts of the 
country. These protection groups were soon transformed into 
pressure groups whose main concerns were the unity of the profession 
and the conditions of work under National Health Insurance. At the 
end of the war, there were about 100 groups (200 in November 1947) 
which were described as the 'Group Movement' (39).
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The Movement played a determining role in 
convincing the leaders of the profession, especially the leaders 
of the BDA, to promote a policy of unity. As L.J. Godden who 
was himself a pioneer of the Movement recorded recently 'practice 
protection gave the initial impetus for the formation of groups 
but it achieved more than this. The effect of practitioners of 
all types meeting as a local group was that they became acquainted 
with each other and the barriers of professional insularity were 
broken: competitors became colleagues and unity of organisation
seemed increasingly desirable' (40). It is interesting to note 
that at no point was there any mention of the Group Movement 
becoming a fourth dental organisation: on the contrary, the
Groups were advising their members to join at least one of the 
existing associations if they were not members and to join another 
association if they were already members of one. Accordingly 
groups remained autonomous; they had no by-laws and no regulations 
and their actions were co-ordinated by two liaison committees, one 
for London and one for the Provinces, which had no executive powers 
(4l). They obtained the early support of the PDSA and the IDS, 
followed later, in September 1943, by the BDA whose Council after 
having examined carefully the information available about the 
groups recommended that the Representative Board of the Association 
'records its interest and approval in the work of groups as at 
present constituted'; it further asked to be authorised 'to investigate 
some channel of communication between groups and the Association' (42). 
This position reveals a rather suspicious and apprehensive attitude 
which had its roots in the fears of many that the groups wanted to 
replace or compete with the existing associations (43). This does
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not appear to have been the case and as soon as serious talks on 
amalgamation of the three dental associations started, at the 
end of 1946 the groups almost ceased to function. Their liaison 
organ, the Dental Group Circular carried on until the end of 1948 
and after amalgamation the movement was ceremoniously wound up at 
a dinner in London in April 1950.
- AMALGAMATION OF THE BDA, IDS and PDSA -
As mention.5.4 earlier, the IDS and the PDSA had 
been in favour of amalgamation of the three main dental societies 
as early as 1954. At the time Lhe BDA, feeling that a large 
proportion of its members were not yet ready to take such a step, 
refused to join in discussions with the two other associations.
In 1957, however, the BDA took the initiative in inviting the IDS 
and the PDSA to appoint representatives to a committee to examine 
the problems associated with an eventual merger. The committee 
duly reported in the autum of 1938; the IDS and the PDSA accepted 
its report but not the BDA (44),
Whilst the discussion on unity never stopped at the 
rank-and-file level, it took some years before it was raised again 
formally by dental associations. The initiative had obviously to 
come from the BDA and it came in 1945, on the occasion of the annual 
general meeting in London. Five motions relating to professional 
unity were to be discussed; significantly, the motions were put 
forward by members not by the Council. Two motions dealt with the 
opening of membership of the Association to *1921 men* and to persons 
not registered as dentists in Britain but with a registrable
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qualification (registered doctors for example), and three suggested 
the formation of some sort of federation of dental associations (43).
All but the second one concerning persons with 
a registrable qualification were clearly aimed at putting the 
EDA on the road to unity. The proposer and the seconder of the 
resolution on the opening of membership to all registered dentists 
made it clear that unity was their main concern. One of them gave 
the example of ’dilution*, that is the threat of the introduction 
of operative auxiliaries in the dental system and said that in 
that instance *the profession should be able to speak with a 
united voice* (46). He also invited his colleagues to behave 
towards ’dentists 1921* in a decent British fashion and to avoid 
the snobbery which was the curse of the profession (47). The 
resolution, which many speakers described as statesmanlike, was 
carried by a large majority; however, this meeting could not 
alter the Articles of the Association.. Only a majority of two 
thirds in a referendum, which had already been promised,or a 
majority of three quarters in an extraordinary meeting of the 
Association could alter the Articles regulating conditions of 
admission to the Association. As to the proposals for a dental 
federation, they were rejected as too complicated and premature 
and the meeting finally adopted a milder resolution expressing 
the members‘ desire for unity and calling upon the Board of the 
Association * to take immediate steps to implement this desire*.
The Board of the BDA organised a referendum in 
early 1944 which by 2066 votes to l488 confirmed the decision of 
the 1943 Meeting that ’any person registered in the Dentists*
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Register (including*dentists 1921*) shall be eligible for 
membership of the Association* (48). The voters represented 
6&% of the members, which was considered a great success in 
view of the war conditions, but the majority required for a 
modification of the Articles of the Association was not achieved. 
Hence the convening of an extraordinary general meeting in 
December 1944, which attracted only slightly more than 200 
members,failing again to draw a sufficient number to 
change the rules (49).
Meanwhile the BDA Council, although it had no 
intention of rushing anything, had taken steps to further 
professional unity. A ’Unity Conference* under the chairmanship 
of Sir Norman Bennett, who by then had been active in the BDA 
for over 40 years, met for the first time on December 13, 1944.
Two more meetings were held in 1943 and 1946 and the Conference 
finally reported in the autum of 1946, making a formal proposal 
for an amalgamation procedure (30). The only serious obstacle 
left in the way of negotiations on amalgamation was the restrictive 
admission policy of the BDA; the IDS particularly resented it 
claiming that it could make the public think that there were two 
categories of dentists (31)• In. the event, the BDA moved swiftly 
this time and another extraordinary meeting, in January 1947, 
removed this obstacle by a vote of 696 to 93 in favour of 
accepting *1921 men* as members.
In June 1947 an Amalgamation Drafting Committee 
was set up to examine the problems of incorporation of the three 
groups into one. Right from the start it was decided that the
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BDA should be the vehicle of amalgamation as its Articles would 
require few alterations to integrate the two other associations 
and as dentists wanted to retain the title of British Dental 
Association for the new association. The committee reported in 
March 1949 (52), with detailed proposals as to the legal and 
financials aspects of amalgamation (53)• It was expected that 
the new BDA would be an association of approximately 11,000 
members or nearly 80% of the registered dentists; the BDA was 
bringing in 8000 dentists and the IDS 3000 whilst virtually all 
PDSA members were already members of one of the two other 
associations. The amalgamation finally took effect on Jsinuary 1, 
1950 after a long and arduous process of negotiations,illustrated 
by the divergent attitudes of the three associations on the National 
Health Service during the years 1946-49 which are dealt with in 
another chapter.
It had taken nearly thirty years to heal the 
wounds of 1921 and it is probable that some BDA members never 
accepted the association with persons they considered as of lower 
status than themselves. At different points in time during the 
1940*s there were statements by older members of the BDA, mostly 
academics like W.E. Fish, who later became chairman of the Dental 
Board, Sir Frank Golyer, W.E. McGregor, that the British Society 
of Dental Surgeons should be resurrected. The idea, however, had 
no appeal for either the younger dentists or for the general 
practitioners who were more concerned with the scale of fees of 
the NHI and the consequences of the Beveridge Report and the 
future of dental services generally than with the potential loss
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of status resulting from association with non-qualified dentists, 
who had anyway been practising legally for twenty years.
- THE FORMATION OF THE GENERAL DENTAL PRACTITIONERS* ASSOCIATION -
The relative unity of policy and organisation 
achieved in 1949 in the dental profession was soon troubled by 
the formation of an association to defend the interests of general 
practitioners in November 1953- The General Dental Practitioners* 
Association was set up * to protect the general dental practitioner 
in securing for him a proper standard of living and clinical freedom 
in his practice* (54) which meant in plain terms a better scale of 
fees in the NHS and less government regulations. The founders of 
the association complained that the BDA did nothing to defend the 
general dental practitioner and that the actual system of 
representation on the Representative Board did not allow his voice 
to be heard.
The GDPA adopted a strategy of internal struggle 
and tried to become the voice of general dental practitioners in 
the BDA. At first it claimed a following of thousands of dentists, 
mainly on the basis that its journal. The Probe, was read by most 
dentists. In fact. The Probe was sent free of charge to all 
dentists working in the NHS and the actual membership figures were 
rather modest. The Registry of Friendly Societies gave its 
membership as 995 in 1958; it fell to 589 the next year after the 
publication of the controversial evidence given by the Association 
to the Royal Commission of Enquiry on Doctors* and Dentists*
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Remuneration. The number of members started to increase again 
in the following years and has been in the region of 1000 - I5OO 
since I966.
The GDPA tried unsuccessfully to be recognised 
as representative of general dental practitioners in 1957 in 
negotiations with the Ministry of Health after the election of 
one of its members to the General Dental Council (95). Again in 
i960 when the Royal Commission on Doctors* and Dentists*
Remuneration reported (56), the Minister of Health refused to 
receive a deputation of the GDPA to discuss the report, arguing 
that the Ministry already had recognised the EDA as representative 
of the profession (57). Meanwhile the EDA policy was to refuse any 
discussion with the GDPA and to make no concessions whatsoever to 
what it called a minority organisation whose criticisms could not, 
in the EDA*s view, *be described as good, honest or constructive*, 
an. organisation * that proclaims at public meetings that the three 
enemies of the dental profession are the Ministry, the General 
Dental Council and the Eritish Dental Association* (98).
In the 1960*8, the GDPA opposed many EDA policies 
and decisions, like the acceptance of a package deal of proposals 
concerning remuneration and conditions of work made by the 
Minister of Health, Enoch Powell, following the report of the Royal 
Commission. The Association succeeded in gathering a sufficient 
number of signatures of EDA members to call an extraordinary general 
meeting during which A. Fearn, chairman of the GDPA, moved a motion of 
no confidence in the EDA Council- The motion was defeated by 899 to 
969 but it showed again the divisions within the EDA (99).
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The GDPA also fought the BDA*s intention, in I962, to create a 
special category of membership for ancillaries. A special protest 
fund was even created on that occasion (60). In the following 
years, the GDPA frequently expressed its displeasure with the way 
the BDA conducted negotiations with the Ministry of Health. In 
1968, The Probe published a manifesto in which the GDPA stated:
•...we believe that the BDA should be restored to its position 
as the learned society in which professional men and women may 
discuss their art and science. The GDPA and the Annual Conference 
of Local Dental Committees (of the NHS) should be accepted as the 
proper bodies through which the general practitioner protects his 
freedom and negotiates his terms of service with the Minister of 
Health* (6I).
This aim has yet to be achieved; but, since 1957 
when the first GDPA representative was elected as a member of the 
General Dental Council, the influence of the GDPA has greatly 
increased and, if the association is not recognised as representative, 
it certainly has a substantial influence on the attitudes of the 
BDA negotiators. The GDPA has succeeded in the last four General 
Dental Council elections in having its candidates elected to a 
majority of seats reserved for representatives of general 
practitioners: in addition some of its prominent members have
been appointed to BDA committees, and, in the 1970*s, they have 
been particularly active on committees dealing with ancillaries.
- CONCLUSION -
Soon after the passing of the Dentists Act,1921, 
dentists from many different quarters pointed to 'professional
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unity* as one of the major problems confronting the profession. 
Arguments in favour of a combination of forces were first that 
only a united profession could deal successfully with the 
government at a time when it was more and more probable that 
public dental services would be instituted. This argument was 
used with renewed force in the early 1940*s after the Beveridge 
report and when the Teviot Committee was reviewing the state of 
affairs in dentistry. At the same time, it was argued that there 
were threats of * dilution* of the profession from governmental 
promotion of dental auxiliaries and from the attempts of dental 
mechanics to obtain the right to deal directly with the public, 
two issues which will be examined later.
As we have seen, the war brought together qualified 
and unqualified dentists and many prejudices disappeared in the 
course of their transactions. Younger dentists, who had not known 
the pre - 1921 struggles, were less likely to discriminate against 
*1921 men* and were more open to discussions on unity. Their 
opponents, like those who formed the British Society of Dental 
Surgeons in the 1920*s, were the same people who had fought the 
recognition of unregistered practitioners in 1919-21. They argued 
that the profession had nothing to gain and much to loose from 
association with lower status persons. They were not prepared to 
accept that unqualified people should have the right to hold the 
same titles as qualified dentists and have access to the name 
appointments and related privileges.
At the years went by, the arguments of the 
opponents of unity seemed more and more academic to rank-and-file
- 178 -
dentists who were preoccupied with their ability to negotiate 
proper scales of fees under the NHI and later the NHS. They 
could argue that the proportion of *1921 dentists was bound to 
diminish year after year in any case and it was far from sure 
that the public made any difference between such dentists and 
those with qualifications.
Thus it was only after many years of efforts and 
many unsuccessful attempts that British dentists gave themselves 
a coherent and united organisation to protect and further their 
interests. This, however, as illustrated by the formation of the 
GDPA, did not mean that unanimity of views had been achieved and 
to this day the BDA has remained a much divided pressure group.
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CHAPTER 7 - DENTAL LEGISLATION, 1921-1997 -
When looked at superficially, the Dentists Act,
1921 might be interpreted as the fulfilment of the objectives of 
an occupational group engaged in the process of professionalisation. 
To some extent this is so, but such a view would be simplistic. 
First of all, it cannot be said that before I92I dentists formed 
a coherent and relatively unified occupational group; rather 
there were many groups with conflicting objectives and with a 
different social composition. There was no such thing as a 
* dental profession*, that is a group relatively homogeneous and 
united through snaring common ideologies and policies. As I 
already have shown there were deep divisions both between 
unregistered and registered practitioners and within these two 
groups. The Dentists Act, 1921 came as a compromise sanctioned by 
the state between the interests of divergent groups of dentists.
For some it was a complete victory; for instance, for the IDS 
which achieved its specific objective of obtaining the registration 
of its members. For others, however the legislation was only a 
partial victory. The BDA had succeeded in eliminating unregistered 
practice but only after having conceded the admission of thousands 
of unregistered practitioners to the register. For some groups of 
unregistered which failed to obtain the same recognition as the IDS 
and for the qualified dentists who had advocated total prohibition 
and elimination of the unregistered, the Act was a total defeat.
So it must not be assumed that all welcomed the 
new Dental Act as a victory and, accordingly, dental associations 
relinquished their legislative activities. On the contrary.
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they committed themselves to greater vigilance in dental 
politics. First, they were concerned with the provisions of the 
Act dealing with the use of operative auxiliaries in public 
dental services. In view of the increasing popularity of dental 
benefits under National Health Insurance, it was feared that the 
state might take advantage of this section of the law to curtail 
the territory of registered dentists. Furthermore, the *1921 men* 
suspected the qualified dentists of trying to discriminate against 
unqualified men whenever they had an opportunity. In the same 
fashion, many members of the BDA feared that some untrained 
persons could find loopholes in the Act and that the situation 
created by the Dentists Act, I878 might be reproduced. Indeed 
there were pressures within a year after the Act came into 
operation to further open the register. Dental associations 
reacted in trying to tighten the control of dental practice by 
qualified dentists.
In this chapter, it is proposed to review the 
attempts made by diverse groups to amend the 1921 Act. I will 
first analyse briefly the debate surrounding the Dentists Act,
1929 which relaxed the conditions of admission of ex-servicemen 
to the Dentists*Register, and then focus on the genesis of the 
Dentists Act, 1957 which has set the foundations of contemporary 
dentistry in Britain.
- THE DENTISTS ACT, 1929 -
This Act amended section 9 of the Act of 1921 in a 
relatively minor way. It reduced the age limit for access to the
— l8l —
qualification examinations required from bona fide practitioners 
who had been in practice for less than five years before the 
commencement of the Act from 23 to 21. This applied only to 
ex-servicemen and less them two hundred were admitted to the 
Dentists*Register under this Act (l). Although this measure may 
seem to be of little significance in view of its limited scope, 
it is worth examining its background as it gives us a good 
picture of the state of professional opinion in dentistry 
immediately after the legislative reform of 1921.
During the period of time allocated to unregistered 
practitioners to apply for registration, the BDA kept a close eye 
on the process. During the l8 months following the passing of the 
Dentists Act, the Association lodged 328 objections to applications 
for registration, most of which were unsuccessful (2).
In addition to individual cases of discontent 
there were some claims that the Dental Act was unfair to certain 
groups of persons. Tivo rather curious pleas to the Minister of 
Health came from herbalists, who claimed to have an extensive 
practice among sufferers from toothache (3) and from opticians who 
practised dentistry as well (4). Both requests were turned aown 
by the Minister without discussion. In contrast, the appeal of 
a group of unregistered persons who had not attained the age 
limit of 23 prescribed by the Act received a great deal of 
sympathy from all quarters in Parliament. During 1922, approximately 
300 persons under 23, most of them ex-servicemen, had applied 
unsuccessfully for registration as dentists; a ’Junior Dental 
Workers League* was organised to voice their claim that they were 
to be deprived of their livelihood only because of an arbitrary
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age limit (5). Representations on their behalf were made by 
societies representing ex-servicemen and the issue was discussed 
in Parliament. In December 1922, the Minister of Health told 
Lt-Colonel Darlymple White, a MP who said he had been moved by 
the plight of these young men, that if an agreed measure reducing 
the age limit was introduced by a private member, the House of 
Commons would consider it.
On May 9, 1923, Darlymple White introduced a short 
* Dentists Act (1921) Amending Bill* and insisted that it was a 
measure designed strictly to remediate a situation which no one 
could foresee when they had voted for the Bill two years earlier.
He said that he had been careful to draft it in a restrictive way 
and that this measure, designed to help persons who had fought for 
the nation, deserved the unanimous support of the House (6). The 
BDA found itself in a difficult position. Its leaders were incensed 
that the agreement reached in 1921 after many concessions had been 
made by the Association was to be breached so soon. On the other 
hand, it was not easy to oppose a Bill which commended the full 
support of Parliament, as shown by the unanimity of the House when 
the Bill received its second reading on May l4, and which was 
presented almost as a patriotic action to relieve the hardship of 
deserving young men. The Representative Board decided nevertheless 
that it should be opposed *by all legitimate means*(7); 
correspondence was exchanged with the Minister and representations 
made to MPs.
The Bill came out of the Committee stage with minor 
changes only, the BDA having failed to find a member to voice its 
opposition (8). The Bill had its third reading a week later and
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was sent to the Lords who approved it without discussion. It 
became the Dentists Act, 1923 in August to the great disappointment 
of the BDA whose only consolation was that the measure had remained 
one of limited scope (9). Nevertheless the main effect of this 
legislation was to confirm many dentists in their belief that 
the Dentists Act, 1921 was only a fragile protection against 
encroachment and that their vigilance was still required.
- THE TEVIOT COMMITTEE ON DENTISTRY, 1943-43 -
Three years after the admendment of section 3 of 
the Dentists Act,an attempt was made to modify section 5, relating 
to dental companies (10). A private member introduced a Bill to 
extend section 5 so that co-operative societies could set up 
dental clinics for the treatment of their members; for that, they 
needed to be exempted from the regulation concerning the status of 
the directors and shareholders of a dental company. Such clinics 
would have competed in a direct manner with private practitioners 
and the IDS and the BDA opposed the Bill vigorously (11), with 
the result that the Minister of Health blocked it on the grounds 
that it was repugnant to the profession (12). The government had 
obviously no intention of reopening the debate on the Dentists Act 
and was eager to avoid any conflict with dentists.
In 1927, a short Act amending the Medical and 
Dental Acts was passed. Its object, in the case of the Dentists 
Act, was only to legalise certain administrative decisions of the 
Dental Board and to confirm certain agreements between the governments 
of Great Britain, the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland
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concerning the registration of dentists. The Dental Board had 
been under pressure to take advantage of the situation to seek 
further amendments, but it resisted and managed to keep controversy 
out of this Bill. In the following years, the representations of 
the IDS in particular became more insistent, and in 1930 the Board 
finally accepted a request of Fred Butterfield to approach the 
Ministry of Health to discuss amendments to the Dentists Act.
The Minister agreed to meet the Board and a conference was held 
in October 1930 (13).
Four amendments proposed by Butterfield were 
presented. The first was to give the Board powers to approve 
conditions under which minor dental work could be performed in 
public services (rather than being only consulted by the Ministry); 
the second was to prohibit company practice, the third to increase 
the number of elected representatives of dentists and the fourth to 
eliminate from the Act all references to *1921 dentists* as persons 
*not being qualified*. The representatives of the Ministry were 
not convinced that these amendments were necessary to the interests 
of the public and, as they felt that the Board was not prepared to 
press very hard for Butterfield*s proposals, they had no hesitation 
in rejecting the first three amendments (l4). They were sympathetic 
to the fourth one, but they did not want to open a debate on the 
Act just for that. Butterfield hinted that he would seek 
legislation on this latter point through a private member Bill but 
in the end he let the matter drop.
In the 1930*8, the discussion on amending the 
Dentists Act went on and focused on two points, the powers and
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the composition of the Dental Board and the control of non­
registered practice. It was generally thought that the dental 
profession should now become autonomous and have a Council of 
its own (15); and there was concern that the Act could still 
be evaded by unregistered persons, particularly by dental 
mechanics who dealt directly with the public in so-called 
’dental repair shops' where dentures were repaired and fitted 
without the supervision of a registered dentist. The BDA felt 
that these questions and others such as company practice deserved 
the attention of the government. In 1939» the Association 
requested the Ministry of Health to set up a Committee of 
Inquiry on Dentistry (I6). As no positive reply was coming* 
the BDA, jointly with the IDS and the PDSA, asked the Dental Board 
to inquire into the state of affairs in dentistry and to consider 
particularly the status and powers of the Board and 'the practical 
working of the Dentists Acts' (17). The Board replied that it felt 
in sympathy with the request but that such an inquiry did not fall 
within its functions.
Despite appearances, the Ministry of Health was 
not unconcerned with the organisation of dental services. The 
Beveridge Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services carried 
on its inquiry in spite of war conditions, and in the Ministry of 
Health it was known that Beveridge*s. Report did not include 
recommendations specific to dentistry and that the Minister would 
need guidelines before announcing any reorganisation of dental 
services. Accordingly an 'Office Committee on post-war dental 
policy* was set up under the chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary 
of the Department, Sir John Maude. The Committee was formed at the
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end of 1942 and about a year later issued a report which briefly 
assessed the state of affairs in dentistry and recommended the 
setting up of a departmental committee to consider the institution 
of a public dental service, the problem of dental manpower and 
also existing legislation (I8).
This recommendation was accepted and the Minister 
of Health for England and the Secretary of State for Scotland 
formed an Interdepartmental Committee on Dentistry and appointed 
Lord Teviot as its chairman. The committee of 20 members, a 
majority of whom were dentists, examined evidence submitted by 
19 bodies representing dental interests. It also sent a 
questionnaire to dental schools and was supplied with further data 
on dental manpower by the Government's Actuary. At the request 
of the Minister of Health who was preparing a White Paper on a 
National Health Service, the committee issued an Interim Report 
(19) at the end of 1944 which set the principles which should 
guide the government in the organisation of a public dental 
service. A final and more detailed report was issued in October 
1945 (20): it made various recommendations concerning the setting
up of a comprehensive dental service, measures to secure an 
adequate number of dentists, ancillary workers, dental research 
and legislation.
As regards legislation, the committee yielded to 
representations of dental organisations. It recommended the 
creation of a separate Dental Council, the prohibition of dental 
companies and the elimination of denture repair shops (21). The 
three dental associations and the Dental Board had been particulary
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pressing on these issues. On the question of delegation of tasks 
to ancillary workers however, the dental associations failed to 
get complete satisfaction. After consultations with the Dental 
Board, the committee accepted the principle that only registered 
dentists should be allowed 'to perform any operation in the mouth 
which involves deliberate interference with living tissue ' (22). 
Accordingly, it rejected the introduction of dental operative 
assistants at least until there was proof of a shortage of 
dentists. As concerns non-operative functions, like cleaning and 
polishing the teeth, giving oral hygiene instructions and the like, 
the committee recommended that 'a scheme for the training of 
dental hygienists should be initiated forthwith on such a scale 
as would provide an adequate test of their value' (23). In view 
of the great needs, in terms of manpower, of any future public 
dental service, the committee had to take a stand on delegation 
and this recommendation of training dental hygienists was seen 
as the best compromise that could be offered to the profession (24). 
The recommendation was narrow in scope and was accompanied by many 
safeguards so as to ensure that hygienists would be trained and 
work under the close supervision of dentists. Reactions to the 
proposal were nonetheless hostile as will be seen in the next 
chapter in which I examine the particulars of this issue as well 
as those of the reorganisation of dental services under the National 
Health Service.
The Teviot Report, like the Ackland Report of 1919, 
was expected to lead to amendments of the Dentists Acts in the 
short term. But unlike the position in 1919, the amendment of 
dental legislation was not a major priority. Both the profession
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and the government were above all concerned with the organisation 
of dental services within the new NHS, and the issue of dental 
ancillaries was too controversial to be dealt with legislatively 
without lenghty and careful assessment of the situation.
Accordingly the government chose not to move in the direction 
of fresh dental legislation and concentrated on the preparation 
of the sections of its NHS Bill dealing with dental services.
- THE DENTISTS ACTS, 1956 and 1957 -
in 1947, the Minister of Health told the dental 
associations that he intended to accept most of the Teviot Committee's 
recommendations concerning dental legislation and to amend the 
Dentists Acts accordingly. He was not prepared, however, to 
legislate immediately to prohibit denture repair shops as 
requested by dentists, arguing that as dentures would be repaired 
free of charge under the NHS, those shops were doomed anyway.
The BDA did not share his optimism and its council sent him a 
memorandum in which it urged 'with all the knowledge of the 
present temper of the profession in this regard and with the 
certainty that the public interest demands it, that His Majesty's 
Government will reconsider its decision to postpone this issue' (25). 
This appeal remained a dead letter as did further demands for other 
amendments.
Relations between the dental profession and the 
government were tense and strained in the aftermath of the Teviot 
Report. Dentists complained of the lack of consultation on the 
organisation of dental services under the NHS. The BDA was
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particularly resentful and went as far as advising its members 
not to enter the NHS in 1948. Most did, however, and for a 
while the leadership of the profession found itself in a position 
of great weakness, having been openly disavowed by its members.
In June 1951, H. Marquand who had replaced 
A. Bevan as Minister of Health 6 months earlier, announced that 
proposals for amending the Dentists Acts were under consideration 
but that it would not be possible to introduce legislation in 
the current session, although it remained his intention to do so 
as early as possible (26). In fact, it was his last session as 
Minister because, the Labour Government was defeated by the 
Conservatives in the general election of October 25th. Somewhat 
s u r p r i n t t h e  new Minister of Health introduced the Bill 
prepared by the previous government in the House of Lords in 
November, less than a month after taking office. This gave more 
weight to the Bill as it meant that the proposed amendments were 
supported by both sides of the House: the Bill included provisions
for the creation of a Dental Council similar to the Medical Council 
and to enable all registered practitioners to use the title dental 
surgeon thereby giving qualified dentists and *1921 men* exactly 
the same rights (27). The Bill also provided for an experiment in 
the use of operative auxiliaries in public services to be conducted 
under the supervision of the new Dental Council.
Most clauses of the Bill were welcomed by the 
profession, but those relating to operative ancillaries (clauses I8, 
19, 20) raised considerable opposition. The experiment was described 
as * an experiment in dilution* by the BDA which, as in 1921, had
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again to face the question 'whether the concessions which it is 
asked to make... outweight the gains* (28). The Representative 
Board was divided as to the strategy to adopt. Only a small 
minority of three or four were prepared to accept the experiment 
and to assess the contribution of ancillaries on merit. The 
majority included advocates of uncompromising opposition and those 
who preferred an opposition which would put forward alternative 
proposals.
In the end, the Board adopted a resolution 
disapproving the three controversial clauses and instructed the 
council of the Association to take steps * to minimise the dangers 
to the public* of any legislation authorising ancillary workers 
to perform operative dental work (29). These steps included 
sending deputations to the Minister of Health and also to the 
Health Committee of the Parliamentary Conservative Party; 
amendments were drafted and circulated to sympathetic Peers.
Lord Teviot himself moved many amendments prepared by the BDA 
and some minor alterations were accepted by the govemement (30). 
Individual members of the Association were asked to contribute 
to a campaign of opposition to the controversial parts of the 
Bill by sending a letter to their patients saying that the Bill 
would create a class of semi-trained dentists and asking them to 
complain to their MPs (31). The result of this agitation was that 
after going through the House of Lords and being introduced in 
the House of Commons, the Bill was never given a second reading.
It was killed by the unwillingness of the dental profession to play 
a conciliatory role.
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The Times declared that the Bill had been dropped 
because the BDA had * fought it so stoutly* for it * feared the 
experiment with ancillaries more than it wanted autonomy for 
its profession* (32). In reply, the BDJ argued that the BDA*s 
opposition to ancillaries was in the public interest as their 
use would lead to a lowering of standards and be detrimental to 
dental health in the long run. Rather than spend public funds on 
a questionable experiment, the government would do better to 
* increase the number of fully trained dentists capable of playing 
a full part in the promotion of the dental health of the community*
(33).
The government*s response was to delay the 
amendment of the Dentists Act for nearly four years. It was 
only in July 1955 that a Dentists Bill was reintroduced,this 
time, in the House of Commons. The Conservative government had 
had plenty of time to reconsider the whole situation and now had 
decided to push the Bill through, which presented no difficulty 
as it had the support of opposition parties. The Bill incorporated 
the amendments agreed by the House of Lords in 1951 and a few minor 
concessions to the BDA as to the conduct of the experiment and to 
the composition of the General Council; but on the whole it was 
similar to the 1951 Bill and the government had not retreated on 
the issue of the experiment in the training of operative ancillaries, 
The BDA acknowledged that this Bill was an improvement on the 1951 
Bill but reaffirmed its policy of absolute opposition to the 
establishment of further classes of ancillary workers (34). At the 
same time it recognised that there was little hope of preventing the 
adoption of the Bill, and it decided on a strategy of trying to move
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a series of amendments at the Committee stage, 'with the object 
of improving the Bill*. In doing so, the BDA reasserted that 
its opposition to ancillaries has not been based on a spirit 
of "restrictive practice" and *that ultimately the interests of 
the public and of the profession are one'. Finally it hoped that 
its amendments *will receive the respect which is due to sincere 
conviction* (35)«
In all, 18 amendments were prepared and I6 were 
introduced at one stage or another of the discussion on the Bill 
by sympathetic MPs and Peers (36). In the end, 11 were incorporated 
in the Bill: one was to delete words referring to the * professional
status* of ancillaries to eliminate the danger of the public seeing 
them as professionals rather than as ancillaries; another required 
patients to be examined by a dentist before being treated by an 
ancillary. The representation of general dental practitioners 
on the General Dental Council was also increased and 8 other minor 
alterations were accepted by the Minister of Health. Major 
amendments to tighten the supervision of ancillaries and to prevent 
them from performing any extraction were rejected out of hand as 
they would have rendered the experiment meaningless (37).
The Bill had its third reading at the end of 
January 1956 and was sent to the House of Lords which adopted it 
virtually unchanged. The Dentists Act, 1956 provided for the 
dissolution of the Dental Board and the establishment of a General 
Dental Council, thereby severing the subservience links of dentistry 
to medicine. This measure which had been advocated for more than
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twenty years was deemed to raise the status of the profession in 
the public mind and to attract suitable recruits to correct a 
long standing shortage of dental manpower (38). The restrictions 
on carrying on the business of dentistry were tightened along 
lines suggested by the BDA. As regards ancillaries, the General 
Dental Council was given regulatory powers to establish classes 
of ancillary workers, with the reservation that regulations as 
to the training of such persons should be such as not to * materially 
impair the facilities for the training of dental students* (39)* 
Restrictions on the scope of the work and of employment of these 
ancillaries were imposed. Finally, it was made a duty for the 
General Dental Council to make arrangements for an experimental 
scheme in the use of operative auxiliaries if required to do so by 
the Privy Council. This section of the Act represented a defeat 
for the BDA which recognised that * there was no question that the 
Association had lost the main battle on the question of the 
ancillary experiment* (40).
The attitude of the BDA had been a puzzle to MPs 
involved in the discussion of the Dentists Bill as there was 
only question of an experiment limited in scope, to be conducted 
and assessed by a body representing the profession. In fact, 
the BDA*s defeat had been predictable right from the réintroduction 
of the Bill in July 1935 as both sides of the House had showed 
their keenness to go ahead with such an experiment. A policy of 
opposition was however pursued to the end, which indicates the 
strong feelings of dentists about the issue.
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In 1957, the Dentists Acts were consolidated in 
a single legislative measure the Dentists Act, 1957; as 
prescribed by the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure)
Act, 1949, no material amendment was allowed and consequently 
this measure raised no political debate. Since that date, the 
1957 Act has been the legal foundation for the practice of 
dentistry in Great Britain (4l).
- CONCLUSION -
The Dentists Act, 1921 apparently created a 
dental profession with virtually all the characteristics of a 
"dominant profession*. Dentists were then recognised as the 
legitimate practitioners in the field of oral health care and 
outsiders were banned. However, there were two limitations to 
dentists* control of dentistry: their regulating body, the
Dental Board of the United Kingdom, was still a statutory body 
of the General Medical Council and the restrictions on unregistered 
practice did not apply to public dental services.
Its subservience to the medical profession was more 
symbolic than substantive. The Dental Board was virtually 
autonomous aid there is no record of the Medical Council 
intervening in its affairs. However, dentists came to feel that 
formal association to medicine, which at the time of the campaign 
for registration had been perceived as raising the status of the 
profession, was now damaging the image of dentistry as an autonomous 
profession. When the chairman of the Dental Board declared in 195& 
that it was time that dentists had self-government (42), he was
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merely expressing what a great majority had been thinking for 
sometime. The General Medical Council could hardly reject the 
arguments of the dental profession and had little interest in 
trying to control dentistry. Nevertheless, it never actively 
supported the dentists* quest for autonomy. Even at the time 
of the Teviot Committee, when it was generally assumed that all 
connected with dentistry agreed that a Dental Council should be 
set up, the Medical Council submitted evidence in which it merely 
stated its neutrality on that issue (43)- So when the Teviot 
Report was published there were no doubts whatever that the 
question of self-government could be settled by legislation with 
little or no discussion.
In contrast, the issue of dentistry in public 
services was much more problematic. The clause in the Dentists 
Act enabling the Minister of Health to sanction the use of operative 
auxiliaries in the school dental service or other public dental 
services was perceived as a dangerous threat by a large majority 
of dentists. If operative auxiliaries were to be successfully used 
in public services there was no reason not to use them everywhere.
At a time when the government was setting the foundations of a 
public dental service, the profession felt that its position in ' 
the market was in danger. Hence its strategy of total opposition to 
dental dressers and other operative personnel and its quasi-permanent 
campaign to prevent their introduction. But in view of the commitment 
of successive governments to provide dental services to the nation, 
the,\R. struggle was doomed. In the end, dentists managed only to 
delay the government*s plans and to trade their cooperation for
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guarantees that the position of dentists in private practice 
would not be affected by the use of ancillaries. To this day, 
the profession has managed to contain the development of 
ancillary dental manpower and though their elimination has not 
been possible up to now and seems unlikely in the future, 
dentists have gained firm control of them.
The Dentists Act, 1956 can hardly be said to be 
the result of a process similar to that which led to the passing 
of the Dentists Act, 1921. In 1956 the points at issue were not 
the same, the dental profession was organised in a different way 
and the level of political sensitivity in the debate was higher.
But in both cases, the role of dental associations was crucial.
In 1921, associations of registered practitioners had had to 
compromise with representatives of the unregistered under pressure 
from the Ministry of Health. In 1956, negotiations took place 
between the profession, which was relatively united on the 
objectives of obtaining self-government and eliminating ancillaries, 
and the government which, this time, had not played the role of 
arbitrator but had taken the initiative in the organisation of 
dental services. That the government was involved in the debate 
on a larger scale and that the profession was better organised and 
now institutionalised led the dental associations to choose a 
different strategy during the discussions on the 1956 Act. In 1921, 
the only attitude possible was conciliation as there was so much 
to loose for registered dentists but in the 1950*s, the profession 
felt secure and strong enough to adopt a strategy of total resistance 
to government’s plans.
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Results were mixed. The menace of competition 
from operative ancillaries was not eliminated but it was 
considerably restrained. On the other hand, dentists acquired 
a bad name for themselves both in government circles and among 
the public and, in the following years, they had great difficulties 
in attracting public sympathy for their demands. However, 
legislative strategies of dental associations are better 
understood when account is taken of the market conditions in 
which dentistry was practised between 1921 and 1957 aud I now 
turn to them.
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CHAPTER 8; DENTISTS, THEIR MARKET AND THE STATE
It is a familiar claim of professional groups 
that their foremost motivation is the well-being of their 
clients and not economic profit. They insist that the organisation 
of professional practice and the delivery of professional services 
are free of supply and demand considerations; in other words, 
professional ideologies almost negate the existence of a market 
for professional services. The assistance of an expert to 
recover health, to obtain justice or to benefit from sophisticated 
technical or administrative knowledge has always been presented 
as "priceless" ' by professionals; when they are compelled to 
discuss economic issues, they claim that their own interests are 
second to the welfare of their clients (1). The sincerity of such 
a claim is difficult to assess; but the argument that market 
forces are not at work in professional areas of work can by no 
means be sustained. There is considerable body of literature 
showing that professional services have a price and that this price 
is determined by supply and demand factors (2). There is also a 
small but growing number of works showing that market conditions 
and the organisation of professional services, particularly 
the division of labour within it, are related.
Health care services have been a particularly 
fertile breeding ground for professional ideologies. Values of 
altruism can more easily be connected to healing than, say, to 
accounting and economic values excluded at the same time. But 
since third parties started to mediate the doctor - patient 
relationship, it has become clear that economic factors are not
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irrelevant, especially as public expenditure on health services 
cannot be limitless.
For many decades, professionals in the health 
services have had to negotiate with insurance companies and with 
the state to set the price of their services. Like any other 
occupational group, they have pursued their own socio-economic 
interests and tried to keep as much control as possible of their 
working conditions. Whether their interests and their clients* 
are inseparable, as they claim (3), is debatable. What is relevant 
here is that health professionals are not indifferent to their 
economic situation and that they too engage in collective actions 
to protect and further their economic interests. Those actions 
must be taken into account if one is to understand the dynamic 
relationship between professional organisations, the state and the 
consumers of health care services.
In dentistry, the year 1921 is an important landmark 
from a market point of view in two respects; first,the right to 
provide oral care services was restricted to registered persons 
and second, from July 4th, the Approved Societies started to pay 
dental benefits under the National Health Insurance Schema. However, 
the expected economic consequences for dentists, that is lesser 
competition and greater demand for dental services, did not come 
about. Instead dentists found themselves in a market where demand 
was not forthcoming and where competition, both virtual and actual, 
was still very much present. In this chapter, I wish to examine 
how dental organisations dealt with those interconnected issues. I 
will look first at the economic aspects of the practice of dentistry
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before and after the introduction of the National Health Service 
in Britain and then analyse the profession's strategies to check ' 
competition via the control of the division of labour in oral care.
- FROM PRIVATE PRACTICE TO PUBLIC DENTAL SERVICES; DENTAL BENEFIT 
UNDER THE NHI,(1921-1940) -
The first valuation of the Approved Societies under 
the National Health Insurance was made as of 31 December, I918 but 
was declared only in 1921. From July 1921, societies with 
financial surpluses after paying benefits defined as statutory 
in the National Insurance Act, I9II, could provide additional 
benefits such as dental and ophtalmie services. Although regulations 
could vary from one society to another, a person generally had to 
have been a member for 2-3 years to be entitled to dental benefit.
At least Q^P/o of the cost were met by the society, the exact 
proportion varying according to treatment and from society to 
society. The member could go to any dentist who agreed to his 
society's regulations and scale of fees. The dentist was free to 
accept or not any beneficiary.
Large numbers of dentists chose to participate in 
the scheme which was particularly welcome in industrial areas as a 
supplement to private practice. Many people who could not otherwise 
have afforded the to £5 fees (4) were able to come to the dentist. 
Some categories of persons like school children and pregnant women or 
the more destitute had previously had some limited access to dental 
care in public clinics or through charitable organisations, like 
the Ivory Cross and the Surgical Aid Society, but most wage earners 
had no support and could hardly afford dental treatment. It was
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commonly acknowledged that only the richer sections of the 
population could afford conservative dentistry and that the 
others, the majority, went to the dentist only in the last 
resort, usually to have their teeth replaced with artificial 
ones (5)-
Although dental treatment was often saiid to be 
the most popular of all dental benefits, it was estimated that 
in any year only between h% and 10^ of those entitled to dental 
benefit actually applied for it (6). It was argued that the 
cost, which could be up to 50^ of the treatment, was still a 
major deterrent. This might have made a case for the inclusion 
of dental treatment among normal benefits under the NHI, but such 
a measure was said to be too costly (7). That was the view taken 
by the Royal Commission on the NHI in its 1926 Majority Report.
The commissioners also considered that in view of the state of 
transition in which the dental profession found itself the time 
was not opportune to change arrangements (8). The four members 
who signed the Minority Report disagreed. They thought that 
dental and ophtalmie treatment should become normal benefits sind 
that a public dental service should be established by stages (9)*
In the event, dental treatment remained an additional 
benefit and its regulations were left unchanged. Dentists continued 
to complain about the lack of uniformity of regulations, about the 
gap between the school dental service and admissibility to dental 
benefit (10) and about the charge which deterred many potential 
claimants. Predictably, they also complained about the scale of 
fees which they found too low and which Approved Societies found
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too high. Following the report of the Royal Commission on the 
NHI, some Approved Societies expressed the intention to establish 
clinics where their members could be treated at lower cost than 
in private practices. This idea was strongly opposed, even on 
an experimental basis, by dental organisations (11). They felt 
that dental clinics were a threat to private practice and to 
"the happy relationship subsisting between patient and dentists 
built up by years of mutual confidence* (12).
In the early 1930*s, because of the economic 
depression, dental benefit was more important than ever ■ in 
maintaining the demand (13). Talks on the development of public 
dental services continued even though the expansion of existing 
services presented great difficulties, the lack of financial 
resources and a shortage of dentists being chief among them (l4). 
The profession was not prepared to accept a full-scale state 
dental service, as advocated by the Labour Party for instance; as 
the BDA insisted, "treatment in public services should be available 
to those only whose circumstances do not allow of their attending 
a private practitioner" (13).
The provision of dental treatment as a statutory 
benefit was the measure preferred by dentists as increasing 
access to dental care and at the same time protecting private 
practice. The BDA sent a report on that question to the Minister 
of Health in 1932 (l6), and in 1937 the three dental associations 
presented a collective memorandum to the Minister proposing that 
in the event of dental benefit becoming statutory, dentists should 
be paid by capitation rather than on a fee-for-service basis (17).
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Their request was supported by the British Medical Association 
and by many provident societies (l8). The Ministry took the view 
that although this matter was important, it was not an urgent one.
A delegation received by the Minister was told that payment by 
capitation was "quite inapplicable* and that the costs of providing 
dental treatment on the lines of medical treatment were too high 
for the nation, irrespective of the desirability of such a measure 
(19). Not long after, the outbreak of the war reactivated the 
debate on the provision of health services and dentistry became 
an important issue, for the first time in its history.
- TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE DENTAL SERVICE -
In the early 1940*s the official attitude towards 
the establishment of a comprehensive dental service was still an 
amalgam based on recognition of the importance of dental treatment 
with reservations about the practicality of setting up a complete 
dental service for the whole population. Sir William Beveridge in 
his report on Social Insurance and Allied Services stated: "that
the insurance title to free dental service should become as 
universal as that to free medical service is not open to doubt* (20), 
but he said nothing of the ways and means of implementing a public 
dental service, and the Teviot Committee was set up on the 
recommendation of the Ministry of Health's Office Committee on 
post-war dental policy, in 1943. This policy committee, which 
included the closest advisers to the Minister of Health, restated 
the view that a comprehensive dental service would take many years . 
to organise because of costs and lack of manpower. Accordingly, the 
committee favoured a strategy consisting in improving and extending
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the existing services, particularly those catering for the 
priority classes identified in the Beveridge Report (21).
Another factor which was leading the Ministry's 
officials to prefer a strategy of gradual implementation was the 
attitude of the dental profession itself. There was much 
confusion about what the profession wanted or was prepared to 
accept. Dentists argued that there was no logical reason to 
exclude oral care from a National Health Service, especially as 
dental disease was known to be almost universal. However, it 
was much easier to agree on the principle of making dental 
treatment available to everyone than on a scheme to provide it.
Some saw no alternative to state-controlled dentistry which one 
dentist considered 'as inevitable as rates and taxes' (21). Others 
found that any form of state dentistry was greatly to be deprecated 
'as dentistry to be live and progressive must be free from 
bureaucratic control and 'red tape' as the relationship between 
dentist and patient must retain that personal human contact and 
friendly atmosphere so essential to success* (22). Between these 
two extremes a wide spectrum of opinions prevailed and the 
appointment of an interdepartmental committee on dentistry was 
seen as an appropriate way of finding out, in the words of the 
terms of reference of the Teviot Committee, 'the progressive 
stages by which, having regard to the number of practising 
dentists, provision for an adequate^nd satisfactory dental service 
should be made available for the population*.
Meanwhile the government was preparing its strategy 
for a National Health Service which it made public in a White Paper
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in February 1944. The Ministry's position regarding a comprehensive 
dental service was in line with that of the previous twenty years 
and was stated as follows: *a full dental service for the whole
population... is unquestionably a proper aim in any whole health 
service, and must be so regarded. But there are not at present, 
and will not be for some years, enough dentists to provide it.
Until the supply can be increased, attention will have to be 
concentrated on priority needs' (24). The White Paper insisted 
on this approach despite the Minister's advance knowledge of the 
forthcoming recommendation of the Teviot Committee's Interim 
Report that a comprehensive dental service should be instituted 
as an integral part of the i\HS at its inception. The Committee 
took the view that such a measure would help to increase the 
recruitment to the profession as it would give dentistry 'its 
rightful place in the public estimation' and would attract young 
men and women to the career in sufficient numbers, thus enabling 
the scheme to work.
The principle of establishing a comprehensive service 
right from the start was agreeable to the profession but dentists' 
organisations insisted that it should not be done at the expense of 
the dental practitioner by introducing new categories of operative 
ancillaries and by enabling mechanics to deal directly with the 
public (23). The IDS was particularly concerned that the number of 
dentists should be gradually increased only in proportion with the 
increase in the demand for dental services. They were worried that 
the government might want to train dental personnel in great numbers 
to meet the needs for oral care rather than just cope with the slowly 
rising demand for it. The three associations feared that the use of
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ancillaries which they described as 'dilution* would threaten 
private practice which they wished to preserve. The shortage of 
dentists was said to be temporary and related to war circumstances 
and it was alleged that the future of the health centres proposed by 
Beveridge was at stake as 'the use of partially-trained personnel 
in such centres might well result in lack of confidence in centres 
and a consequent lessening to the nation of their usefulness* (26). 
These views and the warning that a comprehensive scheme had to be 
acceptable to the profession before it had any chance of working 
successfully were repeatedly pressed upon the members of the 
Teviot Committee, the work of which the Ministry was monitoring 
closely.
Soon after the publication of the Interim Report, 
the Minister of Health submitted his revised position to the 
profession (27). The main points were that a comprehensive dental 
service should be set up from the start; dentists should be free 
to join; patients should be free to choose their dentist; dental 
services should be made available to all in a General Dental 
Practitioner Service; remuneration would be made according to a 
scale of fees nationally settled after consultation with the 
profession and there would be experiments in the provision of 
services in health centres.
A first informal meeting between the Minister and 
representatives of the three associations took place at the end of 
December 1944 and was followed by more formal ones in February and 
March 1945, at which dentists expressed their willingness to cooperate 
with the government if some alterations to the proposals were accepted.
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The BDA, in particular, objected to the proposed scale of fees 
and wanted *a more imaginative method of payment*. All had 
previously agreed that remuneration by capitation and by salary 
were to be rejected. The BDA argued that as many dental 
operations could be done in more than one way, a uniform scale 
of fees would prevent the dentist from exercising his professional 
judgement. They suggested that instead of paying the dentist by 
a scale of fees, the government should establish a system of 
grant-in-aid whereby the patient would receive the cost of 
ordinary treatment and would be able, if he wished, to apply it to 
a 'finer job*, paying the difference himself. In January 1946, the 
Minister replied with a proposal whereby, while keeping the scale 
of fees, there would be an addition to it of a list of 'special jobs' 
of the kind referred to by the BDA. The reimbursement of the cost 
would be approved by the Central Dental Board, a supervising body 
proposed earlier. At the following meeting this was not objected 
to as such by the profession.
- NHS DENTISTRY -
On 6 February, the Minister introduced a National 
Health Service Bill which included dental treatment among the 
services. Services were not to be unlimited, despite the Minister's 
admission that 'the condition of the teeth of the people of Britain 
is a national reproach' (28). Because of the shortage of dentists, 
the government could not guarantee that everyone would obtain full 
dental treatment at the inception of a general dental service. At 
first, priority would be given to expectant and nursing mothers, 
infants and school children and it was hoped that a dental service
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for the whole population could be built up gradually through the 
development of dental services in health centres (29). As to the 
scale of fees, the problem of establishing what level of remuneration 
it should yield was referred to an Interdepartmental Committee, 
chaired by Sir William Spens, who reported in May 1948 (30),
Criticisms of the Bill were not slow to come. All 
three dental organisations complained that the Bill was not along 
the lines of the Teviot Report and that private practice's future 
was in danger. The BDJ commented; 'we would be surprised if the 
scheme for the general dental service, as outlined in the Bill, were 
to commend itself to dentists generally' and appealed to the 
Minister to think again, reminding him that he needed the cooperation 
of the profession to implement any dental service (31).
The IDS and the PDSA reacted rather more mildly to 
the Bill than the BDA. They adopted a strategy of lobbying Parliament 
the usual way and were prepared to wait and see how the proposed 
service would work (32). The BDA, by contrast, engaged immediately 
in a campaign against the Bill: a press statement was issued to
denounce the Bill to the public as a breach of its freedom to have 
the treatment of its choice by the dentist of its choice (33).
At the same time, the Association appealed to dentists to oppose 
the Bill and to refuse to practise under any government scheme 
incompatible with the following principles: that private practice
should remain the main channel through which dental treatment is 
provided, that dentists should be compensated for the depreciation 
of their practices which was likely to follow the introduction of 
a general dental service and that dentists should be represented on 
all advisory and executive bodies of the National Health Service (34).
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Meetings of all dentists were arranged in all
parts of the country on the initiative of the BDA and the following
resolution was adopted: "the members of the Dental Profession here
assembled, while approving whole-heartedly the principle of a 
comprehensive health service for the Nation, within the framework 
of which dental treatment is to be included, consider that the 
propositions relating to dentistry in the National Health Service
Bill, are contrary to the public interest and so inimical to the
profession. They, therefore, pledge themselves to support such 
amendments to the Bill as will ensure the provision of a dental 
service under conditions completely acceptable both to the public 
and to the profession and will participate in the scheme on the 
appointed day only if the regulations to be made under the Act do 
in fact make such a service possible* (35)- Dentists were also 
invited to suscribe to a defence fund similar to that raised by 
the medical profession (36).
The BDA prepared a list of I8 amendments which 
were presented by Captain J. Baird, MP, a member of the Association 
(37). After his unsuccessful attempt to incorporate them in the 
Bill at the Committee stage, Baird was much criticized and later 
refused to continue to represent the profession in the House (38). 
’When it became clear that the Bill would not be amended along the 
lines suggested by them, the BDA Representative Board took the 
grave step at the end of January 1948 of advising its members 
to refuse to enter the service due to start on 3 July, 1948 (39). 
They objected to prior approval of some treatments by a Dental 
Estimates Board and to the fee-for-service method of remuneration. 
They complained about the absence of adolescents among priority
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classes and about the time that would be lost on form filling 
and more generally about state intervention in the dentist- 
patient relationship (40).
The IDS Sind the PDSA, however, had decided to 
leave it to their members to decide whether or not to join the 
service. Eventually, 4562 dentists entered the General Dental 
Service on the appointed day representing approximately 45^ of 
the number of the Minister had expected. The number rose to 
6545 at the end of July, 7550 at the end of August and 8436 at 
the end of October (4l). By then, the Representative Board of 
the BDA had recognised that-, more than 50^ of the members of the 
Association had already undertaken service under the NHS Act.
The Board restated its view 'that the present service is detrimental 
to the welfare of the public and the profession' and changed its 
policy of opposition to entry to one of letting members judge for 
themselves whether to enter the service or not (42). One year 
after the inception of the service approximately 9400 dentists were 
on the lists, leaving only a small minority of about five per cent 
of those eligible outside.
Thus, the dental service started on the terras set 
by the Minister of Health and without the support of dental 
organisations. Although all agreed that the service should be 
free and comprehensive, that dentists should be free to enter and 
that patients should go to the dentist of their choice, the 
profession's representatives opposed the method of remuneration 
and the role fo the Dental Estimates Board set up to give prior 
approval to more costly forms of treatment (43). Despite tensions 
between the profession and the Ministry, the services was immediately
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successful, at least as far as demand was concerned. The demand 
for dentures was likened to a deluge and despite longer hours of 
work, dentists were unable to cope with it. Soon long waiting 
lists built up.
An immediate result of this large consumption of 
dental services was a steep increase in dentists' earnings.
Soon the expenditure forecasts were shattered and the Minister of 
Health decided to intervene. In December 1948, he announced 
that regulations, to take effect on February 1, 1949, would be 
passed to limit the earnings of dentists by means of a reduction 
by half of payments in excess of £400 per month (44). This 
measure was taken to bring back dentists' incomes to the average 
recommended by the Spens Committee, i.e. £l600 per year net in 
1939 value of money terms for a dentist working 1500 hours at the 
chairside (45) .
However, as was to be shown later, the assumptions 
as to practice expenses, the number of hours worked and. the demand 
proved false and the cost of the service went rapidly out of control. 
Predictably, dentists were incensed at Bevan's action which the BDA 
described in a press statement as 'an attack on the liberty of the 
individual and (...) against public interest, as leading to the 
curtailment of an essential health service* (46). Dentists strongly 
resented that they had not been consulted by the Minister and that 
the cut was arbitrary.
To soothe the profession's feelings, the Government 
appointed a Working Party 'to ascertain the average chairside time
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taken by general dental practitioners... to complete each of the 
types of dental treatment* set out in the NHS regulations (4?).
The objective was to provide a basis for discussion with the 
profession on a scale of fees. In May 1949, the Minister told 
dental organisations that in view of the high level of payments 
to dentists despite the limitation regulations, he would have to 
change the scale of fees without waiting for the report of the 
Working Party. Dental associations, to which this was *wholly 
unacceptable* refused to enter into discussion on a new scale of 
fees (48) and an average cut of 1?^ (10/6 for prosthetic work and Zy/o 
for conservative and surgical work) was imposed as of 1 June 1949 
to stop, in the words of the Minister, *the present unjustifiable 
drain of the Exchequer* (49).
The limitations on earnings were phased out at 
the end of July, a few days before the Working Party reported.
The Working Party, formed of two representatives of each dental 
organisation under the independent chairmanship of W. Penman, past 
president of the Institute of Actuaries, examined the work of a 
sample of dentists and concluded that whilst dentists were earning 
in average approximately 19^ in excess of the Spens standard, this 
was through more hours and greater speed (50). Difficult discussions 
between the Ministry of Health and dentists* representatives followed 
and the new BDA, which for the first time presented a united front 
of the profession to the government, was unable to prevent a further 
cut of 10% of the scale of fees, effective from 1 May 1950.
Relationships with the Ministry of Health had been 
uneasy since the first discussions on the White Paper on the NHS
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in 1944 and in 1949-30 they were at their lowest. Dentists were 
pointed to in the press and in government circles as greedy 
moneymakers. There was probably some exaggeration in many of the 
accusations, but it is clear that NHS practice was very lucrative.
So much so that many dentists working in public services left to 
enter the General Dental Services. The chief Medical Officer of 
Health in his report for 1948-49 emphasised that 'the most serious 
feature of the dental service has been the drift of dentists away 
from the public dental services' (31)• For example, the number of 
school dentists, expressed in whole-time equivalent, dropped from 
921 in 1947 to 819 in 1948 and 732 in 1949. It reached a low of 
712 in 1931 before growing again in the following years (52).
An illustration of the low esteem of dentists in 
official circles is provided by a debate in the House of Commons, 
in October, on the National Health Service (Amendment) Bill (55)- 
John Baird, one of the two dentists in the House, moved a new clause 
to prohibit private practice by NHS dentists. He reminded the House 
that he had been one of the staunchest advocates of the right to 
treat patients on a private basis before the service started.
However, during the first year of the service, he had been informed 
of so many abuses that he had changed his view on private practice. 
Now, in his opinion, only total prohibition could put a stop to 
"rackets" that occurred on a large scale. The amendment was not 
accepted by the Minister of Health but his comments say much about 
his views on dentists. He concluded the discussion on Baird's 
motion in saying that 'the dental profession has been guilty of worse 
conduct than any other profession in the Health Service (...). But 
I am satisfied, on experience, that the misconduct is on the decrease
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and that the behaviour of dentists, generally speaking is 
improving. Therefore I say it is far better for us to allow 
the disciplinary machine which has been established under the 
scheme to operate*. In fact, dentists had been disciplined twice 
since the beginning of the dental service, and the Minister 
probably knew that a little moderation on his part was advisable. 
Nevertheless, the warning to the profession was clear:abuses 
would not be tolerated.
In 1951» the Government, further to reduce expenditure, 
turned to the demand for dental services. The April Budget provided 
for the introduction of a charge of £4,5s on dentures, representing 
about half of the cost, which took effect from 20 May (54). Almost 
immediately a fall of approximately 25% in the demand ensued. The 
consequent reduction in the cost of the service was important, but 
not enough to the liking of the Government which introduced a charge 
of £1 for any dental treatment, exempting only expectant mothers 
and those with a child of less than 12 months and persons under 
21 (55).
The BDA claimed that the resulting decline in demand 
should be compensated for by the cancellation of the 10% cut of May 
1950. The Minister refused but invited the BDA to join officials 
of his department in an inquiry into, the effects of the charges.
The BDA's request was renewed in 1954 and again in February 1955*
The Association claimed that NHS dentists should earn on average a 
net income of £2200. A reply came in the form of the cancellation 
of the 10% cut which raised the average income of dentists to £2000.
The scale of fees remained unchanged until May 1957 when it was 
increased by 2.6%. A few months before, the Government had set up
- 215 -
a Royal Commission on Doctors' and Dentists' remuneration in the 
hope of ending the permanent struggle on that issue. In its 
report, the Commission stated that dentists' remuneration should 
continue to be based on a scale of fees and recommended that the 
average general dental practitioner should earn £2500 in I96O 
compared to the £2950 demanded by the BDA in its submission to 
the Commission in 1957* It was also recommended that a Standing 
Dental Rates Study Group should be established and that henceforth 
levels of remuneration should be recommended to the Government by 
a Review Body of individuals whose standing and reputation could 
command the confidence of the professions, the Government and the 
public (5Ô). By and large the machinery set up after I96O worked 
ever since.
This suecint account of the relationships of the 
profession and the Government on the problem of dentists' earnings 
indicates how difficult were the beginnings of the General Dental 
Services. There was much suspicion on both sides and successive 
cuts in the remuneration of dentists and attempts to reduce demand 
did nothing to restore confidence. These governmental measures were 
brought about by unrealistic assessments of the behaviour of both 
the consumers and suppliers of dental care. After the humiliation 
of the BDA in 1948 when its members entered the service in large 
numbers, despite its advice to the contrary, the Minister of Health 
was clearly in a position of command and for the next or h years 
his Ministry could almost dictate the conditions of service to 
dentists. Meanwhile, dental associations had engaged in the process 
of joining forces and, after amalgamation, the new BDA took some years 
to learn to work as one body and to establish a reasonable working 
relationship with the Government.
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- THE CONTROL OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR -
I have already mentioned on several occasions the 
alarm raised in the dental profession whenever the suggestion was 
made that others than registered dentists should be allowed to 
perform operations in the mouth. This issue has been central in 
British dentistry for the last sixty years, and over that period 
of time there always has been a sizeable proportion of the profession 
which opposed strenuously any encroachment on dentists* diagnostic 
and operative functions.
To the sociologist, the issue is of crucial 
importance as it shows in a revealing manner how professional 
attitudes and collective strategies bear upon the division of labour 
in an area of work. Dentistry provides a particularly interesting 
case study because the work to be divided has always remained 
fairly limited in scope and because the actions of different 
interest groups upon the division of labour can reasonably be 
isolated and analysed.
In this section, I propose to examine four episodes 
in the debate on the division of labour in British dentistry 
during which the profession tried in different ways either to 
control or altogether to eradicate competition from other 
occupational groups. The first one has already been discussed in 
part in chapter 5: it was the dental dresser scheme launched in
Derbyshire during the First World War which ran into difficulties 
soon after the passing of the Dentists Act, 1921 and was ended in 
1932. A second episode starting in the mid 1930*s involved dental 
technicians; the point at issue was whether technicians, or dental
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mechanics as they were then known, should deal directly with 
patients or not. To this day, the profession has opposed 
vigourously all attempts of technicians to work outside the 
control of a dentist. A third episode started in 1942 when the 
Royal Air Force reopened the issue of operative ancillaries with 
an experiment in the use of dental hygienists- The Teviot Committee 
examined the experiment and made recommendations on the use of 
hygienists. The profession took some time to agree on a common 
policy on hygienists; in fact, hygienists with limited educative 
functions were accepted only when it became clear that the government 
intended to introduce legislation to test the use of operative 
ancillaries. This final episode started in the late 1940*s and 
dominated the discussions preceding the Dentists Act, 1956. Thirty 
years later the debate is far from closed and the fate of dental 
therapists, as operative ancillaries have been called since 1978, is 
still very much in the balance.
- THE DENTAL DRESSERS SCHEME (1921-1952) -
One of the problems the Dentists Act, 1921 failed 
to settle was that of the performance of 'minor dental work* in 
public services by persons other than registered dentists. Clause 
5 of the Act prescribed thai the conditions of work of those persons 
should be laid down by the Ministry of Health after consultation 
with the Dental Board. This provision led the opponents and 
promoters of the creation of a new class of dental operators to 
argue their case more vigorously than ever.
The initiator of the dental dressers scheme 
Dr Sidney Barwise and his supporters claimed that the use of
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properly trained operators to perform simple dental procedures 
was both economic and efficient. In addition, they said it was 
the only way to provide dental services to certain classes of the 
population such as school children or young mothers, until there 
were sufficient dentists to meet their needs (57). To the BDA 
this was nothing but a * dangerous expedient*. The Association 
argued that there was no evidence of a shortage of dentists and 
was adamant that if * every assistance which would permit the 
dental officer to do his work speedily and without undue fatigue 
should be welcomed... no dental operation such as filling, 
extracting or scaling should be performed by any but a qualified 
dental surgeon* (5&). The position of the BDn was that now that 
the problem of unregistered practice had been solved, no 
relaxation of the provisions of. the Dentists Act should be 
allowed to take place, even on an experimental basis. It was not 
prepared to accept that the work of dressers could be as satisfactory 
as that of a qualified dentist to which the proponents of the dressers 
scheme replied that *the majority of those who attack them have not 
actually tested their use by personnal experience* (59).
In September 1922, the Ministry of Health made known 
the conditions under which non-registered persons could perform 
minor dental work in public services (60). The definition of
minor dental work excluded work like fillings and extractions
and was limited to non-operative procedures; strict conditions of 
supervision were also laid down and circulated to Local Authorities 
by the Board of Education.
The BDA recorded its satisfaction that its plea had
been heard and that the treatment of patients attending public dental
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services was not to be relegated * to a class of operators who 
would not be tolerated in dental private practice* (6l). On 
the other hand, advocates of dental dressers were not prepared 
to give up and those local authorities which had been employing 
dental dressers and had been given two years to adjust to the 
new conditions pressed for amendments to the Board of Education*s 
memorandum to be allowed to continue the employment of dressers 
as operators (62). They were unsuccessful and were warned that 
they had now to abide by the conditions set by the Ministry of 
Health.
However, Bariirise and the Derbyshire Authority were 
determined not to give up their scheme and soon they became the 
main target of a campaign by the BDA and the main dental journals.
In September 1924, an editorial in The Lancet, which suggested that 
in view of the limited number of dentists. Dr Barwise*s scheme should 
be allowed to continue (65), provided the occasion to launch what 
the BDA hoped would be the final battle against dental dressers. 
Correspondence by Barwise himself and by opponents and supporters 
was published (64) and the BDA itself took part in this correspondence. 
The Secretary of the Association stressed that there was no such 
thing as ‘minor dental work* or routine work which could be easily 
done by partially-trained persons in the school medical service.
On the contrary, he described the dental treatment of children as 
‘one of the most delicate and difficult departments of dental 
surgery* and said that its provision by other than registered 
dentists * on the specious plea of economy* could only be detrimental 
to the well-being of children. Finally he reminded The Lancet readers 
that the profession made great sacrifices in 1921 on the understanding 
that no more unqualified people will get recognition; in 1925 an
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attempt was made to give dental dressers access to the register, 
so the danger of infiltration is real. Dentists, he wrote, 
were not prepared to see a situation like that existing prior 
to the passing of the 1921 Act recur (65).
Indeed, the Council of the BDA assured the members 
that they were * taking all steps to oppose (Barwise*s) misdirected 
efforts* to extend the Derbyshire scheme beyond the period allowed 
and the chairman called upon members to * take every opportunity 
of combating a campaign which menaces the advancement of scientific 
dentistry* (66). The BDA*s views and actions were supported by 
school dentists (6?) and by dental journals like the Dental Surgeon 
whose editor wrote emphatically; *the employment of dental dressers 
is the first step of a subtle scheme to undermine the whole existing 
system by which the public are protected from the dangerous 
attentions of unskilled persons who profess to have a knowledge of 
medical surgery or dental surgery; this scheme must be stopped now; 
there is no time for delay* (68). The BDA also claimed the support 
of medical journals, of the British Medical Association and of the 
Medical Committee of the House of Commons (69).
In March 1925, a deputation met the Minister of 
Health to oppose the continuance of the Derbyshire scheme and the 
Minister promised to consider sympathetically the BDA*s views (?0). 
At the same time, the Incorporated Society and the Dental Board 
also expressed their opposition (71). At the Ministry itself, 
there was much resistance to Barwise*s arguments; the Minister 
was advised by Norman Bennett of the BDA eind by Sir George Newman, 
Chief Medical Officer of Health of the Board of Education, who were 
both fiercely opposed to the scheme (72). In the end, the Minister
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decided to extend the scheme only until the end of 1925 when the 
conditions set in 1922 should strictly be applied.
A few weeks after this decision, Dr Barwise 
died and the dental dresser scheme lost its initiator and 
staunchest propagandist. The issue was not altogether dropped, 
however: in 1926-27, the County Councils Association made
representations to the Board of Education on the possibility of 
amending the 1921 Act to allow the employment of dental dressers.
They were told that the Board had no intention to press the 
Minister who, they were informed, "was not prepared to introduce 
legislation which would be of controversial character, besides 
being open to criticism on medical grounds* (75)*
In 1950, an application by the Hackney Wick Dental 
Clinic was made to the Ministry of Health * to use dental dressers 
to treat boys and girls over the school age and other persons 
outside the school medical service*. Officials at the Ministry 
knew that it was still a very sensitive issue as Michael Heseltine, 
private secretary to the Minister, wrote in an internal memorandum:
* this as you know is a very controversial matter; we shall have the 
whole of the dentists against us if we allow the employment of 
semi-qualified persons on dental work àn inch beyond what the law 
plainly allows* (74). In short, the Minister's decision was not to 
engage in a reopening of the debate.
The Minister, on the other hand, was aware that the 
dental needs of school children were great and dental manpower 
resources scarce. In the autumn of 1931, he responded sympathetically
to a suggestion made by the authorities of the Eastman Dental Clinic 
in London that the Board of Education's circular 1279 on minor 
dental work should be altered so as to allow nurses to perform 
dental inspection in the School Medical Service. The Minister 
consulted the Dental Board who in turn sought the views of the 
profession (75). Sir Francis D. Acland,chairman of the Dental 
Board,shared the Minister's view that inspection by nurses would 
both increase the number of children examined in the schools and 
would spread the habit of going to dentist (76). The profession, 
however, was far from convinced by this sort of argument and united 
in opposition to that proposal. The BDA, the IDS, the PDSA, the 
Public Dental Officers' Group and dental members of the Dental 
Board all expressed their objection to what, they considered, 
amounted to diagnosis which in their opinion was the inalienable 
function of the dentist (77).
The Dental Board finally resolved to advise the 
Minister not to allow dental nurses to undertake dental inspection 
of children (78) and the Minister agreed. This marked the end, for 
a time at least, of attempts to increase the volume of dental 
treatment in public dental services by resorting to personnel 
trained to perform routine dental operations. Although the number 
of authorities employing dental dressers in the early 1920*s never 
exceeded eight and the number of dressers at work was less than 
thirty (79), the profession treated this issue as one of utmost 
importance and used all available political means to kill the 
experiment in embryo to prevent the institution of an alternative 
to dentists* services.
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- DENTISTS, DENTAL TECHNICIANS AND THE MARKET FOR DENTURES -
Until recently, 'mechanical dentistry* 
constituted the principal activity of British dentists. During 
the first six decades of this century the market for dental 
services has been, in the main, a market for dentures. Originally, 
dentists would make themselves the dentures required by their 
clients but as demand grew it became a common practice to hire a 
mechanic or to have dentures made by one of the many dental 
laboratories that had cropped up in the late 19th and early 20th 
century.
The conditions of work of dental mechanics in 
private surgeries as well as in laboratories were generally bad: 
working hours were long, the environment often insalubrious and 
the pay low. It is not surprising that many mechanics were tempted 
to take up extracting teeth as well as making artificial substitutes 
and to set up an independent practice. Before 1921, there were no 
legal restrictions precluding them from so doing and a substantial 
number of mechanics engaged in dental practice; so many did that 
in the early decades of the century they outnumbered registered 
dentists. In 1921, when these unregistered practitioners were put 
on the register, they formed 60% of all dental practitioners.
The relationship between dentists and mechanics had 
always been uneasy and it did not change overnight after the closure 
of the profession in 1921. The traditional perception of the 
mechanic as a potential competitor remained deeply rooted and even 
hardened as the demand for dentures appeared likely to grow with
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the payment of dental benefits by Approved Societies- The ranks 
of mechanics were greatly depleted by the Dentists Act, 1921 as 
thousands took advantage of it to become registered dentists.
Their numbers increased again afterwards and reached 8OOO in 
1951 and nearly 15,000 in 1951 (80).
The position of the dental mechanic after 1921 
was not improved; the conditions of work were as bad as before 
and the prospect of improving his lot by setting up a practice of 
his own had been taken away. Collective action to raise the status 
of the mechanic was made difficult by the fact that mechanics worked 
in isolation and had very few contacts with each other. Only in 
the late 1920*s did the first organisations of dental mechanics 
appear in Britain. Trade unions recruited mechanics from 1929: 
the Society of Goldsmiths, Jewellers and Kindred Trades had a 
section of Associated Dental Technicians and recruited mainly in 
London (81), and later the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Workers recruited in the provinces. Both organisations were 
affiliated to the Trade Union Congress and were primarily interested 
in negotiating better working conditions and higher pay for their 
members who, for a majority of them, worked in large dental laboratories.
Another group with more 'professional* interests 
was formed in 1951 as the British Association of Dental Prosthetists 
a name changed to the British Association of Dental Laboratories 
Prosthetists at the request of the BDA who insisted that only a 
dentist could claim to be a dental prosthetist and that his 
mechanical assistant should bear a different title. This association 
represented owners of small laboratories and self-employed mechanics 
and its policies were inspired by the South African legislation on
-  225 -
dental mechanics passed the same year* It set as its main goal 
the establishment of examinations to raise the status of the 
mechanic; a first step in that direction was to substitute for 
mechanic, mechanics and workshop the words prosthetist, prosthetics 
and laboratory (82). The cherished goal of the association was to 
develop dental mechanics as a skilled craft or more exactly to bring 
it back to where it was before mass production transformed skilled 
mechanics into unskilled manual workers (83). Return to training 
by apprenticeship was discarded as *a weapon in the hands of 
unconscientious men who seek cheap labour* (84). A more formal 
way of training mechanics was called for as well as some legal 
protection like the control of a title or the establishment of 
a "Chartered Institute of Dental Laboratory Prosthetists* (85).
Little was achieved by either of these groups; in 
1935 a Union of Dental Mechanics of Great Britain was registered 
and added its efforts to those of existing associations. 
Representations were regularly made to the Ministry of Labour by 
these groups that the conditions of work and remuneration of their 
members were unsatisfactory. In 1937» the Ministry asked for the 
dental associations* views on the situation in dental mechanics.
The associations replied that to their knowledge the conditions were 
reasonable, but they had little evidence to put forward in support 
on their assessment- The Ministry then suggested that they 
investigate the situation; they agreed and formed a "Committee of 
Inquiry into Training, Conditions of Service and Wages of Dental 
Technicians* which sat from January 1938 and reported in the autumn 
of 1940 (86).
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The committee, formed of three representatives of 
each of the three dental associations, sat at a time when there 
was a growing concern among private practitioners about the 
activities of some mechanics who dealt directly with the public 
without prior reference to a dentist. The attention of the 
profession had been called to this earlier (87) but it was not 
until 1937-38 that the alarm was really raised. The BDA sent a 
deputation to the Dental Board to alert it to this infringement 
of the Dentists Act (88) and The Mouth Mirror called for more 
prosecutions of delinquents (89). On the other hand, there were 
comments to the effect that the increase in the number of 'repair 
shops' where mechanics repaired or replaced dentures without the 
prescription of a dentist was the responsibility of dentists 
themselves who paid low wages (90).
The committee of inquiry, however, ignored this 
argument and concluded that it was satisfied that 'the trained, 
skilful dental mechanic is able to secure healthy, interesting and 
reasonably well paid employment' (91). Poor conditions of service 
and low wages were common only among semi-trained and unskilled 
mechanics, it was argued. The solution proposed was to improve 
the training of mechanics by returning to the system of apprenticeship. 
The committee suggested that a mechanic after 5 years as an apprentice 
should earn £3.10 s per week for 44 hours of work, which was about 
the average earned by mechanics at the time of the report.
The report was circulated to the unions and in 1942 
an agreement was reached with the dental mechanics' sections of the 
USDAW and of the Society of Goldsmiths to set up a Joint Council with
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the BDA, the IDS and the PDSA to restore the apprenticeship system 
and to negotiate wages and conditions of work (92). The other 
bodies representing technicians were left out because of their 
strong views on apprenticeship and their sympathy for technicians 
working direct to the public. The proposed council was seen by 
both sides as a device to check the renewed increase in denture 
repair shops since the beginning of the Second World War. The 
BDA estimated their number at in 1943, an increase of 100 
since 193& (93)* Among reasons offered to explain the phenomenon 
of repair shops were again low wages and poor conditions of work 
in private dental practice (94) and the overcrowding of the craft 
(93). In fact this overcrowding was only relative; the war 
conditions had reduced the number of dentists available for 
civilian private practice and consequently reduced job opportunities 
for mechanics in large laboratories. On the other hand, the demand 
for denture repairs or replacement was relatively stable as the 
population in need of those services was likely to be older and 
not in the armed forces. Mechanics who wanted to could find among 
denture wearers a vast market for their quick and cheap service: 
many dentists too,used their services for their mechanical work 
and at one point the BDA felt it necessary to ask them 'in their 
own interests and in that of the profession as a whole* not to deal 
with repair shops (96).
The whole issue was put before the Teviot Committee 
on Dentistry by the three dental organisations who submitted that 
repair shops were breaching the Dentists Act, threatening public 
health and discrediting the profession and thus should be eliminated 
(97). The committee responded favourably in recommending that
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* consideration should be given to the desirability of introducing 
legislation designed to bring to an end the activities of denture 
repair shops' (98). The committee also suggested that apprenticeship 
and part-time technical instruction should be the usual method of 
training. These proposals, however, were not supported by a member 
of the committee, Major General J.P. Helliwell who, in a reservation, 
condemned the combination in practice by the same person of dental 
surgery, preventive dentistry and the supply of artificial teeth in 
which the dentist 'makes his greatest profit' (99)- He proposed 
instead that the dentist concentrated his activities in the medical 
and surgical sphere and that the technician took over the mechanical 
work.
Helliwell's proposal was brought up during the 
discussion on the NHS Bill (100) but the Minister of Health decided 
that the existing relationship between dentist and mechanic should 
not be modified and that there would be no place for a denture 
service by mechanics direct to the public in the new service (101).
He resisted the pressures of the representatives of repair shops 
owners who had formed the Denture Service Association in 1944 and 
who complained that the Teviot Committee had been unfair to their 
case in its examination of the question of dentures supply (102). 
Meanwhile the dental profession welcomed the recommendations of the 
Teviot Committee and pressed for their rapid implementation. But 
the Minister did not see any reason to introduce legislation to ban 
repair shops as he assumed that when the new service was in operation 
and dentures supplied free of charge, there would be no public 
demand for repair shops and they would gradually disappear. BDA 
leaders were not convinced at all and the Council of the Association
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wrote to the Minister of Health to inform him of their strong 
views on that issue and plead, in vain as we have already seen, 
for a change of policy (IO3).
The profession* s views on repair shops were shared 
by dental technicians* unions who believed that their future was 
as members of the * dental team* with a status similar to that of 
medical auxiliaries (104). A few months before the inception of 
the NHS, the Minister of Health told the profession that repair 
to dentures would be carried out under the supervision of dentists 
in the general dental services and argued that prompt service 
would eliminate the need for repair shops dealing direct with the 
public (103). This acceptance by the Ministry of the dentists* 
views did not deter the Denture Service Association, with the support 
of some MPs, from carrying on a campaign in favour of a separate 
repair service (IO6).
In April 1931 a new association, the Incorporated 
Dental Technicians* Association, brought up the issue again by 
circulating a statement to all MPs alleging that an economy of 
£6.3 to £9 million could be made in the cost of the dentures supplied 
under the NHS if dental technicians were allowed to work direct 
to the public (IO7). The argument did not seem to impress the 
Minister of Health who replied that such a proposal 'would appear 
to involve contravention of the Dentists Acts designed to safeguard 
the public* (IO8). Later in 1933 aud 1936, further attempts were 
made, during the discussion on the Dentists Bill, to introduce a
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separate class of prosthetists to take charge of the provision 
of dentures but they also failed (109). To this day, the law 
has remained unchanged as to the control of the work of technicians 
by dentists; but 'denturism*, as it came to be known, is still 
very much a live issue. Inspired by the example of their American, 
Australian and Canadian colleagues, groups of dental technicians 
have continued to bring pressure on the government to pass dental 
legislation so as to enable them to practise independently (llO).
This objective never had the support of the two 
main unions representing technicians. Independant practice was 
attractive only to self-employed mechanics and the unions had no . 
interest in promoting it. Their policy was one of cooperation 
with dentists and of better integration in the dental team. They 
believed that two ways of raising the status of the technician were 
to improve his training and to set up a register of Dental Technicians. 
The latter suggestion was made as early as 19^3 to the National Joint 
Council (111) and repeated regularly. In 19^7, the Dental Technicians* 
Section of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
circulated a Draft Bill providing for such registration and for the 
prohibition of non-registered practice. They failed to obtain the 
BDA*s support (112) but the Bill remained in circulation. It was 
revised the next year but again was found unsatisfactory, mainly 
because it made membership of a trade union a condition of 
registration (113). A new version was drafted (ll4) and was hailed 
by The Dental Technician as * the outstanding event in the history of 
our craft* (115). Although it was only meant to * create a status 
that will complement the role of the dentist* (ll6), the BDA asked 
for the inclusion of a specific clause prohibiting direct contact
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with the public (117). This was done and in April 1930 the 
Technicians Bill was approved by the BDA (ll8).
The discussion on the new Dentists Bill provided 
an opportunity to put forward the technicians' Bill which the 
unions hoped to incorporate in new dental legislation (119). This 
hope was soon dashed by the Minister of Health who said that 
control of the craft was a trade union affair and that state 
registration was excluded (120). A final attempt was made in 
1936 but it was a failure too (121). The only option left was to 
establish voluntary registration under the supervision of the 
National Joint Council. The BDA was slow to give its approval, 
but in the end the register came into operation in January, I96O. 
Conditions of registration included the signing of an undertaking 
not to do any prosthetic work except to a perscription of a dentist 
(122). This was resented by many and the number of registered 
technicians grew only slowly and never exceeded 30^ of those 
practising the craft. The BDA has used this reason to turn down 
repeated requests for support for statutory registration by the 
technicians’ representatives on the Joint Council, the most recent 
one dating from late 1977 (123).
Dental technicians have always been potential 
competitors to dentists in their most lucrative area of work, that 
of dental prosthesis. But because they play an essential part in 
the delivery of dental services, technicians could not be dealt 
with like dental dressers who were alternative dental practitioners,
Policies of total exclusion would have been self- 
defeating. Instead dentists tried to keep technicians under their
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control by legislation, by an apprenticeship training, by 
integration in a negotiating body and by the establishment of 
a register. All these efforts to institutionalise the authority 
of dentists over technicians have so far been successful in 
checking the competition of technicians, but have failed to 
extinguish among the latter the desire to break the existing 
relationship of subservience between them and the dentists and 
to work autonomously. In view of the recent recognition of 
denturisra in many western countries, the dental profession's 
case for control of dentures is weakening; it is mainly because 
of the internal division among those exercising the technician's 
craft that the profession's position remains strong. In time, 
this might prove a fragile base for retaining the control of the 
production of dentures.
- THE INTRODUCTION OF ORAL HYGIENISTS IN BRITAIN (1942-1937) -
The training of a new category of dental personnel 
to carry out prophylactic treatment was first initiated in the 
United States in I906 (124). It started what came to be known as 
the 'dental hygiene movement' which developed very rapidly 
thenceforth. The first formal course was instituted in 1913 and. 
the first legislation allowing prophylactic treatment by non­
dentists was passed in Connecticut, in 1913* Ten years later 
there were 10 schools in operation and 23 states had legislation 
regulating the practice of 'dental hygienists*; approximately 2000 
hygienists were active at the time. By 1930, all the American 
states had licensing laws and there were 26 schools training dental 
hygienists whose number was now more than 3000.
This important development in dentistry was not 
unknown in Britain; but far from being seen as a useful and 
efficient collaborator of the dentist, as was the case in America, 
the dental hygienist was seen here as a threat to the profession, 
particularly before 1921. The BDJ wrote in 1920: 'the suggestion
of such a thing (hygienists) in this country, under present 
conditions at least (...) must be fought to the death. Here any 
certificated hygienist, dental dresser or nurse is but a potential 
unqualified practitioner...* (123). Although the Dentists Act,
1921 changed the conditions referred to by the BDJ, the journal 
did not change its attitude and continued to argue 'that very 
serious danger lies in the employment of men or women... whose 
occupation, possibly legitimate in itself, must inevitably tend 
to encroach on work which, in the public interest, ought to be 
kept strictly in the hands only of the recognized practitioner of 
dentistry'(126). The argument was restated everytime the 
suggestion was made that the American model should be followed by 
Britain and only one limited and short-lived experiment in the 
training of hygienists took place in 1930 at the National Dental 
Hospital School (12?) before the Royal Air Force established a 
scheme of dental hygienists in 1942.
The Air Ministry was concerned with 'the accumulation 
of arrears of necessary dental treatment due to the limited number 
of dental officers' (128) and wanted women to be trained to do 
scaling, polishing and gum treatment under supervision. A 12 weeks' 
training by instructors with experience of American methods of 
training hygienists was proposed. The BDA, the IDS and the PDSA 
immediately expressed their concern and asked to be consulted
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before the Ministry of Health reached any decision on the Air 
Ministry's proposal. The Secretary of the BDA wrote to the 
Chief Medical Officer of Health to obtain his support: he 
argued 'there might be a good case in support of such a method 
but the real danger, as I see it, is what is to happen to these 
girls when the war is over. There will understandably be a 
strong move in favour of their introduction into private practice 
and before we know where we are we shall have them undertaking 
the treatment and an endless series of prosecutions overloaded 
with sentimental appeal that they were taught to do it at the 
expense of the government during the war and if it was good 
enough then, why is it not good enough in peace time'(129).
Finally guarantees were given that the scope of the scheme would 
be limited in terms of the number of persons trained and of 
duties carried out and the dental organisations stopped their 
campaign (13O). The scheme was approved in January 1943 by 
the Ministry of Health and soon became a success (I3I).
The use of dental hygienists in civil practice found 
more and more advocates (132) and in 1944-46 the Teviot Committee 
studied the suggestion. Despite the opposition of dental 
organisations who considered the introduction of hygienists as 
'dilution' of the profession, the committee, after acknowledging 
the differences among its members on the merits of delegation, 
recommended that a scheme for the training of dental hygienists 
should be initiated. The committee concurrently recommended that 
the institution of any scheme of operative auxiliaries should 
await proof of a shortage of dentists and stressed that in order 
to obtain the cooperation of the profession they had confined their
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proposals 'within quite narrow limits'. The scope of duties of 
the hygienist was limited to prophylactic work and strict rules 
of supervision were recommended. It was also stated that should 
the experiment prove successful, hygienists should work only in 
public dental services where they could be effectively controlled.
The first comment of the BDJ was that the 
recommendation on hygienists would sharply divide the profession 
(133). The Dental Gazette was also critical (134) while The Lancet 
welcomed the use of hygienists and of ancillaries in general as 
contributing to change the businessmanlike image of the dentist 
into that of a medical man and so raise the status of dentistry 
(135). When the Ministry of Health made it known that it intended 
to initiate an experiment in the use of hygienists, the BDA opposed 
this proposal on the grounds that the only way to increase the 
volume of dental services was to train more dentists, not to 
introduce a new category of semi-trained auxiliaries (I36). A 
joint meeting of the BDA, IDS and PDSA took a similar view against 
hygienists as shows the following resolution adopted on that 
occasion; 'that this Joint Meeting is of the opinion that the 
operation of scaling and polishing forms so important a part of 
paradontal treatment and preventive dentistry that it cannot be 
considered as minor dental work. The meeting, therefore, strongly 
condems the delegation of this operation to any person not 
registered as a dental practitioner, as being detrimental to the 
public interest and to the health of the community' (137)• One 
speaker said that,the profession would look ridiculous in the 
eyes of the medical profession and of the public as dental hygienists 
had been recognised for many years in U.S.A., the country where 
dentistry was the most successful; but the argument failed to
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impress his colleagues to whom the word ancillaries was a 
synonym for dilution.
The scheme went on despite dentists* opposition and 
hygienists were trained at the Eastman Dental Hospital from 194-9•
In the same year a British Dental Hygienists* Association was 
founded, and it is worth noting that the post of president was 
offered to a dentist, W. Kelsey Fry. That is not to say that 
the attitude of the profession generally had changed - the chairman 
of the Council of the BDA stated in October 194-9 that the Association* s 
policy was one of opposition to the employment of dental hygienists 
in any circumstances and under any conditions (I38)- but there were 
more and more dentists, especially those with experience in public 
dental services, who openly supported and encouraged the 
employment of hygienists.
As the experiment went on, the pressure mounted on 
the BDA to change its policy, as it became obvious that the work of 
hygienists was both satisfactory and efficient (139) and that its 
limited scope presented little if any danger to dental practitioners. 
In a complete reversal of its long standing policies, the BDA 
approved the use of hygienists in November 1951, in a pamphlet 
entitled 'Fuller Dental Service for the People', which was 
circulated to MPs and to the press (l40). The change brought strong 
criticisms from many members, but the Council reported later that 
the bulk of letters received from members were congratulatory and 
attributed criticisms to 'failure to understand the pamphlet or 
the present state of the law* (l4-l). In October 1952, the BDA 
sent a memorandum to the Ministers of Health and Education and 
suggested that 'the fullest possible use should be made of the 
services of oral hygienists and chairside assistants* (l4-2).
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This change of policy must be seen in the context 
of the discussion on a new dental Bill and on the proposal to 
introduce New Zealand type auxiliaries. The acceptance of 
hygienists can be seen to some extent as a strategy to weaken the 
government*s case for the introduction of operative auxiliaries.
Its purpose was to demonstrate that the profession was prepared 
to make concessions but indicate at the same time that further 
concessions should not be expected (143)»
In 1937, the new General Dental Council prepared 
a set of *Ancillary Dental Workers Regulations* which were approved 
by the House of Commons in June. Oral hygienists were then allowed 
to work in private practice as well as in public services. One 
year later, the Council established an oral hygienists* roll and 
a little less than I30 hygienists registered; their number has 
been growing steadily since and reached 1223 in November 1978.
Given the size of the British population and of its dental needs, 
this is still a very modest figure.
The development of a dental occupation in the 
field of oral hygiene owes much more to external pressure than 
to the initiative of dentists themselves. Despite the example set 
as early as the 1920’s by countries like Canada, New Zealand or 
the United States, the British dental profession resisted the 
introduction of hygienists as long as it could. The case for 
hygienists was made by the Government itself and even after the 
successful RAF experiment it took nearly ten years before dental 
organisations accepted hygienists. Moreover, this acceptance came 
only because a bigger threat, from their point of view, was in the 
offing; the proposal to introduce operative auxiliaries as well as
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hygienists was receiving considerable support in Government 
circles and among the public in the early 1930*s. The BDA 
had to restore its credibility in showing that its opposition 
to ancillaries was not self-interested; in accepting hygienists 
and in promoting the greater use of better trained chairside 
assistants, it hoped to demonstrate its concern both for 
prevention in dentistry and for the need to increase the supply 
of service. The move, however, probably came too late eind too 
suddenly to convince the Government that it should shelve its 
proposal concerning operative auxiliaries, and a long, still 
on-going,political struggle ensued.
- THE DENTISTS ACT, 1936 AND THE EXPERIMENT IN THE USE OF 
OPERATIVE ANCILLARIES -
The desirability and the feasibility of introducing 
a class of operative dental ancillaries in Britain to increase the 
availability of dental services have been debated since the First 
World War. The first practical experiment was the dental dresser 
scheme in Derbyshire which the profession opposed vigorously and 
finally managed to stop. Afterwards, discussion on ancillaries 
was forced on the profession by reports on foreign experiments, 
namely the use of dental hygienists in America and the employment 
of dental nurses in the school system in New Zealand. The latter 
was perceived as more threatening because of the scope and nature 
of the work done by dental nurses which included all the basic 
operations that formed the largest proportion of a dentist’s work.
The New Zealand scheme had many supporters in 
Great Britain but to dental organisations it was nothing but
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another form of dilution, a term plainly defined by The Mouth Mirror 
as meaning ’the introduction of unregistered persons authoritatively 
to undertake dental treatment ordinarily the sole province of the 
dentists under the provisions of the Dentists Act, 1921' (l44).
As was often stated, no one could deny the possibility of training 
people other than dentists to do dental operations; the problem, 
however, v/as where to draw the line between routine and simple 
dentistry and operations requiring the full training of a dentist.
Following the RAF experiment vri.th hygienists in 
1942 and the depletion of the ranks of the profession since the 
start of the war, the Teviot Committee naturally examined the 
question of operative ancillaries closely. They sought the advice 
of the Dental Board as to the maximum scope of work which ancillary 
personnel should be allowed to perform. The Board, while expressing 
no opinion as to whether it was in the public interest to encourage 
the training of dental ancillaries or not, stated that as a matter 
of principle no persons other than registered dentists should be 
permitted 'to perform any operation in the mouth which involved 
deliberate interference with living tissue (l43). Otherwise, 
the Board did not object to ancillary personnel performing 
prophylactic functions or doing prosthetic work as long as they 
were properly trained, were subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction 
of a competent authority and performed ’only under the immediate 
personal supervision of a registered dentist’.
Arguments in favour and against ancillaries were 
put before the committee. On one hand, it was argued that their 
use would increase the supply of manpower to meet the demand for
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dental services, that ancillaries specialised in relatively 
simple procedures could attain a high degree of proficiency, 
that delegation would increase dentists' job satisfaction and 
raise their professional status and that there were successful 
precedents. On the other, opponents, who included the three 
dental organisations, replied that the use of ancillaries would 
adversely affect recruitment to the profession, that the line of 
demarcation between minor dental work and other procedures could 
not easily be drawn, that if the dentist were to supervise 
ancillaries* work closely, not much of his time would be saved 
and that in any case the public would not accept treatment by 
semi-trained persons.
The committee acknowledged that there were 
divergent opinions among its members as to the value of delegation 
but recognised 'that if delegation is to be successful, the 
cooperation of dentists is essential, and it must in fairness be 
stated that the professional associations are not in favour of 
it* (l46). So they worked out a compromise and recommended that 
no scheme of operative assistants should be instituted unless it 
was proved that there was a shortage of dentists and that an 
experiment in the training of hygienists should be made. This 
recommendation, it was thought, should commend itself to the 
profession as both sensible and moderate.
However, in the event, dental organisations stepped 
up there campaign against auxiliaries. For example, the 1946 Annual 
Meeting of the BDA adopted a resolution expressing *its entire 
condemnation of the dilution of the profession by any type of
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ancillary worker either as a principle or for any alleged saving 
in dental manpower* (l4y). At the following meeting, the president 
of the Association warned the Minister of Health that dentists 
would not accept dilution which he said would be * professional 
suicide*. He argued: 'if this, or any other government, has
promised good dental treatment to all the people, it is the duty 
of that government to render dentistry so attractive a profession 
that there will be sufficient dentists, all suitably qualified, to 
provide such treatment. It is not a honest fulfilment of the 
munificent promise to produce semi-trained persons - thousands of 
hybrids whose capabilities will be not greater than those of a 
second-year student - just to make a comprehensive service appear 
statistically possible* (l48).
The Teviot Committee suggested that an annual intake 
of 900 students in dental schools could in time provide enough 
dentists to attend to the British people's needs, but in the late 
1940*s it was hard to see how this could be achieved. Financial 
resources were scarce, training facilities and personnel were 
insufficient and time was needed to increase the supply of dentists 
substantially. The situation was also complicated by the high rate 
of professional attrition as great numbers of *1921 men* were reaching 
retirement age. It is not surprising that more and more dentists 
became convinced that the New Zealand scheme could offer a solution 
to Britain's lack of dental manpower. One convert even wrote, after 
visiting New Zealand, that 'contrary to what I anticipated, this 
service, through making the country more dentally minded, had enhanced 
the prospects of private practice by increasing the volume of adult 
patients attending for treatment* (l49)«
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In view of the conflicting opinions on the dental 
nurses scheme, the Minister of Health decided, in 1950, to send a 
mission to New Zealand to obtain first-hand information- The five 
member mission which included the chairman of the Standing Dental 
Advisory Committee, the President of the BDA and representatives 
of the Ministries of Health and of Education and of the Department 
of Health for Scotland reported that the scheme had the support 
of both the profession and the public and that it had resulted 
* in a high standard of technical efficiency in the treatment of 
children 'and that 'the dental nurse system in New Zealand meets 
an urgent need* (150). They also insisted that, should Britain 
decide to accept such a system, modifications to adapt the system 
to this country's conditions would be necessary and that it would 
be important to secure the cooperation of the dental profession.
The BDJ, in its comments on the report, accepted 
that 'that the scheme has been successful in New Zealand is no 
longer in doubt' but wondered if it would be a success in Britain 
and if such cooperation as was called for in the report would be 
forthcoming (151). The correspondence that was published in the 
following issues indicated sharp divisions among members, although 
the opponents appeared to form a majority. The BDJ dropped the
criticisms of the capabilities of dental nurses and instead
emphasised that it was uneconomical to train women auxiliaries who 
have a shorter working life than trained dentists (152). The Minister 
of Health who had been deeply concerned with the costs of the Dental 
Service since the inception of the NHS was not prepared to accept
that view and at the end of 1951, put forv/ard a new dental Bill which
included provisions for an experiment in the use of ancillaries-
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The BDA reacted angrily to the proposal and 
repeated that the only long-term policy, which was economic and 
reasonable, was to increase the facilities to train dentists 
(153)- The chairman of the Dental Board and the Conference of 
Local Dental Committees of the NHS expressed similar views (154).
The Government refused to amend the provisions of the Bill on 
the experimental scheme and in the end preferred to withdraw 
the Bill altogether rather than yield on the question of ancillary 
workers.
To avoid its opposition being construed as a 
lack of concern for the well-being of the public, and of cliildren 
in particular, the BDA sent a memorandum on the dental treatment 
of children to the Ministers of Health and of Education saying 
that, following an enquiry among its members as to their willingness 
to treat school children on a regular basis, the Association could 
offer more than 10,000 hours per week for such treatment to help the 
school service (155). The scheme, which was designed without 
consulting the school dentists, was seen as a further tactic to 
prevent the introduction of ancillaries. The chief dental officer 
of the Wakefield Public Health Department commented that *the 
official attitude of the BDA towards the school dental service is 
a purely selfish and cynical one* (I56). In November 1952,
Sir William Kelsey Fry who was a fervent promoter of hygienists 
and a former member of the Teviot Committee wrote to The Times to 
ask why the BDA, in view of the obvious shortage of dentists, 
opposed an experiment. He concluded: * the public will find it 
difficult to realise why vested interest should be permitted to 
oppose such as obviously necessary public measure* (157). The 
chairman of the Council of the BDA replied by saying that the scheme
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put forward by the Association was a better solution to a 
recognised problem. His view was not shared by the editor of 
The Times who, two months later, described the experiment as a 
worthwhile one and questionned the BDA's attitude (158).
In a lenghty editorial, the BDJ professed the 
Association's sincerity and dedication to the public interest.
The editor argued that the BDA's opposition was consistent with 
the provisions of the Dentists Act, 1921, and 'that experience in 
New Zealand has shown that there is a constant tendency for the 
boundaries of the work of dental nurses to be extended*, It went 
on to state that it would not be logical to expect any ether 
result, and that this could produce 'a gradual lowering of 
standards, detrimental alike to the dental health of the people 
and the highest interests of the profession'. He finally stated 
that in view of the short working life of nurses, the 'long term 
cost of employing them is higher than that of employing dentists'
(159).
The Association maintained 'its absolute objection 
in principle to the introduction of ancillary workers other than 
those authorised by the 1921 Act* (I60), a position which it 
maintained when a new Dentists Bill was introduced by the 
Conservative government in 1955* . The likelihood of the Bill 
becoming law was enhanced by the support of the opposition parties 
for its main clauses and the favourable response to the experiment 
in the training and employment of New Zealand type dental nurses- 
Accordingly, the BDA opted for a strategy of lobbying Parliament 
to obtain amendments to the contentious clauses rather than one
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of full-scale opposition to the Bill (l6l). As the chairman of 
the Representative Board put it, the Association's attitude was 
now to say 'we do not like ancillary workers but if we have got 
to have them we are going to have them under our control' (162). 
Eventually, the Bill passed through both Houses of Parliament 
without any significant amendment and became the Dentists Act,
1956.
Clause 20 of the new Act made it a duty for the 
General Dental Council to make arrangements for an experimental 
scheme to judge the value to the community of operative auxiliaries, 
if the Privy Council, after consulting the GDC, required them to 
do so. The BDA tried to take advantage of the period of consultation 
prescribed by the Act to press on the GDC that it was 'not in the 
public interest for an experiment of this kind to be undertaken at 
the present time' (I63). The GDC had no such power to delay the 
experiment and when, in July 1957, the Privy Council expressed the 
desire to have an experimental scheme initiated, the Dental Council 
set up a committee to make the necessary arrangements. A Memorandum 
on The Size, Duration and Cost of The Experiment (l64) was submitted 
in November 1958 and after Parliament approved the GDC's proposals, 
a training school was established at New Cross, London. The first 
course, with an intake of sixty young girls (I65), started in 
October I96O and the first graduates came out two years later.
In April I966, the GDC was invited to report on the 
experiment which it did in August. The report concluded that 'dental 
auxiliaries can be successfully trained and employed under proper
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supervision to do, within the limited field prescribed, work of 
great value, particularly among young children* (l66). Auxiliaries’ 
clinical work was described as being of high quality and their 
work in dental health education as valuable; they had also been 
well accepted by both young patients and employing authorities, 
though resistance by some dental officers was reported. Finally 
the Council recommended that the strict supervision regulations 
should be continued. As to the economic value of auxiliaries, 
the Council commented that it could ’not be assessed in the 
course of an experimental scheme*. The experiment was officially 
terminated in I969 after 424 auxiliaries had graduated. The 
Government approved the continuation of the scheme and the New 
Cross School has carried on ever since- So far it remains the 
only training centre in Britain, despite recent recommendations to 
open a second school (l67).
Although more than 1000 ancillaries have been 
trained since the scheme first started, the number in employment 
is much less. When auxiliary enrollment with the GDC commenced 
in 1969, only 220 of the 424 graduates enrolled (I68); at the end 
of 1974, there were 374 enrolled auxiliaries and 572 at the end of 
1978. Not all are employed, however, which is typical of feminine 
occupations where movement in and out of work is usually higher.
But in this case the fact that employment is limited to community 
dental services probably further reduces the number of auxiliaries 
in employment as job opportunities are less numerous and conditions 
less flexible than would be the case in general dental services.
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Since 1966, the policy of the BDA towards auxiliary 
workers has become a little more flexible; but there is still a 
good deal of suspicion about. During the experiment, in 1964, 
the BDA defined its policy at its Annual General Meeting in the 
following terras: ’that this Annual General Meeting, mindful of
the disastrous consequences to the future requirement and status 
of the profession which would accrue from further dilution and 
fragmentation, calls upon its representatives to assiduously watch 
that the present legislation governing the control of ancillaries 
and auxiliaries is adhered to, and to fight with every weapon at 
their command any widening of the scope of authorised ancillaries 
and auxiliaries, or the creation of new categories’ (l69)» This 
somewhat bellicose attitude had to be tempered after the publication 
of the GDC’s report and the BDA had little choice but to accept 
the conclusions of the report, which they did reluctantly after 
reaffirming ’their conviction that the total dental health of the 
community can best and most economically be secured only by a 
greatly increased and energetically sustained programme of health 
education on a national scale and by full utilisation of the 
expanded facilities for training more dental surgeons’ (170).
A Dental Ancillary Personnel Committee was 
appointed and in I968, it issued the first comprehensive review 
of the auxiliary workers question by the BDA. The report accepted 
that more operative auxiliaries would be needed in the near future 
and concluded that ’consideration should be given to the establishment 
of an additional training school or schools’ (I7I) outside London.
But the committee insisted that the scope of functions of auxiliaries 
should remain unchanged, that there should be no relaxation in the
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degree of supervision and that their employment should be confined 
to public health and hospital dental services. They also 
recommended that dental auxiliaries wear a ’distinctive prescribed 
uniform or badge* to avoid confusion with womain dental officers.
In 1972, the Representative Board adopted the 
report of a working party entitled "Dental Care for the Community* 
(172). The report concluded that there was evidence that a great 
deal more work in dental practice could be delegated but that 
the economic value of delegation should be investigated. The 
report stated the position of the Association as to delegation 
as follows: "Parliament has properly entrusted to the dental
profession full responsibility for the dental care of the population 
and the profession will not consider any methods of delivery of 
dental services which increase availability at the expense of 
quality. Ideally, all dental disease should be treated by fully- 
trained dentists. But if methods exist, or can be developed, for 
providing high quality treatment more cheaply than at present, the 
profession has no right to deprive the community of the extra 
treatment which can be made available’ (173)•
This position was endorsed by the Ancillary Personnel 
Committee in 1973, although two of its members disagreed (174).
A. D’Arcy Fearn, a long standing opponent to ancillaries and C.F.A. 
Downie wrote in a minority report that the suggestions made as to 
the delegation of more work to hygienists and operative auxiliaries 
’would only strenghten the hands of those anxious to dilute the 
profession’ and suggested ’that the Association would do better to 
turn its attention to creating more dental surgeons rather than 
produce more auxiliaries whose wastage is. known to be high and whose
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cost effectiveness is an unknown factor* (173)- The argument 
that the delegation of operative procedures might not be economic 
has, since, been repeatedly brought up and used to justify the 
demand that the training of auxiliaries should not be extended 
until their cost-effectiveness has been demonstrated (I76). Thus 
the Association was coming back to its traditional policy of 
opposing the delegation of operative procedures. It emphasised 
the need to raise the qualification and status of chairside 
assistants and to increase the number of dental hygienists, 
arguing that there were now more dentists available for public 
dental services and that what they needed was assistance at the 
chair and more personnel to take charge of the domain of prevention 
rather than operative auxiliaries. Finally, in 1978, A. D’Arcy Fearn 
was appointed chairman of the Ancillary Personnel Committee which 
further indicates that the balance of power has shifted back to 
the camp of opponents to delegation.
In sum, the profession’s attitude to delegation of 
operative procedures in the mouth was one of overt opposition until 
1966 when the Dental Council reported favourably on the use of 
operative auxiliaries in public services. Afterwards, the opposition 
softened for a short while but surfaced again more recently. British 
dentists, for reasons I explore later, always refused to accept that 
others than registered dentists could perform tasks which incorporated 
elements of diagnosis. They probably assumed that once you 
accept that others could perform diagnostic functions, the door 
would be open to alternative providers of services. Faced with the 
probability of auxiliaries being introduced despite their disapproval, 
the profession opted for a strategy of controlling this personnel 
through strict regulations of the scope of its functions and by
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supervision. This strategy can be said to have been very 
successful. The functions of auxiliaries have not been extended 
over the years; they are still confined to community and 
hospital dental services; their number is limited and does not 
appear likely to increase rapidly in the near future; and the 
policy-making of the BDA is firmly in the hands of opponents to 
delegation.
CONCLUSION :
The account of the relationships between the 
dental profession and the state, after 1921, shows that the 
profession always had a twofold attitude to external intervention 
in the arrangements for the provision of dental services. On the 
one hand, dentists welcomed measures such as the introduction of 
dental benefits under the KHI and the institution of a comprehensive 
dental service under the NHS because they contribute to the increase 
and stabilisation of the demand for their services and consequently 
of their revenues. On the other hand, proposals to increase the 
availability of oral care, such as the establishment of dental 
clinics or the use of operative auxiliaries, were fought strenuously 
as potential threats to private practice which dentists saw as the 
proper channel through which their services should be rendered.
As the development of the Group Movement in the 
1940's and the failure of the BDA's attempt to convince its members 
to refuse to join in the NHS at its inauguration in 1948 show,rank- 
and-file practitioners were more attached to the security of a state 
funded dental service than to the principles.defended by their
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professional organisations. The characteristics of the demand 
for dental care are such that dental practitioners cannot, like 
doctors, expect a constant flow of clients to apply for their 
services. In addition to the fact that the scope of services 
they are able to offer is limited, there always have been 
economic, cultural and social barriers that keep clients away 
from dental surgeries. Given also that dentists are small 
entrepreneurs who have to invest a substantial capital to start 
a practice, it is not surprising to find among the profession a 
widespread feeling of economic insecurity. As I have shown, 
this was particularly exacerbated, before 1921, by the competition 
of unqualified practitioners. The closure of the profession in 1921 
did not remove this deeply entrenched attitude which has been 
perpetuated as a profound distrust of any potential alternative 
service.
The profession’s attitude to auxiliaries illustrates 
that ’professional trait’ of British dentistry. Over the last sixty 
years, the profession has systematically fought the introduction of 
new categories of personnel that could be substituted to dentists.
The profession has striven to retain the sole right to diagnose 
dental diseases and to operate in the mouth. It has successfully 
opposed the right of technicians to deal directly with the public 
and has managed to contain within narrow limits the use of hygienists 
and of operative auxiliaries, after having failed to prevent their 
introduction.
While opposing potential competitors, the profession 
has often argued that the use of more and better trained assistants
at the chairside would render purposeless the resort to hygienists 
and to New Zealand type dental nurses. Although expressions of 
support of the use of chairside assistants were frequent, little 
was done to improve their training and regulate their practice.
In 1940 a Dental Nurses and Assistants Society of Great Britain 
was founded by a Lancashire dentist, P.E. Grundy (177); he became 
president and organised services like a library, an insurance 
scheme, and a job opportunities information service. An annual 
conference was held, a monthly journal was published and study 
groups were started. When Grundy left the presidency in 1948 
the Society claimed more than I6OO members, which was a great 
success given the great mobility of dental assistants, the 
unwillingness of many dentists to let their assistant become a 
member and their comparative isolation. This society was the 
only organisation which succeeded in recruiting dental assistants: 
a British Society of Dental Assistants, founded in 1943 in London, 
was disbanded in 1949 after having failed to be recognised by the 
Whitley Council. The Confederation of Health Services Employees 
also tried to recruit among DNAS members in 1948, but had to 
retreat as *99% (of members) would immediately resign if there was 
any suggestion of it becoming a trade union* (I78).
In 1948, the three dental organisations set up an 
inquiry into the conditions of work of assistants and concluded 
that an increased number of properly trained chairside assistants 
was desirable. The committee expressed the view that every * normally 
busy* practitioner should employ an assistant but emphasised that 
*the chairside assistant is an ancillary worker... and that her work 
should be restricted to assisting the dentist without impinging
- 233 -
upon the sphere of the dentist* (179). Later in 1933, a joint 
committee was established between the BDA and the assistants* 
society (l80) and cordial relations have developed. In 1962, 
the assistants adopted a code of ethics which codified their 
•duty* to co-operate with their employer and to refrain from 
performing tasks reserved to him (l8l). A voluntary registration 
scheme was established by the joint committee in 1964 and has had 
only a limited success since.
The profession* s policy is still to encourage the 
use of surgery assistants at the chairside instead of delegating 
operative functions to personnel working independently. This is 
in line with its long-standing strategy of trying to control the 
work of those who are useful or even essential to the dentist, by 
institutionalising their dependence on the dentist. Of course, 
this strategy of control has been extended to other categories of 
personnel like hygienists and operative auxiliaries when it became 
obvious that their elimination would not be possible.
It is difficult to point to specific reasons for 
this attitude of the profession towards auxiliaries but it seems 
reasonable to refer to the economic context of dentistry as of 
some explanatory value. The constraints of an entrepreneurial 
type of practice, the limited scope of services demanded by 
clients, the distinctive features of demand for dental care all 
contributed to perpetuation of the pre-1921 attitude of distrust 
of all dental personnel other than registered dentists. These, 
and other factors which I examine in the next chapter have contributed
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to making the profession resistant to change, even in the face 
of successful foreign and local experiments, and have consequently 
had an influence on the division of labour in dentistry and 
ultimately on the volume and type of dental services made 
available to British people. In the negotiations between the 
dental profession and the state as to how and by whom dental 
services should be rendered, the profession, has pressed hard, 
and successfully from its own point of view, to restrict the 
provision of oral care services by others than registered dentists. 
Whether this has been to the benefit or to the detriment of the 
population is debatable. One thing is certain; the profession has 
done little to test all the ways and means of increasing and 
improving dental services and has even spent a good deal of its 
energy and efforts to prevent experiments in that direction. In 
the next chapter, I explore the factors that can explain this 
attitude and the other developments that have contributed to 
change the organisation of dental services in Britain since the 
beginning of the century.
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PART IV; CONCLUSION
In this concluding section, I want, first, to 
examine two issues raised by the study of the role of professional 
organisations in the professionalisation of British dentistry.
The first one concerns the reasons why British dental practitioners 
formed occupational associations in the first place and why they 
engaged in the process of campaigning for the prohibition of 
dental practice by unqualified persons. The second issue concerns 
the social factors that contributed to the overall success of 
dentists* professionalisation strategies. Here I want to exsimine 
some of the conditions that enhanced the acceptability of dentists* 
claims by British society and helped the profession’s advance.
Then I want to assess more generally the role of 
occupational pressure groups in the process of professionalisation 
and draw some policy implications. Finally, I will point to 
directions for further research to increase our understanding of 
the influence of professionalism as a work structure in the 
provision of health care services.
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CHAPTER 9: PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE ADVANCE OF
THE BRITISH DENTAL PROFESSION
The development of an independent and self- 
regulating dental profession in Britain took place over a period 
of about a century, from the first recognition of dentists by 
the Royal Colleges of Surgeons in the l860*s to the creation of 
a General Dental Council in 1956. This thesis has focused on 
the last sixty years of that period which are demarcated by two 
important legislative measures, the Dentists Acts, 1921 and. 1956.
From the end of the 19th century when dentists were 
loosely organised and had little public recognition, dentistry rose 
to be an autonomous and highly organised profession recognised by 
the state and by large sections of the public as of importance to 
the well-being of the British people. In 1900, only a minority of 
dental practitioners were organised and their associations had yet 
to become efficient pressure groups. Gradually, however, more 
practitioners joined dental organisations and engaged in the 
collective furtherance of their occupational interests^ Although 
a substantial number of dentists continued to stay out of professional 
organisations, those who were organised became strong and influential 
enough to bring about major changes in the legal status of dentists 
within a comparatively short period of time.
By the time of the passing of the Dentists Act, 1921, 
dentistry had become a well organised occupation and had gained 
considerable legal and social recognition. Unqualified practice was 
prohibited in a way unprecedented in British legal history; dentists
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were granted privileges that even medical doctors had been denied. 
Dentistry was taught in Universities and its potential contribution 
to public health was more and more acknowledged by the state. For 
example, there were Army and Navy dental services and school 
dentistry and other public dental services were progressing. Also, 
from 1921, dental benefits were paid by the Approved Societies 
under the National Insurance Act, I9II. Furthermore, the profession 
could even claim royal patronage; in 1914, the King was patron of 
the Sixth International Dental Congress, held in London. The Prince 
of Wales was patron of the Royal Dental Hospital, London and nine 
members of the profession had been knighted over the years (1).
In 1956, the picture of dentistry was that of a 
well-established profession. It was fully autonomous, the Dentists 
Act, 1956 having severed the remaining links of dependence upon 
medicine. Dentists* monopoly over the provision of oral care 
services was almost intact despite fifteen years of attempts by 
the state to substitute alternative categories of personnel for 
dentists in public services. Auxiliary occupations which developed 
after 1921 were firmly under the profession*s control. Dental 
services were part of the National Health Service, thus securing 
a relatively stable market for the profession. Finally, unity 
of organisation was achieved and although all internal tensions 
had yet to be resolved, the profession spoke with one voice to 
the state and to the public.
Such changes between 1900 and 1957 undoubtedly 
represent a considerable collective achievement for the dental
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profession, considering the difficulties dentists had to face 
in the first place. Dentists were usually in independent 
practice and competition among them was harsh. They had little 
contact with each other and their isolation made it difficult 
for them to organise collectively. Only a small section of them 
was qualified, and, in the public mind, the practice of dentistry 
was more frequently associated with a trade than with the provision 
of health care.
My aim in this study has been to account for these 
changes. I wanted to understand how, historically, dentists 
established and maintained a monopoly of the provision of oral 
care services and how a hierarchical structure of occupations 
dominated by dentistry developed. I intentionally chose to focus 
principally on the actions of professional organisations in order 
to assess their role in the professionalisation of dentistry. I 
justified this approach by arguing that the process through which 
a group of persons achieves a legally recognised occupational 
monopoly and subsequently maintains its control over an area of 
work, is a political one. It involves complex relationships with 
rival occupations, the state and the users of professional services.
Historically, all campaigns for occupational 
monopoly were initiated by groups of practitioners who claimed, 
on the grounds of some particular expertise and so as to safeguard 
the interests of the public, that only they should be allowed to 
provide certain services and perform certain tasks (2). Their 
efforts were usually aimed at state recognition as in the last
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resort it is the state which ultimately grants the privileges 
of monopoly.
In the first half of this century, various 
occupations, in the field of health, made attempts to achieve 
legal recognition. Some, such as midwives, nurses, dentists, 
opticians, chiropodists, were successful to varying degrees while 
others, such as osteopaths or trichologists (hairdressers), had 
their appeals turned down (3)* Thus, the question arises of what 
factors contribute to the success or failure of the professionalisation 
process.
So far in this thesis, I argued that professional 
organisations played a crucial role in the development of an 
autonomous dental profession. British dentists tried to raise their 
status by engaging in collective actions in the three areas of 
professional organisation, legislation and the provision of dental 
care services. First they endeavoured to create and develop viable 
and credible professional bodies to advance their common interests.
Then they campaigned for amendments to the laws regulating the 
practice of dentistry, and for the establishment of a monopoly of 
practice for qualified dentists. Their success in achieving the 
latter objective put dentists in an advantageous position to 
establish their control over the provision of dental services and 
to resist challenges to their dominance.
But to say that professional dominance was achieved 
by dentists because they organised efficiently and devised
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successful strategies provides only a partial answer to our 
question. Dentists did certainly not dictate the terms of the 
legislative measures that did so much to raise their status nor 
did they shape the market for their services according to their 
own wishes. Some external factors on which dentists had little 
influence were also at work and they must be taken into account 
if we are to understand the professionalisation of dentistry 
in Britain. Three seem to have been particularly important: 
the developing social concern for physical health, the changing 
role of the state in the field of health and the absence of 
well organised opposition from other potential competitors to 
the dentists* progression towaris control of oral care.
However, before turning to these three factors,
I wish to discuss an issue which I addressed only implicitly in 
this thesis, that of why dentists engaged in the collective pursuit 
of state recognition and carried on their campaign for monopoly 
well after the closure of the profession by the Dentists Act, 1921.
- British Dentists and Collective Action -
At the end of the 19th century, the main feature of 
dental practice in Britain was the increasing level of competition 
between practitioners. However, many among them chose to cooperate 
and to support professional organisations instead of remaining 
isolated competitors. Gradually, their number increased to the 
point that they could form successful pressure groups. Why did 
dentists choose to organise in that particular way to advance their 
interests? For example, they could very well have relied on
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scientific associations to raise their status. Indeed, a number 
of members of the BDA, especially among well-established 
practitioners, were reluctant to engage in political action.
They saw the BDA as a mixture of scientific body and club where 
professionals could meet socially rather than as a pressure group. 
Their resistance to engage the association in the realm of politics 
was particularly felt in the years I88O-I9IO and the debate on the 
Draft Dental Bill sponsored by W. Guy and the Scottish Branch of 
the BDA is a good illustration of this point (4).
However, for many others who practised in areas 
where competition was more bitterly felt, joining an association 
had a different meaning. They wanted its protection and the 
example of the British Medical Association was there to demonstrate 
that a well organised professional association could successfully 
advance the interests of an occupation. The formation of professional 
associations of dentists and their engagement in a campaign for the 
limitation of the right of practice can be better understood when we 
examine both the evolution of the manpower situation and the 
structural characteristics of the practice of dentistry.
First, the number of qualified dentists increased 
continuously after I878. There were 483 qualified practitioners 
on the Dentists' Register in I879» l840 in I9OI and 4493 in 1921.
They represented 9»!^ of all registered dentists in 1879, 40.8?^  in 
1901 and 80.1% in 1921. By the turn of the century, most newly 
qualified dentists had received their training in dental schools. 
There, they participated in a network of colleague relationships 
and acquired a sense of professional solidarity that the former mode
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of training by apprenticeship could hardly transmit. Thus there 
were more and more persons who had spent time and money in 
formal training and who resented the 'unfair competition' of 
untrained persons who had not.
Qualified practitioners had an investment to 
protect and the continuous growth of unregistered dental practice 
made this task increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the 
individual alone. Collective action was a logical choice for 
persons who had acquired a sense of belonging to a profession 
and who experienced everyday the difficulties of coping with 
competition from individuals who disregarded the rules which 
registered dentists had to follow, in particular that prohibiting 
advertisement.
As to the unregistered practitioners who formed 
the IDS, they first joined forces to resist the threat of a 
restriction of their right to practise. But they too, in common 
with many of the qualified dentists, had established practices 
that were threatened by the activities of 'unethical* unregistered. 
They saw themselves as members of the profession rather than as 
outsiders as shown by the willingness of the IDS to campaign for the 
control of unregulated practice and its efforts to raise the status 
of dentistry as an occupation. They too, felt that the growth of 
unregistered practice was harmful to the profession and the public 
and that it should not remain unchecked.
Secondly, the conditions of practice of dentistry, 
which were fairly similar among qualified dentists and the members
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of the IDS, were such as to encourage dentists to seek state 
intervention in the field of oral care services. The average 
practitioner who did not have access to a wealthy clientele 
probably knew by experience that individually he was powerless against 
unregistered practice and that he would be under constant threat 
unless some legal prohibition was achieved.
Many features of dental practice could lead 
practitioners to take the view that collective action was 
necessary to protect their interests. First, let us look at 
the nature and the scope of the tasks which dentists performed. 
Dentists' activities used to comprise essentially two types of 
treatment: first, conservative treatment consisting mainly of
•repairing' teeth affected by caries or of orthodontic treatment, 
that is the correction of malalignment or maldisposition of the 
teeth; and second, prosthetic treatment, that is extracting 
diseased teeth and replacing them with artificial substitutes.
The average practitioner usually concentrated his practice on 
prosthetic services which were in much greater demand. Preventive 
dentistry was hardly practised at all outside public services; 
periodontology, the treatment of gum diseases, has been recognised 
as an important part of practice only recently. Thus, the work 
of dentists tended to be comparatively narrow in scope and to be 
limited to a basic number of tasks, like cleaning the teeth, filling 
cavities and performing extractions. The fitting of artificial 
teeth was also important, but the making of dentures itself was 
left to technicians employed by dental companies.
The skills required for the performance of those 
tasks are in the main associated with manual dexterity and are
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probably better acquired by experience than by academic learning. 
Clearly, some parts of dentistry, as practised then, included 
many routine tasks which did not require four years of university 
training; the thousands of unqualified practitioners providing 
dental services similar to those of their university trained 
colleagues were living proof of this. So dentistry provided a 
particularly appropriate ground for the emergence of alternative 
practitioners with less training but comparable ability. Dentists 
were aware of the possibility of substitution and were quick to 
see the potential dangers of allowing anyone without restriction 
to set up a practice.
Another important feature of dental practice is 
that productivity is closely related, among other things, to the 
age of the practitioner (5). Older dentists tend to see less 
patients everyday, to work shorter hours and consequently to 
have lower remuneration. Before the 1960*s, most dentists worked 
in the standing position which over the years could lead to leg 
and back problems and reduce the practitioner's capacity to work 
for as long as he used to. Accordingly, dentists who were in 
private practice tended to be apprehensive about the end of their 
career years and to be more sensitive to potential competition 
during their most productive years.
British dentists usually worked independently as 
private entrepreneurs. As dental technology developed, the setting 
up of a practice required a greater investment in terms of equipment 
and of proper premises. The choice of a suitable location for a 
surgery was particularly important because there must be sufficient
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demand for the dentist's services if he is to recoup his 
investment and make what he considers a reasonable living (6).
It is important to realise that demand for oral 
care services follows a specific pattern. A whole combination of 
economic, social and cultural factors influence the utilisation 
of the services of a dentist (?)• Cost is an obvious deterrent, 
particularly in the case of a disease which is not perceived as 
life-threatening. Health beliefs and knowledge about dental 
diseases also play a crucial role; a large proportion of persons 
with dental problems are said to have a fatalistic attitude 
towards dental health (8). They do not consider themselves 
sick and tend to consider caries, gum bleeding or short episodes 
of toothache as merely facts of life. When this view is supported 
by the community as was generally the case at the beginning of 
the century, it is very likely that a dentist was consulted only 
in the last resort (9)« Fear of pain also played a role in people's 
decision to visit a dentist.
When they did visit the dentist, people usually 
preferred the more attractive proposition of replacing diseased 
teeth with dentures than the more expensive and potentially - at 
the time - more painful procedure of filling them. It was seen as 
a definitive and complete solution whereas conservative dentistry 
offered only partial relief. These features of the demand for 
dental care were bound to benefit practitioners specialised in 
mechanical dentistry and especially those who were prepared to 
advertise low prices for supposedly painless extractions or for 
dentures. In sum, unregistered practitioners were at an advantage 
because of a permissive law and because of people's attitudes to
dental health.
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As more dentists reacted to economic insecurity 
by joining professional societies, the conditions became favourable 
for their 'take-off* as viable pressure groups. Their increased 
membership brought more funds, enabling them to provide more and 
better services and, in turn, making them more attractive to 
potential members. With more qualified, or in the case of the IDS, 
reasonably trained members, they could claim more credibility and 
offer better chances to individual dentists to raise their social 
status.
After 1921, the conditions that had prompted 
collective action in the first place were still present. Although 
the Dentists Act, 1921 restricted practice to registered dental 
practitioners, there was a clause in the Act to exempt public 
dental practice. Many qualified dentists feared that this exception 
could lead to further unregistered practice and they urged the BDA 
to campaign against it. Also the rivalry between qualified dentists 
and the former unregistered recognised under the 1921 Act remained 
as strong as ever. The members of the IDS felt that their interests 
were still threatened and that their society had to carry on 
defending them. Thus, dentists did not see the 1921 Act as the 
ultimate achievement of their professional organisations and 
maintained their support and allegiance to them.
Between 1921 and 1956, the conditions of practice
which I have described earlier changed. The practice of dentistry
became gradually more sophisticated, public dental services developed
and state intervention increased financial access to the services of
dentists. These changes in a way confirmed in the eyes of dentists 
the need for strong professional associations. More than 8 ^  of
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dentists were private practitioners (10); they were subjected to 
increasing pressure occasioned by the need for greater investment in 
equipment to keep up with technological advances on the one hand and 
by the development of public dental services which many saw as a new 
form of competition on the other. They particularly rejected any 
idea of training new categories of personnel to provide oral care 
services.
This measure was advocated by those who though
that the needs of the British were too great to be met by fully
trained practitioners only. Their concern was enhanced by the
slow growth of the number of registered dentists and the rapid
ageing of the dental population. Between 1921 and 1925, 8455
unqualified practitioners were registered and the number of names
on the Dentists* Register rose from 585I at the end of 1921 to
14,199 at the end of 1925, an increase of l45^. In the following
thirty years, the number of dentists grew by only 11.9% to reach
15,895 at the end of 1955» As Table 1 shows, the growth, however
small, was steady until 1945 when the number of practitioners started
to fall for five consecutive years at the very time the need for
dentists was increasing because of the forthcoming NES. It has
gradually increased since 1957 to reach 21,257 iu 1980, the more
substantial increases having occurred since 1971*
TABLE 1
Registered Dentists in the United Kingdom, (1925-1955)
Year Number of Increase in % per
Registered Dentists period of 5 years
1925 14,199 ----------------
1930 14,422 + 2.8#
1935 14,505 + 0.5%
1940 15,032 + 3.5%
1945 15,422 + 2.6#
1950 15,327 - 0.6#
1955 15,895 + 3.7%
Source: The Dentists* Register, I98O.
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Between 1921 and 1951, the number of dentists grew
much more slowly than the population of the United Kingdom (7-9#
and 11# respectively; see table 2). Afterwards the number of
dentists increased proportionally more than the population,
bringing down the dentist-population ratio (11) from 1 dentist
per 5277 in 1951 (5185 in 1925) to 1 per 2758 in 1978 (12).
TABLE 2
Registered Dentists and Population (1925-1978) * (1925 = 100)
Year Registered Dentists Population
1925 100 100
1951 101.6 101.8
1941 105.9 106.6
1951 107.9 111.0
1961 114.4 116.5
1971 125.9 122.7
1978 142.8 123.4
* Last available population data are for 1978.
Source: The Dentists* Register, I98O, and Butler, D. and Sloman, A.,
British Political Facts, 1900-1979, 5th Ed., London, The 
MacMillan Press, I98O, p. 293•
Thus, the three decades which followed the closure 
of the profession in 1921 were a period of relative decline in the 
ratio of dentists to population. The explanation for this is twofold: 
the age structure of the profession showed an exaggerated concentration 
of dentists in the older age groups and recruitment was difficult.
The age problem was, of course, the result of the registration at the 
same time of more than 8OOO practitioners already in practice for at 
least five years, many.of them with the greatest part of their career 
already finished. The depletion of the ranks of the *1921 men* was 
bound to be more rapid than the addition of new names to.the register. 
Their number was reduced to 4698 in 1947 and to 2827 in 1956, when 
most of them were in their sixties (13).
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That would have sufficed to feed the argument 
tliat the profession was unable to meet the needs which ironically 
dentists themselves had overemphasised by stressing the alleged 
evils of oral sepsis. In addition, however, there were obvious 
difficulties in attracting new recruits to the profession. Before 
the war, the average intake of first-year students in dental 
schools was 340, 90# of whom would eventually register. This 
number fell to 300 during the war (l4); this could hardly 
suffice to maintain the existing number of practitioners let alone 
increase the availability of dental services to a level corresponding 
to the needs of the population. The Teviot Committee figured that an 
annual intake of 900 new students would be necessary in order to 
reach the number of 20,000 active dentists 20 years later, a target 
figure set in anticipation of the probable introduction of a 
comprehensive public dental service (13)•
After the war the number of places in dental schools 
was increased, but after exceeding 650 in 1947, the number of 
entrants diminished gradually (l6); in 1954, for example, there 
were only 495 first-year dental students to fill the 600 places in 
15 U.K. dental schools (17)• This situation caused great concern 
both in professional and government circles and in March 1955 a 
Committee on Recruitment to the Dental Profession, under the 
chairmanship of Lord McNair, was appointed to investigate the 
problem. By that time, there was a unanimous agreement that there 
was a shortage of dental manpower that was made even more disquieting 
by the difficulty of attracting young people to the profession. Such 
unanimity of opinion, however, had not been manifested earlier..
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Before compulsory registration, the inability of 
qualified dentists to meet the demand for oral care services was 
made plain by the sheer existence of thousands of unqualified 
practitioners. In the mid 1910*s, the first attempts to train 
dental dressers were, for the most part, motivated by the view 
that there was a shortage of dental manpower and that it was 
unlikely that sufficient supplies could be made available, at 
affordable costs, in the near future. From then on, the question 
of whether there was a shortage of dentists or not was sharply 
debated in the profession and in connected circles. Some 
argued that the needs of the population were almost infinite 
and that more personnel and more public dental services were needed 
(18) while others believed that there were plenty, if not too many 
dentists to meet the actual demand for dental services, which was 
growing only very slowly. The latter insisted that there was no 
clear demonstration of a shortage of dentists and that there were 
dentists who had difficulty in making a living (19).
In practical terms, the assessment of the desirable 
size of dental manpower was a difficult problem. In their evidence 
to the Teviot Committee dental associations warned the committee 
against increasing the number of dentists too rapidly and recommended 
that efforts to raise demand should first be made (20). The committee 
was sensitive to such arguments and proposed measures to gradually 
increase the number of dentists without upsetting the present 
situation. The committee recommended raising the number of places 
in dental schools and made suggestions to make the career of dentistry 
more attractive (21): as to the use of operative ancillâries, they
argued that any scheme in that direction should await proof of a 
shortage of dentists to work a comprehensive dental service (22).
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Such proof was soon to be provided by the long 
queues and by the depletion of the ranks of school dentists after 
the introduction of a general dental service in 1948, As we 
have seen in chapter 8 this shortage did not convince the 
profession of the necessity for operative ancillaries to supplement 
dentists in public services. Dentists insisted that the remedy to 
any shortage was the training of more dentists; as the President 
of the Dental Board put it in his comments on the Dentists Bill,
1951, if there was money for an experiment in the training of 
operative ancillaries, there must be some for the training of 
more dentists (23).
Later, the McNair Committee concerned itself mainly 
with the problem of recruitment after acknowledging the 'impressive 
evidence of shortage*. Among indicators of a shortage, the committee 
listed the pressure of work on dentists in general practice; the 
decline in the value of goodwill in general practice (because of 
the ease with which a young dentist could build up a successful 
practice); the difficulties in obtaining staff for the school 
dental service; the high salaries which assistants could obtain 
because they were so few; and the shortage of dentists in the 
armed forces (24). They also pointed to the average age of the 
*1921 men* which they estimated as 65* As to the causes of the 
shortage, they were seen to lie both in the attitudes of the 
public who put little value upon dental services and in the 
attitudes of dentists who were generally dissatisfied with their 
conditions of practice and who often 'would be unwilling to 
advise any young person to make dentistry his career* (25). The 
cost of training was also seen as a deterrent, especially in view 
of the limited rewards brought by dental practice (26). To these
- 272 -
factors militating against sufficient recruitment, the BDA had 
added, in its evidence to the committee, the possibility of the 
introduction of ancillary workers as a further contribution to 
the lowering of the status of dentistry; the physical and mental 
strain of dental practice; and the insecurity of general practice 
in the NHS following the cuts in the scale of fees (27).
The committee recommended organising programmes 
of dental health education so that the public could appreciate 
the value of dental health and the importance of the agencies 
through which dental services can be obtained. Other 
recommendations included publicity on dentistry as a career, 
recruitment of women (28) and a review of the whole system 
of remuneration in order to make dentistry a more secure and, 
thus, a more attractive profession (29).
Thus, after 1921, dentists felt that the reasons 
that had brought them to engage in collective action and to support 
professional associations were still valid. The concern for market 
security, which is pervasive in the debates on dental manpower, 
remained as strong as before unqualified practice was prohibited. 
They relied on their professional bodies to protect their 
occupational territory against any encroachment and to resist 
attempts to question the arrangements arrived at under the Dentists 
Act, 1921 and subsequent regulations.
Dentists had another good reason to keep up their 
support to their professional organisations. Because of the payment 
of dental benefits under the National Insurance Act, 1911, they now
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had to enter negotiations with Approved Societies on their scale 
of fees. There were also talks of establishing public dental 
services and many dentists felt that it was imperative to have 
strong organisations to represent their interests in discussions 
regarding the provision of oral care services. Although dentists 
remained divided in different associations for thirty years after 
1921, they,nevertheless,were fairly successful in attaining their 
professional objectives. Their market was considerably expanded, 
potential competition was efficiently contained and the profession 
obtained self-regulation privileges. I now turn to the factors 
that contributed to such success.
- THE ADVANCE OF THE DENTAL PROFESSION (1900-1957) -
The core of this thesis has been devoted to the 
reconstruction of the strategies devised by British dentists to 
foster their common interests and raisetheir status- First, I 
described how they formed associations which endeavoured to attract 
suitable members and amass sufficient financial resources to organise 
as credible and influential pressure groups. I also noted that in 
order to advance their claims to exclusivity of practice, dentists 
emphasised the 'scientific character' of the cognitive base of 
dentistry as well as the potential benefits which the nation could 
derive from their services. I showed too, how dentists, through 
their professional bodies, engaged in political action to seek 
modifications of the laws regulating the practice of dentistry.
After state recognition was achieved, dentists were 
in a particularly good position to influence policies of provision
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of oral care. In the years that followed the adoption of the 
Dentists Act, 1921, they successfully used their privileged 
position to check attempts to diversify sources of supply of 
dental care by creating new categories of personnel. They 
also campaigned for an expansion of public dental services and 
state insurance coverage of dental care provided by private 
practitioners. These objectives too,were gradually achieved and 
by 1947 the profession was largely in control of the dental 
health system.
Clearly, the collective strategies and actions 
devised and carried out by dental organisations were necessary for 
the process of professionalisation of dental services to occur.
However, dentists did not attain their objectives by their own 
deeds only. The claim that their services were valuable, even 
indispensable, and that no other group of persons could provide 
equivalent services had to be socially acceptable and remain so.
In sum, the social context in which the campaign for professionalisation 
of dentistry took place had to be favourable for the dentists* cause 
to have any chance of advancing. I suggest that the three factors I 
have already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter - growing 
social concern for health, changing state policies and lack of 
organised opposition - helped to create such a favourable social 
context.
- HEALTH AS A SOCIAL ISSUE _
At the turn of the century, the attention of the 
British to the poor physical condition of large sections of the 
population was dramatically attracted by the problems Britain
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experienced in the South Africa war. Weaknesses of all sorts were 
revealed by the war with the Boers and generated a deep concern 
for 'national efficiency*. A Royal Commission was appointed to 
investigate what had happened and turned out to be a painful 
post-mortem (30)» Chief among the weaknesses revealed was the 
poor physical condition of working-class men, a great proportion 
of whom had failed to meet the minimal requirements to be 
recruited by the armed forces.
The British were both puzzled and terrified by 
this discovery: 'because this was the first time in half a
century that large numbers of English males had been weighed, 
measured and tested for physical weakness, no one could be certain 
whether the conditions discovered were new, whether the unhealthiness 
was the result of an urban, industrial environment or of progressive 
racial degeneracy. But to a nation wedded as the British were to 
the idea that greatness and survival were symbolized by physical 
vigour, the apparent symptoms of national decline and racial decay 
were terrifying' (31).
An illustration of this argument is provided by a 
contemporary who wrote about 'Efficiency and Empire' at a time 
when Britain was experiencing great difficulties in South Africa: 
'...the physical condition of the town population of these islands 
is one that warrants the gravest alarm. If we continue for another 
twenty years as we are going on at the present time, there is little 
doubt that delicacy and infirmity of the race will then prove unequal 
to the maintenance of a great and growing empire. What was won by 
a hardy people, fed on their own beef and bread, will scarcely be 
held by invalids* (32).
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The Conservative government of the day was at 
first somewhat reluctant to listen to alarmist statements of 
this kind but nevertheless appointed an Interdepartmental 
Committee, in 1904, *to make a preliminary inquiry into the 
allegations concerning the deterioration of certain classes of 
the population as shown by the large percentage of rejections 
for physical causes of recruits for the army and by other 
evidence, especially the report of the Royal Commission on 
Physical Training (Scotland), (33) and to consider in what manner 
the medical profession can be best consulted on the subject with 
a view to the appointment of a Royal Commission, and the terms 
of reference of such a commission, if appointed' (34).
Those terms of reference were subsequently changed 
and references to 'allegations' were eliminated; the committee was 
instead asked 'to determine, with the aid of such counsel as the 
medical profession are able to give, the steps that should be 
taken to furnish the Government and the Nation at large with 
periodical data for an accurate comparative estimate of the health 
and physique of the people; to indicate generally the causes of 
such deterioration as does exist in certain classes; and to point 
out the means by which it can be most effectualy diminished* (33).
In its report, the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Physical Deterioration supported the 'allegations' concerning the 
poor health of a large section of the population and made numerous 
recommendations, the principal one being that the medical inspection 
of school children should be undertaken. Good health was defined 
as the principal asset of the nation, as the foundation, of its
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prosperity and as a necessary condition for its protection.
From then on, the attention paid to physical 
health, especially of school children, by the government grew 
steadily. In 1903» another Interdepartmental Committee reported 
on the medical inspection and feeding of children attending public 
elementary schools (36) and the Education (Administrative Provisions) 
Act, 1907 instituted medical inspection at the elementary school 
level.
At that time, the members of the Royal Commission 
on the Poor La.ws were debating 'medical relief' (37)* some of them, 
like Beatrice Webb, were advocating a national health service which 
would make medical aid available to all 'but with an obligation on 
the sick person to get well and stay healthy' (38). Although the 
Commission was divided and produced a Majority and Minority Report, 
both reports had in common that they linked poverty and destitution 
to sickness and ill-health. Further examples of the great interest 
in health related matters include the investigation into unqualified 
practice of medicine and surgery in I9IO (39) and the introduction 
of National Health Insurance in I9II. The war reactivated the concern 
for the physical condition of the nation and its capacity to provide 
healthy recruits.
As to dentistry itself, the war was instrumental in 
advancing its practitioners' case. First, thousands of people met a 
dentist for the first time in their life and were introduced to 
conservative dentistry. Second, some spectacular results were 
achieved by dental surgeons in the treatment of facial injuries, 
which developed as a sort of sub-specialism of dentistry and surgery.
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Thirdly, the war provided British dentists with opportunities to 
make contacts with foreign colleagues and to draw the attention 
of the public authorities to the legal provisions concerning 
dentistry in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the United States, where unregistered practice had been prohibited 
for several years.
Such examples, from other industrialised countries, 
including British Dominions, began to create a public concern about 
the unregulated practice of dentistry sind the need to increase the 
provision of dental services. In I916-I7, for the first time after 
years of indifference, the General Medical Council reacted favourably 
to a request of the BDA to intervene against unregistered practice 
when it adopted a resolution calling on the Privy Council for an 
inquiry into dentistry. The Council's recommendation was accepted 
and the move to state intervention initiated. Support also came 
from the Ivory Cross, which after having started as a charity with, 
the object of enabling recruits and soldiers to receive dental 
treatment from qualified dentists, survived after the war as a 
dental aid society. It brought support from influential upper class 
groups to the BDA's claims (40); such an endorsement would have 
been more difficult to obtain in peace time.
In the first decades of this century, people came 
to expect more state action in the field of health (4l), even if 
the facts did not entirely support the allegation that the physical 
state of the British people was deteriorating (42). Thus, when 
the report of the Acland Committee on Dentistry was published, the 
press was almost unanimous in calling for immediate state intervention 
both to eliminate unqualified practice and to establish proper dental
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services for the population (43). This attitude is to be contrasted 
with the apparent lack of public interest when the National Insurance 
Bill was first introduced in 1911. Sir George Newman recalled: ...
when the National Insurance Bill was in Parliament, one circumstance 
was unusual. It lacked public support...for then there was no definite 
electoral demand for the Bill. The Cabinet, the House of Commons, and 
the public had to be persuaded that the Bill was necessary. No 
substantial public opinion had been created or aroused in favour of 
such a measure* (44). Such public opinion was however created and 
the foundations for a national health insurance service laid.
The creation of the Ministry of Health in 1919 confirmed 
that health had become an important social and political issue. In its 
1926 report, the Royal Commission on National Insurance clearly stated 
that only financial considerations prevented the establishment of a 
comprehensive National Health Service. By the time Sir William Beveridge 
advocated such a service, the matter was considered as almost above 
party politics. The Times wrote: 'Sir William Beveridge has succeeded 
in crystallising the vague but keenly felt aspirations of millions of 
people' (43). The report was a great success with the public and despite 
a rather cold reception by the Government of Winston Churchil (46) it 
became the basis for the Coalition Government's health and social services 
policies.
Later during the General Election campaign of 1943» most 
of Beveridge's proposals were incorporated in the policies of the 
Conservative and Labour parties and Beveridge himself stood as a Liberal 
candidate. Although parties disagreed as to the means of reforming 
health services, they broadly agreed on the objective of establishing a 
National Health Service and in the end, public health matters raised 
much less controversy than other issues (47).
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In short , although dental health never became 
a central issue for either the public or the government, the 
general concern for health which gradually developed created a 
context in which dentists* claims seemed plausible and state 
intervention reasonable. The dental profession produced a 
discourse and projected a public image that fitted the ideological 
context well enough to make its own occupational objectives 
acceptable- V/hat was left, however,was to have them accepted by 
the state which is the source of all legal occupational privileges.
- THE CmiiGING ROLE OF THE STATE IN HEALTH SERVICES -
The translation of new ideas into public policies 
and new social institutions is never immediate. Although one can 
point to a number of government actions in the field of public 
health in the second half of the 19th century, such as the Vaccination 
Act, 1833,the Public Health Acts of I87I and I873 aud a series of 
Factory Acts to protect the health of workers (48), in I9OO 
there was still much resistance to state involvraent in health on a 
large scale. In a society where policies of 'laissez-faire* were 
still dominant, social reformers had difficulty in gaining sufficient 
support for their ideas and policies to see them implemented. Also, 
as one analyst noted: 'the continued increase in national wealth 
was an indispensable prerequisite for the elaboration of more 
enlightened policies. It is difficult to see how, in the absence of 
this crucial factor, the acquiescence of a tax paying and rate paying 
electorate could have been won, in a society in which hostility to 
interference and to the extension of government spending was still 
very far from dead* (49)-
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The shock of the Boer war, however, created a 
new atmosphere (30) and soon a new era of state intervention in 
relief services was inaugurated. The recommendations of the 
Committee on Physical Deterioration led to the Education (Provision 
of Meals) Act, I906 and to the Education (Administrative Provisions) 
Act, 1907 which established the foundations of the School Medical 
Service. In I908, the Old Age Pensions Act was passed but it is 
really the National Insurance Act, I9II which was the crucial 
landmark in the history of health legislation. This measure was 
introduced by Lloyd George, who had been impressed by public health 
policies in Germany and travelled there to see what Britain could 
learn from them. His scheme was revolutioneiry for the times and 
raised great opposition from groups with an interest in maintaining 
the 'status-quo*, such as doctors. Approved Societies, Insurance 
Companies. The public was more sympathetic, in general, and the 
National Insurance Bill went through Parliament after six months 
of intense debate and negotiation (31).
The consequences of this legislation on health 
services were to be far-reaching. Despite its limited scope, the 
establishment of a National Health Insurance scheme was bound to 
highlight the limitations of existing services as well as the great 
needs of certain categories of people. After a few years, it led 
to greater expectations among its beneficiaries as well 6s in the 
population at large. Soon the main deficiencies of the NHI became 
apparent: dependents of the insured were not included nor were
the self-employed; there were no provisions for hospitalisation, 
for specialist services, for nursing after-care, for x-ray diagnosis, 
for orthopedic appliances or for artificial limbs; there was little
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uniformity between the services made available by different 
Approved Societies; and above all the system was very complex 
and difficult to administer (32).
These shortcomings were acknowledged by the 
Royal Commission on NHI in 1926, but little was done to change 
the system in the following years as confirmed by Political and 
Economic Planning’s Report on the British Health Services, in 
1937 (33). By then, both the public and health professionals 
were dissatisfied with the system and when the war came public 
opinion was expecting some form of action from the government.
Pressure was also coming from within health services for change. 
Voluntary hospital costs were rising faster than their incomes 
and the waste resulting from competition between them and the 
local authority hospital sector became more obvious. The developments 
of medical technology and knowledge required more and more sophisticated 
and costly equipment; new paramedical occupations were also developing 
rapidly in the wake of scientific advances with the result that 
traditional sources of revenue (private payments, philanthropy, rates) 
were unable to cope with the requirements of modern medicine.
After 1911, pressure grew for more state involvement 
in the provision of health services. On the other hand, the financial 
resources to respond favourably to public demand were not readily 
available. The First World War and its aftermath drew heavily on 
the Exchequer. So when the Acland Committee recommended the 
establishment of a public dental service in 1919, the Government’s 
reply was that there were no funds available for such a purpose (34).
The same argument led to the shelving of the Dawson Report which 
recommended the creation of health centres in 1920 (33). In 1926,
The Royal Commission on the NHI, while stating that a more
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comprehensive health service should be instituted, again pointed 
to the lack of financial resources to expand the National Health 
Insurance scheme (36). The following decade was one of economic 
turmoil; the agreement on the need for more and better health 
services grew but little was done until the end of the Second 
World War. Even the Labour Party, which had among its policies 
the establishment of a National Health Service as early as 1918,
(37), was unable to act during its term in office. But at least 
over the years the consensus had build up that the state had a 
crucial role to play in providing for the health care of the nation. 
The ideological foundations of the NHS were laid.
Between 1900 and 1946, the role of the state in
health services changed from one of almost total non-intervention
or of piecemeal regulation of a number of areas and services to one 
of planning and instituting a comprehensive health service to attend 
to the needs of everyone ’from the cradle to the grave’. The campaign 
for the prohibition of unregistered practice in dentistry, therefore, 
coincided with the time when the state was expanding its regulatory 
functions. The adoption of the Dentists Act, 1921 can be seen as a 
good deal for both the Government and the dentists. The former was 
able to settle a long standing conflict at little cost while being
seen as acting to improve the provision of dental care. The Act
involved no public expenditure and it had been accepted by both 
sections of the profession prior to its adoption, so that there were 
virtually no political costs, only gains. As to dentists, they 
obtained what they had struggled for, namely the prohibition of 
unregistered practice and a quasi-monopoly of the provision of 
dental services.
- 284 -
Given the economic situation in the period that 
followed the Dental Act, dentistry could hardly be expected to 
become a priority. There was no ’dental policy' as such and 
successive Ministers of Health were careful not to reopen the 
issue of unregistered practice. This attitude of the authorities 
contributed to the success of the profession’s efforts to contain 
attempts to create new categories of personnel that could compete 
with dentists in private practice. Between 1921 and 1946 when the 
state started to play a more active role in dental care services, 
the profession was able to build defences against threats to what 
they considered as their legitimate territory. For example, the 
profession managed to have a strong representation on the Teviot 
Committee on dentistry whose report was to serve as a basis for 
the Ministry of Health’s dental policies. In the end, although 
dentists had to make a number concessions during the negotiations of 
the dental aspects of the NHS, the terms on which they settled were 
largely favourable from their point of view, as we have seen.
It can be argued that the state engaged in the 
planning and organisation of dental services too slowly and too 
late to challenge effectively the dominance of dentists over the 
field of oral care. By the 1940’s, dentistry had become a well- 
structured profession. Its members were university trained, state 
registered and organised in strong pressure groups. Dental benefits 
were institutionalised and the state had little choice but to take 
into account the existing pattern in devising dental policies. 
Dentists were now a force to be reckoned with.
During the period I have studied the profession’s 
attitudes to state action in dentistry changed radically. At first.
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dentists campaigned for public dental services and appealed for 
legislation in favour of qualified practitioners. In 1921, they 
welcomed both the new Dental Act and the payment of dental 
benefits under the National Health Insurance scheme. They even 
pressed for the extension of the coverage and for the benefit to 
be made statutory. However, when the state considered going 
further than just financing services and took steps to rationalise 
the delivery system by introducing new classes of providers of 
care, the profession felt threatened and turned against state 
intervention. At the time of the inception of the NHS, dentists* 
attitudes became ambivalent: the leadership remained hostile to
the Government's plans, but the rank-and-file members were lured 
by the prospects of financial security in the Minister of Health* s 
proposals. A few years later, when further proposals to introduce 
operative ancillaries were made, the profession shifted back to 
hostility to state policies. Since then, its policy has been to try 
to protect and augment the gains of a state dental service and 
at the same time combat state initiatives in the reorganisation of 
dental services that would weaken the profession's control of the 
field of oral care.
- THE ABSENCE OF EFFICIENT OPPOSITION TO DENTISTS' OCCUPATIONAL CLAIMS -
The third factor which favoured the emergence of 
a dominant dental profession was the absence of organised opposition 
to dentists' claims and actions from potential competitors. During 
the formative years of the profession, the greatest potential threat 
to its independent development was the medical profession. Doctors 
could well have claimed that the care of the teeth was within the 
scope of their functions and that there was no need for a separate
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occupation to provide dental care. Instead the medical profession, 
with the exception of the Association of Surgeons Practising 
Dental Surgery which fought the adoption of the Dentists Act, I878, 
showed little interest in oral care. At first, teeth were 
considered as unimportant and tooth pulling a trade not medical 
work. Later, when the BDA developed on professional lines, dentistry 
began to be seen with more sympathy. For example, at the beginning 
of the century, the British Medical Association tried to help the 
BDA's efforts to obtain legislative changes by including clauses 
concerning dentistry in a draft Bill which the Association was 
promoting. At about the same time, the oldest dental organisation, 
the Odontological Society of Great Britain became the Odontology 
Section of the Royal Society of Medicine.
There was also the example of other english-speaking 
countries, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
where dentistry had grown harmoniously beside medicine. British 
doctors had little interest in dental practice - which nothing 
prevented them from practising anyi\ray - and they did not object to 
dentists' plans to take control of oral care. Clearly, they would 
have been in a position of force to resist the dental profession's 
advance, but they did not engage in such opposition. Their 
acceptance or at least their indifference to the dentists' 
professionalisation drive increased its chances of success.
By the turn of the century, the main opposition to 
qualified dentists came from those whom they wanted to exclude from 
the field of dental care. I showed in part II hovf the IDS, in 
particular, forced the BDA to compromise on the issue of unregistered
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practice. But I have also noted that on the whole, there was 
agreement between all sections of the profession that unqualified 
practice should be banned and the status of dentistry raised.
Thus, the advance of the profession was never really threatened 
by the opposition of the IDS and other societies of unregistered 
practitioners.
In the 1920's and 1930's, the main source of 
potential challenge to dentists' dominance came from dental 
technicians. There were precedents of technicians being allowed 
to perform extractions, use anaesthetics and take impressions 
(in Czechoslovakia) (3&) and of state registration of dental 
technicians (in South Africa) (39). Moves in that direction were 
made in the early 1930's by a Society of Prosthetic Dentists which 
at some point claimed 3000 members (6O). The Society wanted to 
raise the social status of technicians by improving their 
qualifications and campaigning for state registration. From the 
start, this latter task seemed virtually impossible. First, only 
a small number of technicians, approximately 3/° iri 1931 and 6% 
in 1931 (61), were self-employed; the others were either employed 
by a dentist or worked in public services or, as was the case for 
the majority of them, in a commercial laboratory. There were 
between 3OO and 400 dental laboratories of various size in England 
according to the Dental Laboratories Section of the Surgical 
Instruments Manufacturers Association which claimed to represent 
7O/& - 80?o of them (62). Thus the class of technicians to whom 
professionalisation was more likely to appeal, i.e., the independent 
practitioners, represented only a minute fraction of the craft.
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Secondly, the knowledge base which dental 
technicians could point to to justify their claim to professional 
status was rapidly waning. As the Committee of Inquiry into the 
conditions of work of dental mechanics stated in its 1940 report,
'in recent years the introduction of mass production mechanical 
dentistry has almost completely destroyed the need for the 
generalised skill which existed previously * (63)- Opposition 
to dentists' claim to sole control of oral care services could 
hardly come from an occupational group engaged in a process of 
deskilling.
Later, other associations made attempts to break 
the dental profession's monopoly, but they failed to get support 
from technicians themselves. Only a small minority seemed attracted 
by a strategy of professionalisation. Instead, many technicians 
joined trade unions which concentrated on improving the working 
conditions and financial circumstances of their members without 
challenging the dental profession's authority (64). Predictably, 
dentists preferred to see technicians join trade unions instead 
of professional societies and encouraged the former. Although 
there are intermittently signs of a professionalisation movement 
among technicians, they have so far been kept in the role of 
subordinates to dentists.
Whereas dental technicians failed repeatedly to 
obtain state support, dental hygienists and operative auxiliaries 
were occupational groups created by the state. Theoretically they 
represented a greater challenge to dentists than, did technicians. 
However, neither group ever mounted any organised opposition to
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dentists' dominance of the field of oral health. Dental 
hygienists were, at first, trained in the armed forces where 
they could not organise. For a number of years too, they 
were allowed to practise only in public services where they 
depended on dentists to get access to patients. Far from 
challenging dentists, they tried to convince them that they had 
nothing to fear from hygienists and that, on the contrary, their 
work in arousing interest in oral health would increase the 
demand for dentistry (63). When an association of hygienists 
was formed in 1949, it sought the patronage of the dental 
profession and for a number of years, its president was a 
dentist (66).
Operative auxiliaries' functions were restricted 
by regulation before the first students started their training. 
Their practice was also confined to public services and, over 
the years, their number was kept low despite recommendations 
to train more of them. The creation of this new class of dental 
operators caused great controversy and the small number of 
auxiliaries in practice have been careful not to aggravate the 
profession's opposition by claiming more autonomy or expanded 
functions, nor has the state made serious attempts to alter their 
conditions of practice.
Finally, there were dental surgery assistants, but 
there was very little they could have done to endanger the dentists' 
position. Before the 1930*s, there were no training schools for 
assistants and they were trained by the dentists who employed them. 
Later, when courses for surgery assistants were instituted, it was
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under the aegis of the dental profession which controlled the 
curriculum. As in the case of hygienists, the first professional 
organisation of assistants was initiated by a dentist and 
presided over by dentists for a number of years. Assistants were at 
pains to assure dentists that they had no intention of taking 
up operative work (6?) and good relations with the dental profession 
were established. Assistants clearly fall into the category of 
auxiliary occupations described by Freidson as 'subordinate in 
authority and responsibility* because they derive their legitimacy 
from another occupation and have little if any prospect of 
becoming autonomous (68).
In sum, none of the occupations that could have 
been expected to have an interest in breaking dentists' control of 
the work structure in oral care was able or willing to organise 
to oppose the dental profession's advance. Although it is difficult 
to speculate on the effects of such opposition, it is not unthinkable 
that the work structure through which dental services are provided 
at present could be quite different if dentists' claims had been 
seriously challenged.
- OCCUPATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PROCESS OF PROFESSIONALISATION -
My objective here is to review the role of 
occupational pressure groups in the process of professionalisation.
At the beginning of the thesis, I stated that I did not see the 
process of professionalisation only as a process leading to the 
legal recognition of an occupation's claim to the exclusive right 
to perform certain tasks. Along with Freidson, (69) I suggested 
that an occupation's position of dominance was dependent on the
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continuous support of a clientele and of the state and was unlikely 
to remain unchallenged by competitors and subordinates. Thus, my 
definition of professionalisation is one of a continuous process 
whereby a group of persons performing a more or less discrete set 
of tasks endeavour to gain and thereafter maintain control over 
their area of work and its related institutions and occupations. 
Historically, they formed associations that turned to the state, 
as the main source of legitimacy and power, to obtain privileges 
such as the monopoly of a titleor, better, the monopoly of practice; 
they also pressed to be recognised as the legitimate source of 
advice on public policy in the area they concerned themselves with.
Formal recognition obviously brings many advantages 
to the professionalising group in terms of prestige, access to 
financial resources and to clients; it also creates a vested 
interest for its members. At the same time, it puts the occupation 
in a better position to defend itself against potential challenges.
It is not a guarantee, however, that a position of dominance will be 
retained indefinitely. The cognitive and technical basis of the 
occupation may become obsolete; or the state, as in the case of 
British dentistry, may attempt to recover part of the control over 
an area of work and to have a greater say in its development; or 
the professionals* clients may wish to exercise more control of 
their activities or may be willing to entrust their needs to other 
groups of practitioners (70). Clearly the process of professionalisation 
is one that can be reversed and professional organisations are usually 
the bodies which professionals mandate to see that deprofessionalisation 
does not occur.
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Thus, the student of professions should pay equal 
attention to the process through which professional dominance 
is achieved and to that through which the advantages of monopoly 
and dominance are retained and even enhanced. Here I have 
attempted to demonstrate that the role of professional 
organisations in both processes is of foremost importance. It 
is they who engage in the pursuit of monopoly and who design 
and carry out the strategies which they hope will lead to 
professional status. Their first task is to establish and 
maintain the credibility and legitimacy of their claims to it.
They must demonstrate that the services their members offer are 
both useful and necessary and that they are competent to provide 
them. They usually emphasise the cognitive basis of their services 
to justify the need for formal training and by the same token the 
exclusion of unqualified practitioners. The existence of a 
cognitive basis, rather than its validity,has to be stressed as 
is shown by the story of the theory of 'oral sepsis* in dentistry. 
Once training is organised, it is easier to point to the uniqueness 
of the skills of the members of the occupation. All that is left 
is to convince the public that the commitment of the members of the 
professionalising group to the welfare of their clients takes 
precedence over the pursuit of their self-interest. Then, if the 
occupational association manages to obtain legislative recognition, 
the assumption that its members perform an important social 
function and that there is no suitable alternative to their services 
must be constantly kept credible. Hence the need for professions 
to reformulate and adapt their ideology and discourse to changing 
circumstances.
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I hold that, historically, professional organisations 
have acted as pressure groups whose aim was to advance politically 
what their members considered as their common interests (which 
professionals usually argue are at one with the public's). To 
do so they tried to amass financial, human and political resources 
in order to pursue their ends. They also produced appropriate 
ideologies directed to their members as well as to the public to 
support their claims to exclusivity. In the few cases where 
the state allowed the creation of occupational monopolies, the 
role of professional organisations as pressure groups did not 
die out but rather changed as their prime objective became the 
protection of vested interests against encroachments by competitors, 
subordinates or the state. In medicine and dentistry, the technical 
developments of the last fifty years and the growth in the demand 
for health services have made the control of the division of labour 
the main issue that professional organisations have to deal with.
I do not deny that professional organisations acted 
in capacities other than that of an interest group. For instance, 
they have been concerned with the scientific advance of their 
discipline, through such activities as publishing academic papers in 
their journals, holding scientific sessions at their meetings and 
organising a library. They pay attention to their members' welfare 
by instituting insurance and pensions schemes to improve the 
availability of services, they sponsor inquiries and they campaign 
in the media to inform the public on specific problems or issues.
All these actions, however well intentioned, make sense only in 
the context of the pursuit of professional objectives. It is 
doubtful whether professional organisations would keep or would
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have had in the first place the support of substantial numbers 
of practitioners if their commitment to the professionalisation 
of their occupation had been or would have become second to 
their commitment to more altruistic objects. There are always 
tensions among members of professional organisations as to what 
their priorities should be, but whenever their professional 
status is threatened the probability that a majority support 
the primacy of protecting professional interests is great.
That is not to say that professionals mislead the public when 
they present altruistic pledges, but simply that their collective 
behaviours, particularly in crisis situations, do not differ 
very much from that of other economic interest groups. Their 
altruism has limits and is not unrelated to the promotion of 
the interests of the profession and its members.
- POLICY IMPLICATIONS -
The obvious question raised by the study of 
professionalisation in terms of policy implications, is whether 
society benefits or not from professionalism. There is a long 
tradition in sociology that attributes great virtues to 
professionalism as raising the standards of practice, safeguarding 
the public interest and having a regulatory function in society (71)• 
More recently, however, sociologists have tended to claim that the 
benefits of professionalism have never been properly assessed and 
are more likely to be nothing but a myth invented by professionals 
themselves to justify their privileges (72).
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It is difficult to judge the impact of 
professionalism on a field like dental services and to make 
an overall assessment of its value for the public. As far 
as the standards of training and practice are concerned, there 
is little doubt that the public is better served now than,
before 1921 and that the prohibition of unregistered practice
has reduced the risks of malpractice. But there is still much 
to be done before the public is guaranteed safe and high quality 
services by any practitioner; the lack of training in the 
administration of general anaesthetics and the absence of checks 
on dentists as to the updating of their knowledge are only two 
examples of potential dangers to the public.
Those who oppose professionalism have often pointed to 
the disadvantages of restrictive practices in terms of the restricted 
availability of services and their higher costs. As to the
first point, it is clear that the British dental profession has
played the dominant role in preventing the increase of the 
volume of dental services by its opposition to the use of ancillary 
personnel. There is a large amount of evidence that shows that 
the volume of dental services can safely be increased by the 
use of auxiliary personnel trained to perform simple prophylactic 
and operative functions (73). From the beginning of this century, 
however, the profession has refused its cooperation and it can be 
argued that their resistance to delegation has had negative effects 
on the availability of services, especially preventive and routine 
treatment services, as well as on the overall cost of dental 
services (74). On the latter point, the argument is twofold; first, it
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has limited competition over prices; and secondly, the restriction 
of the use of ancillaries has reduced the possibilities of early 
treatment thereby increasing the cost of treatment when people 
present themselves to the dentist at a later stage with greater 
needs.
The creation of a monopoly in dentistry was 
intended as a measure to guarantee that only competent persons 
would, in the future, undertake to provide dental care. Whether 
this has been achieved is debatable as shown in a recent report on 
dental education in Britain (73), although, arguably, there has 
been a considerable improvement in the practice of dentistry.
The social costs, however, have been important; valuable 
alternatives to dentists* services have not been properly explored, 
prevention has been neglected and the creation of vested interests 
has reduced the number of policy options that could help bring the 
dental health of the population up to a reasonable level-
That is not to say that professionalism should be . 
rejected altogether to leave the way open to free competition as 
suggested by liberal economists or to be replaced by stringent 
government controls of practice. The public can benefit from 
the profession's effort to display altruism and to raise the 
ethical standards of their members. Similarly, self-regulation 
and autonomy can be valuable features of professional practice so 
long as they serve to further the interests of the consumers of 
health services. What is needed is a set of criteria to define 
how professions can best protect the public. It is a risky policy 
to entrust the health needs of the population to professionals and
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not make them accountable. The licensing of a professional at 
the beginning of his career is not a guarantee that ten or 
twenty years later his knowledge and techniques will not be 
outdated, that he will make sure that the equipment he uses 
is still safe, and so on.
Ways of safeguarding the public interest without 
unduly impinging on professional autonomy can certainly be 
devised. For example, it could be made a duty of professional 
councils to make sure that registered practitioners attend 
refresher and further education courses, and that practice 
premises and equipment meet the standards- Discipline could be 
enforced in a more active manner, for example by visits to 
practitioners at regular intervals of say three or five years, 
rather than waiting for patients' complaints before initiating 
an inquiry. licences could be made renewable every five years 
or so rather than be granted for life, and so on. All these 
measures could be made the responsibility of the profession itself 
and the Government could limit its role to supervising its 
activities and intervening only when the profession fails its 
duties. Such proposals should be acceptable to persons whose 
fundamental claim is that their foremost concern is the welfare 
of their clients. The state could also make it clear that 
professional privileges mufd be deserved and that it is up to 
professionals themselves to demonstrate that the public really 
benefits from professionalism. Their failure to do so should 
then lead to other forms of control of professional practice.
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- DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH -
Although sociologists have been interested in 
the role of professions in society for many decades and a good 
deal of theoretical effort has been made to account for their 
emergence, comparatively little empirical research has been made 
on the historical development of professions. In the health 
field, medicine and nursing have received most of the attention 
and it is only recently that so-called para-medical groups have 
come to interest sociologists. I suggest that the study of the 
origins of professionalism and of its impact on the division of 
labour in health services would gain much from the investigation 
of the emergence of para-medical groups and of the history of 
their relationships with the medical profession. Similarly, 
the study of failed attempts to gain recognition, like those of 
the osteopaths, herbalists, dental dressers and others, should be 
undertaken to provide comparative data.
Cross-national comparisons would also enable us 
to point to the conditions in which the process of professionalisation 
is more likely to occur. The case of dentistry provides a 
particularly interesting field of research in that respect; just 
to take western countries, one can observe striking national 
differences. Whereas the profession developed independently of 
medicine in many countries in the nineteenth century, in Britain 
it became fully autonomous only in 1956 and in a few countries, 
like Italy, it remained a specialism of medicine and had no. 
separate development. In North America, the use of ancillary
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personnel like hygienists and so-called 'expanded-duties assistants', 
has been a feature of dental practice for decades, while Britain 
has a long tradition of opposition to ancillaries of any kind. 
Furthermore, dental specialisms are almost unknown in Britain and 
continental Europe while one dentist in ten in America is a 
specialist.
As concerns the specific issue of the impact of 
professionalism on the division of labour in health, in addition 
to the role of professional pressure groups, attention should be 
paid to such factors as the role of trade unions, the increasing 
bureaucratization of health services and the pressures of consumerism. 
Trade unions often succeed in establishing occupational monopolies 
similar to that of professionals; the tasks their members are 
allowed to perform are strictly defined, encroachments are fought 
and work flexibility is often made impossible by restrictive practices. 
State intervention in the organisation of health services has brought 
in new rules and procedures which often lead to a tightening of 
occupational boundaries so that administrative responsabilities are 
more clear-cut. Finally, consumers' demands can play a crucial role 
in altering the division of labour as in the case of dental 
technicians who as 'denturists' now practise independently in many 
American states and Canadian provinces after public campaigns against 
dentists' high charges for dentures. The recognition of chiropractors 
in U.S.A. and Canada came when it became obvious that the demand for 
their services was so great that it was politically almost impossible 
to deny them any longer the right to practise.
Professionalisation is a dynamic political process 
which plays as great a role in the process of the division of labour
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in health services as does the development of knowledge and 
technology. As such it contributes to the shaping of health 
services and determines, to a large extent, how people’s needs 
are to be defined and catered for. Thus it should not be left 
unscrutinized by those who have at heart the establishment of 
efficient and effective health services.
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V.Z., 'The Making of the Dental Profession in Britain', 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, vol. 37, 10 
(part 1); (October 1964): 922. Cope's list includes 'Dental 
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(The annual subscription was 1 guinea)
Source: Balance Sheet of the BDA, 1884-1900.
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in U.S.A. (1830-1900):
1830 = 2923 
i860 = 3606 
1870 = 7839 
1880 = 12314 
1890 = 17498 
1900 = 29663
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(12) For example, in his 1903 Report, Butterfield wrote that the 
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represented a powerful ally should it be necessary to overcome 
the schemes of those who were desirous of destroying the 
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their legitimate calling'; 'The September Meeting', The Mouth 
Mirror, vol. 1,5; (December 1903): 263.
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(October 1908): 339-360.
(l4) The Lords ruled that 'there is nothing in the [jDentist0 
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C.J.S., op. cit., p. 313»
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a new society, to be called "The British Dental Union".
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insist once and for all, upon the removal of the obstacles in 
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vol. IV, 294; (June I9IO): 351-333-
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of the Council 'to enquire into the Extent and Gravity of the 
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(published by the NDA), vol. 4,23; (December 1920): 288,
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(June 1906): 379-381.
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on the Practice of Dentistry by Chemists', The Dental Surgeon, 
vol. XVI, 749; (March 1919): 66.
(23) The Dentists Act, 1921, clause 1, (3) b.
(24) A leading member of the BDA in a paper read in 1903, said 
that the Association was 'conducted... in a haphazard, 
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(l) Oliver, J.C., 'Valedictory Address', Journal of the British 
Dental Association, vol. XXI, 11; (November I^ÜÔ/: 66?.
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PART IV: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 9; PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE ADVANCE OF THE 
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APPENDIX I
Number of Registered Dentists (United Kingdom), I879-I98O 
and Proportion of Qualified Dentists.
Year N. of Registered 
Dentists
% of Qualified 
Dentists
1879
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1941
1931
1961
1971
1980
5289
4817
4309
4883
3610
14422
13096
13327
16279
17398
21237
9.1#
23.4#
40.8#
64.0#
80.1#
49.6#
Not available
73.1#
90.0^
97.8% 
99.6%
Source: The Dentists' Registers.
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APPENDIX II
Membership of the British Dental Association. l880-198o
Year N. of Members # of Names on the Register
1880 232 4.7#
1891 803 16.7#
1901 1184 26.3#
1911 1933 40.0#
1921 3103 35.3#
1931 4101 28.3# (1)
1941 3042 33.3#
1931 12074 78.8# (2)
1961 10382 63.7#
1971 12118 68.8#
1980 12280 34.9#
Source: Annual Reports of the Representative Board of the
British Dental Association.
(1) Following the addition of the names of more than 8,000
unregistered practitioners to the Register (as a result 
of the Dentists Act, 1921), the BDA's representation 
dropped from 33# to less than 23#. The other main dental 
organisation, the Incorporated Dental Society raised its 
membership from 1,600 at the time of the Dentists Act, 1921 
to about 3,800 in 1931-
(2) The large increase between 1941 and 1931 is due both to
the rapid growth of the BDA during the pre-NHS years eind 
to the amalgamation of the BDA, the IDS and the PDSA. The 
IDS brought approximately 5,300 members to the BDA which 
had about 8,200 members at the time of amalgamation. As 
to the PDSA most of its members were already members of one 
of the other associations.
